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THE
EXPANSION OF
THE BRITISH EMPIRE

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A SHORT HISTORY
OF
THE EXPANSION OF
THE BRITISH EMPIRE

1500—1870

BY
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PREFACE.

THIS History is not a 'Manual,' *i.e.*, a digest of the general body of facts relative to Colonial history. Events have been dwelt upon, or passed over, as they serve, or do not serve, to illustrate the broad underlying principles which from time to time governed British Expansion. A manual of information makes a bad text-book for a student. For the right kind of text-book should aim at something beyond storing the mind with facts: *viz.*, at stimulating the reader to further enquiry, and at guiding him in the classification of his material and in framing conclusions about it. History-teaching is barren if this threefold result has not been attained.

Further, the mental discipline which History affords may be better derived from the earlier rather than the later epochs; in our subject, from the period of struggle and experiment rather than the age of full achievement and fruition. The story of the American Colonies, though we lost them, is in this way more instructive than the orderly progress of Australia. For real insight into motives and forces the Elizabethan time, perhaps, has merits which the Victorian age lacks.

Hence I have refrained of set purpose from bringing down the narrative to the present day. But in thus deciding I have had perforce to devise a *terminus ad quem* of my own: and this, obviously, should vary with the circumstances of

the individual possessions. For instance, the great formative epoch of Indian history closed in 1858; my story stops there: of Canada, in 1867; of Australia, with the grant of Responsible Government. What is dealt with of later date is mainly—not always—the formal rounding off of events already determined, like the Proclamation of 1877 in India, or the grant of full autonomy to Natal or West Australia.

This book is not intended for young students alone. It would be well if a narrative of the rise of our Empire were needed only by them. No civilised country treats its national history with such scant regard as Englishmen. It surprises foreigners to see how phlegmatically we ignore the story of the growth of our great dominion, an unconcern which reacts inevitably upon our schools of all types and grades. If Germany, for instance, had such a history as ours it would be the central subject round which all their national education would revolve.

It is to be understood that the subject-matter of the present book should be read in conjunction with a good general history of England. It has been assumed that the main thread of our history has been fairly grasped; only in this way could the work have been kept within its present compass.

I have to acknowledge the kindness of Messrs Macmillan in permitting me to use the map of 'New France and the American Colonies' from Prof. Parkman's *Montcalm and Wolfe*, and of Sir H. H. Johnston in permitting the use of one of the maps in his *Colonization of Africa* in the preparation of my map of 'British Africa in 1899.'

LIVERPOOL,

October, 1899.

Books recommended for Study.

The following Works—all readily accessible—are suggested for the use of Students desirous of extending their reading upon the subject of the present volume.

Lucas: *Historical Geography of the British Colonies.*

Seeley: *Expansion of England.*

Egerton: *Short History of British Colonial Policy.*

Mahan: *The Influence of Sea-Power upon History.*

The Colonial Office List: issued yearly.

Corbett: *Drake and the Tudor Navy.*

Doyle: *The English in America.*

Parkman: *The Old Régime in Canada.*

„ *Montcalm and Wolfe.*

Greswell: *History of the Dominion of Canada.*

Lucas: *Historical Geography* (as above). Vol. II. gives the best available account of West Indian history.

Lecky: *History of England in the 18th Century*, especially chapters xii, xiv, and xv, dealing with the Revolt of the American Colonies, 1764—1783.

Goldwin Smith: *The United States: an Outline of Political History.*

Johnston: *The Colonization of Africa.* Cambridge, 1899.

Lucas: *Historical Geography* (as above). Vol. IV. is the best authority on South African history.

Bryce: *Impressions of South Africa.*

Jenks: *The History of the Australasian Colonies*. Cambridge, 1896.

Hunter: *History of British India* (in course of issue).

„ *The Indian Empire*: a valuable account of India, its history and administration.

Owen: *A Selection from the Despatches of the Marquis Wellesley*: with Introduction and Notes.

Elphinstone: *The Rise of the British Power in the East*.

Holmes: *History of the Indian Mutiny*.

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A TABLE OF THE MORE IMPORTANT DATES IN THE HISTORY OF THE EMPIRE.

- 1492 Columbus discovers the Western Continent.
- 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas.
- 1497 John Cabot discovers Newfoundland.
- 1498 Vasco da Gama reaches India.
- 1521 Conquest of Mexico by Cortez.
- 1534 Jacques Cartier first explores the St Lawrence.
- 1553 English adventurers in Muscovy.
- 1562 First voyage of John Hawkins to the West Indies.
- 1580 Drake returns from his voyage round the world.
- 1583 Gilbert takes formal possession of Newfoundland.
- 1585 Raleigh founds colony of Virginia.
- 1588 The defeat of the Armada.
- 1600 Charter of the East India Company.
- 1606-7 First charter of the Virginia Company.
- 1612 Factory of East India Company established at Surat.
- 1620 Settlement of Plymouth by the Pilgrim Fathers.
- 1624-5 Barbados settled.
- 1624 Virginia becomes a royal colony.
- 1629 Settlement of Massachusetts.
- 1633 First East India Company Factory in Bengal : Piply.
- 1634 First Committee of Privy Council for control of Plantations.
- 1639 East India Company Factory established at Madras.
- 1640 East India Company Factory established at Hoogly.
- 1642 First voyage of Tasman to Australia.
- 1651 Navigation Act.
- 1651 St Helena occupied by East India Company.

- 1652 Cape occupied by the Dutch.
- 1655 Jamaica conquered.
- 1660 Navigation Act.
- 1661 Bombay ceded by Portugal : first territorial settlement of Britain in India.
- 1662 Mouth of the Gambia occupied by the African Company of London.
- 1663 Carolina founded.
- 1664 New Amsterdam (New York) captured.
- 1667 Treaty of Breda.
- 1670 Hudson's Bay Charter.
- 1672 The Council of Trade and Plantations organised.
- 1683 Revocation of Charter of Massachusetts.
- 1689 The Revolution Parliament begins to assume authority in Colonial affairs.
- 1696 Calcutta founded.
- 1713 Treaty of Utrecht.
- 1713 Assiento Treaty.
- 1739 Outbreak of war between England and Spain.
- 1741 Dupleix made Governor of Pondicherry.
- 1744 War with France in America and Carnatic.
- 1751 British at Madras take the Nawab of the Carnatic under their protection.
- 1754 War on Upper Ohio.
- 1755 Defeat of Braddock.
- 1757 Pitt in office.
- 1757 Victory of Plassey : English masters of Bengal.
- 1759 Capture of Quebec.
- 1760 Submission of Canada.
- 1763 Peace of Paris.
- 1764 Victory of Buxar over Moghul and Nawab of Oudh.
- 1765 Stamp Act of Grenville.
- 1770 Captain Cook proclaims British occupation of Australia.
- 1772 Warren Hastings Governor of Bengal.
- 1773 The Indian Regulating Act.
- 1774 Quebec Act.
- 1776 Declaration of Independence.
- 1781 Surrender of Cornwallis.
- 1783 Treaty of Versailles.

- 1784 Pitt's India Bill passed.
- 1787 Sierra Leone ceded to the English by the natives.
- 1788 Captain Phillip lands at Botany Bay (January).
- 1788 He takes formal possession of Eastern half of Australia
under name of New South Wales (February).
- 1791 Canada Act.
- 1795 England first seizes the Cape.
- 1798 Lord Wellesley Governor-General.
- 1799 Conquest of Mysore.
- 1802 Treaty of Bassein.
- 1803 Mahratta War : Assaye and Laswarri.
- 1804 Founding of Tasmania.
- 1806 England finally occupies the Cape.
- 1807 Slave trade in the British Empire abolished.
- 1812 Tasmania a separate colony.
- 1814 Cession of Cape Colony by Treaty of Paris.
- 1818 Reduction of Mahrattas.
- 1824 First Burmese war.
- 1829 Swan River settlement founded (Western Australia).
- 1836 Founding of South Australia.
- 1836 The Great Trek.
- 1839 Annexation of New Zealand.
- 1840 Canada Reunion Act : responsible Government granted.
- 1840 Treaty of Waitangi with the Maoris.
- 1840 Transportation to New South Wales abolished.
- 1843 Natal proclaimed a British colony.
- 1843 Gold Coast organised as Crown Colony.
- 1849 Punjab annexed.
- 1851 Victoria a separate colony.
- 1852 Responsible Government established in New Zealand.
- 1852 Second Burmese war.
- 1852 Independence of Transvaal recognised by Sand River
Convention.
- 1854 Independence of Orange Free State recognised by Bloem-
fontein Convention.
- 1854 Present Colonial Office organised.
- 1855-6 Responsible Government established in New South Wales,
Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia.
- 1856 Oudh annexed.

- 1857 The Sepoy Mutiny.
- 1858 The Queen proclaimed Sovereign of India : extinction of Moghul dynasty.
- 1858 British Columbia founded.
- 1859 Proclamation of Queensland as a separate colony.
- 1867 British North America Act, creating the Dominion of Canada.
- 1868 Basutoland placed under British protection.
- 1869 Opening of Suez Canal.
- 1872 Responsible Government established in Cape Colony.
- 1877 Transvaal annexed by Great Britain.
- 1877 Proclamation of the Queen as Empress of India.
- 1881 Battle of Majuba Hill : independence restored to Transvaal.
- 1882 Battle of Tel el Kebir, resulting in British occupation of Egypt.
- 1884 Convention of London regulating the status of the Transvaal.
- 1885 Establishment of Federal Council of Australasia.
- 1885 Bechuanaland taken under British protection.
- 1886 Niger Company's charter granted.
- 1888 British East Africa Company's charter granted.
- 1889 British South Africa Company's charter granted.
- 1890 Responsible Government established in Western Australia.
- 1893 Responsible Government established in Natal.

SUMMARY OF CHIEF BRITISH POSSESSIONS BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (1899).

(Mainly from the *Colonial Office List*.)

THE British Colonial Empire comprises forty distinct and independent governments administered under the Colonial Office. Beside these there are certain territories under the Foreign Office. — The Indian Empire is an entirely separate administration.

GROUP I. In the subjoined list the names of the eleven colonies which possess elected Assemblies and *Responsible Governments* are printed in **thicker type**.

GROUP II. The government of twenty-five colonies is administered by aid of Legislative Councils; of four (Gibraltar, St Helena, Labuan and Basutoland) by the Governor alone. These are all called *Crown Colonies*: and are marked C in the list.

GROUP III. Other possessions under British sovereignty are administered by *Chartered Companies* with more or less control from the Crown.

GROUP IV. In *Protectorates* British control is looser and the native rule but slightly interfered with.

GROUP V. *Naval and Military posts*: e.g. Ascension, under the Admiralty; Aden, under the India Office.

GROUP VI. *India*.

The dates given are usually those of the first effective acquisition. In the case of many possessions British sovereignty has not been continuous. Thus, Cape Colony between 1802—1806 reverted to Holland, and several of the smaller West Indian islands have at different times passed by fortune of war into French hands.

EUROPE.

| <i>Date of acquisition</i> | <i>Name</i> | <i>How acquired</i> | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---|
| 1704 1800 1878 | Gibraltar C. Malta C. Cyprus C. | By conquest By conquest By treaty | Placed under 'Europe' in <i>Colonial Office</i> <i>List</i> |

ASIA.

| <i>Date of acquisition</i> | <i>Name</i> | <i>How acquired</i> | |
|---|--|---|---|
| 1639 1640 1661 | India: Madras " Bengal " Bombay | By purchase By grant from Moghul By cession from Portugal | The dates are those of the beginnings of the three Presidencies |
| 1795 1841 1846 1785—1819 1874 1838 | Ceylon C. Hong Kong C. Labuan C. Straits Settlements C. Malay States Aden | By conquest By treaties By treaties By treaties By treaties | A Protectorate A military post under the Indian Govern- ment |
| 1888 | Sarawak | By treaty | Under protection of British Government |
| 1881 1884 1898 | N. Borneo British New Guinea C. Wei-hai-Wei | By treaties By proclamation By treaty | Under Chartered Co. Admiralty post |

AUSTRALIA.

| <i>Date of acquisition</i> | <i>Name</i> | <i>How acquired</i> | |
|----------------------------|-------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| 1788 | New South Wales | By proclamation: which covered the area after- wards divided into four colonies | |
| " | Tasmania | | Created separate Co- lony in 1823 |
| " | Victoria | | ditto, 1851 |
| " | Queensland | | ditto, 1859 |
| 1829 | Western Australia | By settlement | |
| 1836 | South Australia | By settlement | |
| 1839—40 | New Zealand | By settlement and treaty | |
| 1874 | Fiji Islands C. | By occupation | |

WEST INDIES, &c.

| <i>Date of acquisition</i> | <i>Name</i> | <i>How acquired</i> | |
|----------------------------|---|---------------------|--|
| 1624 | Barbados C. | By settlement | |
| 1626 | St Christopher (St Kitts) C. | By settlement | |
| 1628 | Nevis C. | By settlement | |
| 1632 | Antigua and other Leeward Islands C. | By settlement | |
| 1635 | Virgin Islands C. | By settlement | |
| 1646 | Bahamas C. | By settlement | |
| 1655 | Jamaica C. | By conquest | |
| 1763 | Dominica, Grenada, St Vincent, Tobago and other Windward Islands C. | By conquest | |
| 1797 | Trinidad C. | By conquest | |
| 1798 | Honduras C. | By treaty | |
| 1796 | British Guiana C. | By conquest | |
| 1794 | St Lucia C. | By conquest | |
| 1765 | Falkland Isles C. | By settlement | |

NORTH AMERICA.

| <i>Date of acquisition</i> | <i>Name</i> | <i>How acquired</i> | |
|----------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---|
| 1760 | Canada | By conquest | |
| 1713 | Nova Scotia | By conquest | |
| 1713 | New Brunswick | | Acadia; previous occupation or conquest was only temporary |
| 1583 | Newfoundland | By proclamation | |
| 1609 | Bermuda Islands C. | By settlement | |
| 1670 | Hudson's Bay Territory | By charter | including the Western territories, now part of the Dominion of Canada |

AFRICA.

| <i>Date of acquisition</i> | <i>Name</i> | <i>How acquired</i> | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|---|
| 1795 | Cape Colony | By conquest | Continuous possession dates from 1806 |
| 1844 | Natal | By occupation | |
| 1851 | St Helena C. | By conquest | |
| 1815 | Ascension | By occupation | Admiralty post |
| 1885 | Bechuanaland | By proclamation | Protectorate |
| 1890 | Rhodesia | By occupation | Chartered Co. |
| 1891 | British Central Africa | By treaty | Chartered Co. |
| 1888 | British East Africa | By proclamation | Protectorate |
| 1810 | Mauritius and Sey- chelles C. | By conquest | |
| 1868 | Basutoland C. | By treaty | |
| 1662 | Gambia C. | By occupation | |
| 1661 | Gold Coast C. | By occupation | |
| 1861 | Lagos C. | By occupation | |
| 1787 | Sierra Leone C. | By occupation | |
| 1884 | Niger Coast Protectorate | By proclamation | |
| 1886 | Niger Territory C. | By occupation | The date is that of the original Charter |
| 1886-7 | Somali Protectorate | | |
| 1882 | Egypt | | Controlled and de- fended by British Government |

CHAPTER I.

THE PERIOD OF PREPARATION.

1497—1558.

Two characteristics particularly mark the history of the English nation: the development of ordered liberty and the growth of its external dominion. Of these two sides of our national progress the former usually fills the larger space in our minds. The text-books we read chiefly treat the history of English institutions as the central thread of the narrative. In foreign countries it was, for a century, the element in our national life which most attracted admiration. Yet the same energy and self-reliance which gave birth to our self-government in borough, shire, and nation, has had a further result besides a Parliamentary constitution. It has been precisely the same force which has produced the second characteristic of our history—the extension of the English State into distant lands. The qualities of race which made the English a free people made them a colonising people.

Let us note at the outset some of the features of English expansion. We shall find that it was at the outset slowly attempted; a century of scattered effort—of failure, in truth—passed before any definite result was achieved. Spain and Portugal had built up great empires before England

Charac-
teristics of
English
History:

1. Freedom.

2. Expansion.

Features of
English
Expansion:

a. Gradual
development.

stirred herself to any purpose. This was partly due to the fact that English effort was the effort of individuals, with little help, and often none at all, from the State : whilst Spain—as France, later—made the founding of empire the concern of Kings and Government. It was our English mode, halting and unmethodical, but yet the enterprise of a people accustomed to act for itself. Again, the guiding motives have

b. Individualist.

c. Motives : Trade.

Religion.

Settlement.

Defence.

the new, from the enemies of both.

In some respects English expansion has been like that of the City-states of ancient Greece. From them, as from England, citizens went out to found new communities, and where they went they carried the Greek name and civilization. Or again, it has been like that of Rome—the rule of conquerors, lawgivers, governors, imposing order, toleration and peace. The British India of to-day throws

d. Like that of Greece,

e. and of Rome.

f. Its 'inevitable' quality.

a flood of light upon the administration of a Roman Province, Britain, say, or Syria, of the first or second century. Lastly, and the analogy is rather with Greece or Rome than with any modern nation, British expansion has another quality : it is, in a sense, inevitable. This may be due to race and its innate vigour ; to geography ;

to maritime instinct; to permanent economic causes: it is probably the result of all these. But it is there; it perhaps eludes explanation; it certainly needs no defence.

The two great geographical discoveries which mark the close of the 15th century, those of America in 1492 and of the Cape route to India in 1498, England and
Discovery. constitute the natural starting-point of our subject. It is an interesting fact to remember that, at the moment of the engagement of Columbus to the Court of Madrid, his brother was urging Henry VII of England to invite him to London to discuss the project of his voyage. The invitation reached Columbus too late; he was already pledged to Spain. We have perhaps in this incident evidence of the repute of English enterprise and seamanship, perhaps also a recognition of the ability of Henry himself. It is untrue, however, to say that but for an accident America might have been from the outset English instead of Spanish. For England as a country was weak and poor; it was backward and isolated. It had no energy to spare for more than half a century to come for other tasks than those of repairing the waste of civil war, and of bringing herself abreast of European progress.

England was still industrially dependent upon Flanders or Italy in several important respects. Her woollen cloths, the chief product of the country, were finished and dyed in Florence: the shipping in her ports was Italian or Flemish: her bankers were foreigners: her luxuries, like books, and not a few necessities, as weapons, were produced abroad. England had as yet no strong middle class of trained mercantile instinct, of capital and intelligence. In knowledge of affairs, inventiveness, elasticity, Englishmen were among the backward peoples of Western Europe. In geographical research and in maritime enterprise the Portuguese and the Italians were in the front rank; and they were rivalled by the French and the Spaniards before English seamen learnt to venture into distant waters.

The Cabots
discover North
America,
1497-8.

The history of the Cabots illustrates the point. John Cabot, a Genoese by birth and a Venetian by residence, lived from time to time in Bristol, where his son Sebastian was probably born about 1477. To them was granted by Henry VII in 1497 the first patent for western discovery, and under it father and son set sail to explore an Atlantic route to Cathay and Tartary. They were commissioned "to sail with five ships under the royal flag and to set up the king's banner as his officers." The profits of the voyage were to be their own, subject to a royalty of one-fifth to be paid to the Crown. Bristol was named as their port of trade. We have no particulars of their journey. St John's in Newfoundland was discovered by them on June 24th; some information of the fisheries was brought back and Cabot received a donation of £10 from the privy purse. The following year saw a second voyage of John Cabot. He is supposed to have reached the American coasts about $67\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ lat. and to have coasted as far south as the mouth of the Delaware in 38° . There was no record of any exploration of the land or of anything in the nature of occupation, but the two voyages of John Cabot were regarded more than a century later as constituting the English claim to the American mainland by right of discovery.

Nothing proves more conclusively the unfitness of England at that period for a policy of external growth than the neglect with which this most important discovery of the North American mainland was treated. We do not know the fate of John Cabot; Sebastian is not mentioned for nearly twenty years; he had returned to the service of Venice. There are allusions to voyages of other navigators, in 1501 and subsequent years. In 1517 Sebastian Cabot was apparently in command of a venture to the coasts of South America, but no result followed. Henry VIII in his earlier years had like his father reasons of policy for not appearing as a rival of Spain in the Indies. In the 15th century the right of the Papacy to

award legal title to newly discovered lands was disputed by no Christian power. Portugal had sought, for her African possessions, the sanction of successive Popes. In 1493 Spain acquired the like security for the recent discoveries of Columbus. Pope Alexander VI in that year issued the famous Bulls by which Spain was entitled to hold all territories discovered by her situate "one hundred leagues west of the Cape Verde Isles and the Azores." Portugal promptly claimed an understanding with her neighbour as to their respective spheres. By the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 Spain agreed to push back the eastern limit of her rights to a point 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, and this was afterwards determined to mean the meridian of longitude 45.37 W. on our maps. Thus it happened that Brazil, on its discovery in 1500, fell to Portugal, who could claim, in America, nothing further. She, of course, retained her African discoveries, and was left to conquer the East undisturbed. Spain in return appropriated all that lay west of the line of partition. The two peninsular powers assumed the recognition on the part of all good churchmen of their right of possession of such regions of the globe as were at that date unoccupied by Christian peoples. But the French king, Francis I, treated the Bulls with indifference, and ignored the Treaty of 1494, to which he was no party, founded upon them. Henry VII by his patents to Cabot shewed that he did not regard such an agreement as the last word on the question, but apart from other reasons for acquiescence he was busy in marrying his son to a Spanish princess, through whom some share of the wealth thus claimed might flow towards England.

**The Bulls of
Alexander VI,
1493.**

In Henry VIII we are face to face with a son of the New Age. He early gained a true conception of the position of England in Europe. The rapid success of Spain and Portugal in their respective spheres, the dominant influence of the Spanish House, his own special problems, dynastic and ecclesiastical,

**Henry VIII
and the ex-
ternal growth
of England.**

compelled him to caution in foreign affairs, and to the concentration of his energies upon national defence. The King proved himself, as will be shewn, one of the true founders of English expansion as the creator of the Tudor navy. He encouraged ship-building and ship-owning; he was keenly interested in the fisheries in English and in distant waters; and in the seamanship of which they were then, as they have ever been, the best training school. From Southampton and Bristol ships built and owned in England began to find their way to the Baltic and the Levant. William Hawkins, a typical west country trader, sailed to the Canaries, the Guinea coast, and even to Brazil. Henry and his minister Wolsey are found in correspondence with students of geography, and with adventurers such as De Prado, a citizen of London, who sailed from Plymouth to Labrador and Newfoundland. He encouraged the voyage of Hore to Cape Breton in 1536, which, though futile in itself, deeply impressed contemporaries by the narrative of the perils of the north Atlantic. Still, in spite of the comparative failure of these early efforts, the taste for adventure was growing. Newfoundland fishing banks attracted yearly numbers of fishermen from the west of England, and journeys to the Barbary and Guinea coasts were probably more frequent than our scanty records imply.

Before the middle of the century motives of politics and religion were no longer an obstacle to discovery; they, indeed, rather invited Englishmen to dispute the claims of Spain to the New World. The papal Bulls were no longer resented, they were laughed at. Moreover, the printing-press was now applied to the production of maps and charts. In Antwerp, Bruges and Dieppe were published those remarkable early efforts in cartography which stimulated navigation in English sea-coast towns. What Prince Henry the Navigator had done a century earlier, and what Hakluyt was to do nearly a century later, the great map-makers, Mercator, Ortelius, and their school, did now in the first part of

New spirit
of enterprise,
1540—1558.

the 16th century in creating a thirst for maritime adventure. The secrecy of ocean routes could no longer be maintained. In England Thomas Cromwell, following Henry VII, carried legislation directed to encouraging foreign trade in English ships; under his master's immediate impulse the English navy was admitted to be the strongest afloat; a mercantile marine was in existence and increasing; in building and rigging ships we were not behind the Flemings and the Italians. A new aristocracy had arisen, men of practical aims and ready to join the traders of London and Bristol in enterprises which promised both profit and adventure. The middle class was growing in wealth and numbers, whilst the country population was already tending to drift into the seaport and manufacturing towns. A new generation had sprung up, ignorant of civil war, proud of national independence in Church and State, with higher tastes and wider knowledge, and unwilling to lag behind the rest of Western Europe in wealth or repute. Thus, although beyond the patent of the Cabots no definite step in the expansion of England is recorded up to the year 1550, we see the nation preparing rapidly for its future task.

The chief centres of this new spirit of enterprise, as we should expect, were the southern and western sea-board towns from London to Bristol: and in the middle years of the sixteenth century it was directed principally to the Levant, the Guinea coast and the north-east of Europe, where it was attempted to open up a route hitherto untried to India and China, for Southampton was losing its traditional import trade, viâ Italy, in eastern productions now handled by the Portuguese by way of the Cape. Antwerp, Catholic and Spanish, was now the centre of the distributing trade in eastern and continental produce. Moreover, the treasure, poured in increasing volume from Mexico into Cadiz, was fast becoming a peril to Europe, as Protestantism was destined soon to discover. Thus public and private motives alike combined to push English merchant-venturers and their supporters into

activity. In 1549 Sebastian Cabot, the patriarchal figure of the new generation of seamen, was created Grand Pilot of England. Under his presidency a company of discovery was formed to explore a North-East Passage to China. Merchants of London and men of position were his colleagues, and the famous journey organised by Cabot in 1553, when Sir Hugh Willoughby perished, was so far successful that Richard Chancellor, his comrade, reached Moscow viâ Archangel, and in a sense discovered Russia to western Europe. Next year the company received a royal charter, addressed to the Marquis of Winchester and "other merchant adventurers," for "the discovery of lands unknown and not before frequented." The Russian journeys were extended to the Caspian and even to Persia, and the Muscovy Company, which in Elizabeth's reign continued to develop the trade thus opened, was a model of many similar ventures to Africa and the Levant. The farther east, however, was to remain long untouched; and in the west, Cabot's prior discovery had only led to an increasing share in the Newfoundland fishing.

Voyage to
Russia, 1553.

The country
ready for ad-
venture, 1558.

At the time of Elizabeth's accession we see that the way of expansion was but prepared: but certain facts are already significant. The spirit of adventure is born, and with it some experience in distant navigation; merchants and gentry have begun to combine their capital in enterprise with encouragement from the Crown. The State itself, however, attempts nothing, all is left to the initiative of the individual. Statesmen recognise rights of occupation in distant seas, but ignore vague claims, whether supported by Pope or King, not so confirmed: and there is also that reluctance to quarrel with Spain which marked English policy till 1588. In short the elements of a new policy are all ready, and await the opportunity which in the critical state of English relations abroad cannot be long delayed.

CHAPTER II.

THE BEGINNINGS OF EXPANSION : THE ELIZABETHAN AGE, 1558—1603.

NOT until the reign of Elizabeth did the full force of the Renaissance make itself felt in England. Rapid as the progress of the country had been since Bosworth Field, England still lagged behind France, Spain, and the Low Countries. Hence we were, as a people, late in absorbing those new influences which, derived in the main from Italy, were rapidly developing the modern life of western Europe. The classical literary spirit, the new architecture, the desire for greater dignity and refinement of outward life, the wider interests in nature and in travel were blended with the master aims which animated Elizabethan England—the passionate zeal for national independence alike in Church and State.

The Elizabethan age and the maritime growth of England.

Thus in a very real sense the reign of Elizabeth stands for a time of “beginnings.” It is the starting-point of our modern history. In particular the love of adventure and enterprise beyond the seas, the concept of England as a maritime nation, faintly realized in the first half of the century, becomes in the second a definite mark of the national temper. Our purpose is to trace the main stages in the growth of this new force in English history. And here at the outset one caution is needed. If there be any epoch in which the external growth of the English nation may be treated as a “department” of our history to be traced out and judged apart from the rest, this first epoch is certainly not one of them. In no reign are the

different threads of English policy so closely interwoven. However we may isolate, in order to lay stress upon, the element of expansion in Elizabethan England, such study will be wholly misleading unless we bear constantly in mind the religious, the dynastic, the continental, even the personal, factors which make up the complex whole of the policy of the reign. The beginnings of the Empire were in part sought unconsciously, in part were the result of deliberate action. But in neither case were they brought about independently of the main current of affairs.

Within a very short time of Elizabeth's accession the hard facts with which English policy had to reckon during the next five-and-twenty years were already manifest. **1.** The Catholic Church had addressed itself formally to the task of recovering the ground lost to it by the Reformation, notably in England. The Counter-Reformation had begun. The Papal Chair was filled by men profoundly devoted to the cause of the Church; the Jesuit Order had secured the leading voice in its policy. **2.** Spain was now identified with the political power of Rome, whose obedient and ruthless servant she was henceforth, both in the Old World and the New. Catholicism in English eyes wore for a time the cast of Spanish fanaticism and Spanish cruelty. **3.** It was clear that in France in spite of a deep religious cleavage in the nation the Government and Paris were already irrevocably Catholic. Spain, backed by the wealth of the Indies, was about to put forth her whole energy to eradicate heresy in the Low Countries. **4.** The succession was uncertain; the death of the Queen without an heir would renew the crisis of 1553. Mary Queen of Scots is identified with a wide-spread conspiracy to bring back England to the papal allegiance. **5.** This isolation of England and of Elizabeth in presence of an aggressive Catholicism was made complete by the Bull of Excommunication launched against the person of the Queen in February 1570.

*The policy
of the Queen.*

Such were the conditions, so ominous of danger both to the nation and dynasty, amidst which Elizabeth and her counsellors had to steer their course. Fortunately, she was served by men of ability, insight and self-restraint, equal to her own. Tact, patience, dissimulation, were, for a time at least, her main defensive weapons. The Queen fell back upon the fortunate isolation in which both her country and herself found themselves: she would have no foreign alliances and no foreign war. To marry Philip would be only a greater error than to quarrel with him. She encouraged the Dutch Calvinist in the conflict against Spain, the Huguenot against Catherine de' Medici, but nothing would induce her to declare formal war on their behalf. She thought, perhaps after 1570 wrongly, that the religious unity of her own kingdom would not yet bear the strain of a struggle abroad; and that neither in money, in men, nor in fleets was this country equal to a conflict with the great Catholic powers. To efface herself and to give no cause of offence, to bide the time when self-assertion might be less perilous, and the confidence of the nation in its own powers might be fit for a great trial, was the policy of Elizabeth for nearly thirty years. Caution, as even Burleigh thought, may have grown into timidity, economy into parsimony, and the desire to avoid war have actually invited attack. But the waiting policy did in the result achieve its purpose, and the long period of hesitancy and of reserve prepared the way for a brilliant epoch of success.

The Marian persecutions had driven large numbers of Protestants into seclusion, and others, more sturdy and more obnoxious to the authorities, into exile. But in the West of England where reformed doctrines had taken deep root, not a few of the younger men, roused by the stories of oppression, or its actual experience, plunged into a reckless career of sea-roving. There had always

*The Channel
Rovers.*

been along the west country coasts a tendency to wrecking, which attracted the lawless spirits; and so when sons of the yeomen and of the gentry vented their hatred of Rome and Spain upon foreign trading vessels passing up and down the Channel there were plenty of hardy mariners ready to follow. Huguenots from the French shore joined forces with Devonshire sea-dogs from Dartmouth or Bideford and plundered impartially all shipping that passed up into what were called the Narrow Seas. It happened that nearly all their prizes were Spanish or Flemish ships trading between Lisbon and Cadiz, Antwerp and London. That guaranteed the venturers a revenge sweetened by profits, for such merchantmen alone were allowed to carry the wealth of the East and West to Northern Europe. It was a fierce life, a state of war without its rights for the victims, or its duties for the conquerors. We cannot doubt that bitter passions, religious hate, greed, sheer love of violence and bloodshed were only too easily fed in these buccaneering exploits. But on the other hand they taught the Spaniards a lesson which they were slow to learn, that the Englishman was no weak, spiritless prey whom it was safe to disregard in laying hands upon trade and dominion or in crushing heresy. Moreover, to the west country mariners themselves Channel piracy, for it was nothing more, proved a stern school of seamanship and naval warfare. They learnt from it the weakness of the Spaniard at sea; his lack of skill and resource and of real courage, the helplessness of his slow, heavy galleons against small, smartly-handled English vessels. Nor did they ever forget the grim attractiveness of the lawless buccaneering life itself, its excitement and its profit.

As we look back, such unauthorised warfare in English waters upon peaceful trading vessels sheltered by a friendly flag strikes us as utterly contrary to ideas of international right. The responsible ministers of the day, notably the greatest of them Cecil, probably felt so too. But we must not forget the outrages which called such passions into being.

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The conscience of men, even in that age, no longer sanctioned barbarities such as the burning of Protestants in London or Oxford, or the torture of Huguenots or of English sailors by the Inquisition at Cadiz or Mexico. To the plain west country mind to hunt down all who had part or lot in inflicting such fiendish cruelties was a simple dictate of justice.

The taste for sea-roving and harrying the Spaniard did not lapse with the death of Mary and the end of the persecution that had in the first instance called it into play. Elizabeth, as we have seen, dare not openly countenance action on the part of her subjects which might embroil her with Philip. But she had no desire to forbid enterprise which was the outcome of patriotic feeling, and, what was more important still, provided, without national cost, seamanship and fleets. The Queen's navy was at this time falling steadily into decay, as Cecil admitted, and the Crown refused the means for building or for manning one. Yet both ships and sailors were likely to be badly needed. The minister, William Cecil, protested against this irregular warfare, partly because of its very irregularity and partly as likely to embarrass his policy. But the Queen decided to ignore what she could with difficulty prevent. So English and Huguenot corsairs swept the Channel and the Bay of Biscay. Tremaynes, Stukeleys and Cobhams, scions of famous west country homes, continued to spend their money in fitting out craft of twenty or fifty tons with cutlasses and guns and reckless men only too glad to learn the art of using them. Fishermen abandoned their favourite grounds off Kinsale or in the Iceland seas and took to the more profitable trade of piracy; and throughout the West, from Bideford round to Exmouth, the sea-dog's life was the envy of every young fellow of spirit. Elizabeth knew that it was a venturesome game for her to play; but she knew too that she could, if driven to it, disown all part in it; and that the men who captained the vessels, and the crews who manned them, would understand

The attitude
of Elizabeth
and Cecil to-
wards the Cor-
sairs.

and were prepared for all risks that might befall. The truth was that, though Spain and England might be at peace, Protestantism and Romanism were at deadly war. The peace was a fiction, perhaps a necessary one, of sovereigns: the state of war was the grim reality of things as understood on both sides by their subjects.

Here then was one English school of navigation and naval warfare; a hard school but in many ways a most efficient one. We notice the small size of the craft employed; the skill and intrepidity with which they were handled in very difficult waters; the reckless daring with which their captains attacked ships five times their size. They carried small cannon of no great range but served with ever-increasing accuracy; yet in spite of the growing power of artillery their main endeavour at this period was still to grapple and board the enemy and finish the struggle on deck. Skill to build, rig and equip the best type of fighting-ship was swiftly learnt in the busy ship-yards of the sheltered creeks and tideways of south-west coasts.

Hawkins and
the Indies: the
Slave Trade,
1562—1568.

But there were venturers of another type. At the time of Elizabeth's accession William Hawkins of Plymouth had handed on his business to his two sons, of whom John was the younger. Though related to more than one Devonshire family whose younger members were busy privateering in the Channel, John Hawkins held aloof and was engaged in sober trade which carried him as far south as the Canaries, where he established friendly relations with the Spanish settlers and merchants. He had himself no quarrel at this time with the Inquisition, he avoided politics and it was enough for him that Elizabeth and Philip were at peace. No doubt he is a type of many staid respectable merchants of Bristol, London and Southampton, who, whilst casting envious looks upon the new Spanish monopoly, desired nothing more than opportunity of peaceful trade with the new continents lately revealed to view. John

Hawkins, now in confidential relations with the Admiralty, was the first to feel his way into the new field of mercantile venture; for "by his good and upright dealing being grown in love and favour with the people (of the Canaries) he gained much knowledge from them of the West Indies." Amongst other things he learnt that "negroes were very good merchandise in Hispaniola (Hayti) and that store of negroes might easily be had upon the coast of Guinea." He resolved to try the experiment of a cargo and found several leading London merchants very willing to become adventurers in the transaction. Three ships were provided of 120, 100 and 40 tons burden, carrying 100 men in all. He sailed in October, 1562, His first voyage, 1562. found a good hunting-ground in Sierra Leone, where he captured or bought 300 negroes. With this freight he made direct for San Domingo, thus boldly defying the Spanish monopoly of the West. Here he found the settlers not backward in trading for his illicit merchandise. But he stood "always upon his guard," trusting the Spaniard no further than that by his own strength he was able to master them. Touching at three ports in the island he returned to England, after an absence of nearly a year, his cargo all disposed of in exchange for hides, sugar, ginger and a few pearls. The venture had proved commercially a great success; there had been apparently no difficulty in trading, no fighting, and, we may add, no sign of any scruples as to the nature of the traffic. The ease and profits of the voyage kindled the imagination of the London traders as its boldness startled the Spanish officials.

In the following year, 1564, a second venture, on a much larger scale, was sent out, Hawkins commanding a ship of 700 tons with three smaller craft and a His second voyage, 1564. complement of 170 men. The month of January was spent in hunting negroes in the region of Sierra Leone where Hawkins apparently could hardly have been surprised to find himself received with suspicion, which quickly became treachery and hostility. The Atlantic voyage lasting 48 days

was attended by something of the horrors which formed a terrible feature of the "middle passage" throughout the history of the slave trade. Hawkins, touching Dominica on March 9th, now passed to the mainland west of the Orinoco. But he encountered a strict refusal on the part of Spanish officials of permission to trade. He was regarded as a dangerous intruder, for the Spaniard with perfectly sound instinct detected peril to the sanctity of their great Western preserves if English vessels were allowed to penetrate them with impunity. So the order had gone forth "that no man should traffick with us, but should resist us with all the force they could." But Hawkins with his cargo of slaves sickly and dying and his own crew diminishing from stress of climate was, though against his will, forced to use threats. He knew that the settlers were ready to barter, and he was strong enough to hold his own provided fresh food and water could be had, and in the end he gained his point. But he took with him from Spanish seas that which was more valuable than hides or pearls; for coasting along the mainland in the direction of Panama, then crossing to Jamaica, San Domingo and Cuba, he had ample opportunity of spying out the wealth of this tropical world and its unprotected state. He found it, though appropriated, largely unoccupied, and he had learnt that though peaceable trade would not be allowed, some show of force backed by English determination might produce speedy and profitable results. But we should note that on this voyage Hawkins uniformly appeals to the friendship between his sovereign and the Spanish king; he asks only for the same freedom to trade that was conceded to English ships in Spain and Flanders; he never actually proceeds to hostilities; and succeeds, though less easily than before, in transacting business "with great profit to the venturers of the said voyage, as also to the whole realm in bringing home both gold, silver, pearles and other jewels great store."

The homeward voyage was made by the coast of Florida, thought to be an island, where he relieved the struggling French

settlement, hard pressed by Indians, but found no Spaniards. The fertility of the soil made a strong impression and we already find the suggestion of pastoral settlement. Driven northwards by gales the fleet reached the fishing grounds off Newfoundland and arrived at Padstow on the 20th September, 1565.

The third voyage, of the year 1567, was planned on a larger scale. There were now five ships, two of which were "Queen's ships" hired out for the occasion, and another was under command of Francis

*His third
voyage, 1567.*

Drake, a cousin of John Hawkins, who had already in the previous year penetrated the Indian seas on his own account. Hawkins himself invested some equivalent of £15,000 of our money in the venture which had as the two previous ones an exclusively commercial object, notwithstanding the presence of the two ships lent from the Royal Navy. The usual cargo of between 400 and 500 negroes was secured, Dominica safely made, and trade opened. But the Spanish governors on the mainland had received more stringent orders than before; the news of the venture had reached Madrid and had caused much searching of heart. So Hawkins finds that the traffic goes forward "somewhat hardly, because the King had straightly commanded all his governors in those parts by no means to suffer any trade to be made with us." One town, as in his previous voyage, he occupied in force until business was completed. Carthagena he found too strong to admit of attack, but "in all other places where we traded the Spaniard inhabitants were glad of us and traded willingly."

Hawkins now made for home. He was driven by hurricanes into the Gulf of Mexico: entering the Spanish harbour of San Juan de Ulua he begged leave "as friends to King Philip" to trade for provisions and to refit for the Atlantic voyage. There is no reason to doubt that Hawkins meant peace: but unluckily a strong Spanish fleet of war appeared off the natural breakwater which encloses the port. To secure his own safety

Hawkins insisted on a written agreement to the effect that his weak and battered ships should be allowed free egress. He occupied the breakwater and trained his heaviest guns against the Spanish frigates lying outside, which now ran serious risks should the gale be renewed. The agreement was made and signed. The Spanish commander broke his word; his heavy frigates bore down on the English vessels lying moored in easy security. Two only of the five escaped to sea with the loss of a large part of their crews. But the fight had been severe and they were not further pursued. In the end Hawkins reached England, but he had been obliged to set ashore 100 of his crew to avoid starvation on the homeward voyage. Of these the survivors ultimately fell into the hands of the Spaniard; the Inquisition took cognizance of them, some were executed and others lingered in prisons in Mexico and in Seville. So ended the last attempt at trading in the Indies by English merchant-captains under the guise of friends of King Philip.

**The Slave
Trade.**

The feelings with which we regard these voyages of Hawkins, important historically as they are, cannot but be affected by the immediate object with which they were undertaken. Hawkins is the founder of the English traffic in negro slaves. African slavery had for nearly 50 years formed part of the Spanish West Indian system, and, in its origin, the importation of negro labour had received the active support of such a man as Las Casas, the earnest advocate of the interests of the Native races of Spanish America. Negro slavery was advocated partly as a means of preserving the Indian race by the substitution for their labour of the strength of a far more vigorous stock; partly as a means of civilizing the negro himself, who was in his native home the helpless victim of bloodthirsty tyranny and superstition. The Spanish Government endeavoured to regulate the trade and to impose conditions upon the planters in the interest of their human chattels. The State licensed such traffic; the Catholic Church approved it; public opinion raised no voice against it.

The Elizabethan Protestant, finding no commandment against slavery in the Bible, did not stop to consider the abstract question of the humanity of the practice, and it is perfectly evident from the narratives of his voyages that no twinge of moral compunction in the matter ever touched the conscience of John Hawkins.

The voyages of Hawkins brought the Spanish Empire of the West for the first time within the sphere of English policy. The chief characteristics of this dominion were already settled, though its widest limits were not yet reached. Spanish settlement differed so materially from colonisation of the English type that it is instructive to draw attention to its chief features. The "heroic age" of conquest which followed the discoveries of Columbus had passed away. With undisputed occupation, the peculiar defects of the colonial system of Spain soon shewed themselves. In the first place her possessions were really *Dependencies*, rather than true colonies, in that they contained a large native population of various grades of civilization, governed entirely in the interests of the conquering race, which appropriated all the land and mineral wealth to its own purposes. These dependencies had been for the most part easily won; they were here and there extremely rich in precious metals; valuable products such as tobacco, spices, sugar and ginger were grown by aid of slave labour. Again, large estates of rich land enabled the planter to amass in a few years a fortune which was carried home to be enjoyed in Europe. For there was little desire for permanent settlement, nor was the material present which could create a vigorous New Spain. The Spaniard of the Indies quickly degenerated alike in character and physical energy; the cruelty, luxury and vice which Italy had developed in the Spanish nature marked also the slave-owning settler in the Western seas. The tyranny of the officials, the persecuting spirit of the Church, the narrow monopoly of trade, the semi-

Nature of
Spanish Colo-
nial power.

feudal relations of classes, were transferred from European Spain to the New World. The hand of the State was everywhere; freedom of thought and action, individual enterprise in trade or discovery, were repressed or discouraged. It is most significant that the Spanish colonial empire never produced a Spanish mercantile marine. The production of precious metals was the monopoly of the government of Madrid, which kept a close control of the entire traffic between the Indies and the mother country through the House of Commerce or "Contractation House" at Seville. The doctrine that a foreign "plantation" and a colonial empire exist solely for the profit of the parent state was once for all impressed upon the Latin peoples of Europe by the example of Spain.

The Indies were administered under four Governments, of which that of "Tierra Firme" or the South American mainland ('the Spanish Main' of the Elizabethan narratives) and that of Peruana with its rich silver mines of the Andes were the most important. To each Governor were sent, as we have seen, urgent instructions to preserve the Indo-Spanish seas from European intrusion, and that trade with all foreign ships should be rigorously forbidden to the settlers. So that it became clearly understood in England that the Spaniards "account all other nations for pirates, rovers and thieves that visit any heathen coast that they have once sailed by or looked on." But although French privateers had sacked Havannah with ease in 1553, and Hawkins had, ten years later, shewn what one daring captain could attempt, no precautions had yet been taken to defend this astounding monopoly by adequate force.

After the disastrous ending of Hawkins' last voyage it became manifest that English enterprise in the Western seas was about to enter upon a new phase. It was evident that a peaceful trade with the Spanish settlements was henceforth rigorously closed to English merchants and captains, and Hawkins, in

Three types
of adventurers:
i. Hawkins
and commer-
cial methods.

spite of the miserable traffic in which he was engaged, stands for the attempt to extend the trade between England and Spain upon ordinary commercial methods. Both Government officials and City merchants could acknowledge Hawkins and support him without scruple. But (*a*) the exclusive colonial system of Spain, intent only upon securing to herself the sources of her newly-found treasure, and (*b*) the activity of the Inquisition, bent upon debarring heretics from the New World, definitely closed the West to the free commerce of Europe.

English adventurers, then, were from this time confronted by three possible alternatives. First, to abandon all attempt at trading beyond the limits of Europe; second, to extend the operations of the sea-rovers from the Channel to the Western seas; third, to discover fresh maritime routes giving access to regions beyond the sphere of Spanish and Portuguese influence, where peaceful ventures and settlements might be possible to Englishmen.

The temper of the time placed the first alternative out of the question. The growing desire for maritime adventure and trade was too strong to yield to a first repulse. Nor would the English merchant consent to be shut out from access to the great continent which Spain had appropriated to herself. The right of Spain to the exclusive trade of America was never admitted by Elizabeth and her ministers, although they shrank from formally disputing it.

The second alternative appealed directly to the more adventurous spirits, especially in the west. It was too risky to attract the responsible traders of London or Bristol; Burleigh for fear of consequences condemned it openly; the Queen was its secret adherent, from a love of bold adventure for its own sake, and a shrewd conviction of its ultimate advantage to the naval strength of the country. Drake is the typical hero of this irregular warfare, which by degrees merged into the formal conflict of which the defeat of the Armada was the crowning feat.

ii. Drake
and privateer-
ing.

iii. Gilbert
and Frobisher:
colonisation
and explora-
tion.

The third course, the sober method of exploration and settlement, is associated with the names of Frobisher, Gilbert, and Raleigh.

Francis
Drake.

Francis Drake was born in or about the year 1545, of a family of Devonshire yeomen whose home lay near Tavistock. His father had been ruined and driven from his native county by an outbreak of Catholic fanaticism in the west, and, as an apprentice of a small Channel coasting vessel, young Francis Drake entered upon life through a very hard school. He had been thrown into the thick of Wyatt's insurrection. The fierce penalties which followed upon this rising in Kent, and the stories of Spanish persecutions which met him as he called at Dutch ports, combined to implant an implacable hatred of the Catholic and of the Spaniard, which makes Drake in his earlier period the typical figure of the west country sea-rover. He was a cousin of John Hawkins, and at the age of 21 he was risking his life in West Indian waters, probably in one of Hawkins' ships (1566-1567). Hawkins, who found young Francis Drake a thorough seaman, brave, adventurous, loyal, gave him the command of the "Judith," a barque of 50 tons, in the adventure which met with the disaster of San Juan de Ulua. The perfidy of the Spanish admiral and the ruthless cruelties which were afterwards wreaked upon its victims explain and may perhaps justify the lifelong rancour with which Drake pursued the Spanish power upon the seas. From this time (1568) to the day of his death in 1596 Drake was engaged in unceasing warfare with Spain.

Drake and
the irregular
war in the
Spanish
Indies.

Elizabeth and her Government were for the first 17 years of this period at peace with Philip; but it is characteristic of this first period of national expansion, as it was still of the middle of the 18th century, that a state of warfare between two nations in the Indies or in America was quite consistent

with outward amity in Europe. It is important that we should clearly realise the doctrine which was tacitly accepted by European states until a much later period than that of Drake: viz. that the principles of international dealings and the comity of nations did not, unless expressly stipulated for, apply to the new world of America and the East. Peace between Elizabeth and Philip, friendly relations between James I. and Holland, did not preclude open conflict between their subjects in the Indies. Trade rights existed between England and Spain, but they did not extend to America. A merchantman depended upon its own armament for protection and its captain took little heed of colonial monopolies not backed by force. It was, in truth, recognised that the arm of the State was too weak either to control or to defend its subjects beyond its own immediate boundaries. Drake's adventure therefore was irregular in the sense that the voyages of the East India Company were forty years later, but in neither case were they 'piratical,' nor did they then, as they would now, involve of necessity a formal rupture of peaceful relations.

Drake seems now to have entered, though not avowedly, the service of the Queen's Admiralty. The most critical period (1570) in the national relations with Spain was approaching, and, at a moment when the independence of the nation seemed at stake, the Queen could not afford to disown her most daring or most experienced captains.

In 1571 Drake is again in West Indian waters, preparing for overt war or for private reprisals as circumstances might subsequently determine. In the spring of the following year, when the final rupture with Spain seemed inevitable, Drake, with the secret connivance of the Queen and of the Admiralty, set sail from Plymouth. His two ships and their crews were especially equipped and armed for the object in view, which was to prove how the offensive power of Spain could be cut at the root by the interception of the Peruvian treasure on its passage across the Isthmus of Panama.

Within the limits of this voyage (May 1572–August 1573) The voyage of 1572. are comprised perhaps the most exciting of all the exploits of English adventure in Spanish seas. The treasure convoy was successfully plundered; the towns of the Spanish main were raided; 200 trading vessels were attacked and despoiled. Drake had moreover looked upon the Pacific Ocean. The terror inspired by the French corsairs thirty years before was renewed. Philip felt himself helpless; he had no organised navy, and could with difficulty provide an escort for the yearly voyages of his treasure ships. Drake too had learnt, as Hawkins before him, that the wealth of Spain was the easy prize of a bold, well-planned campaign carried out in the Western seas. He arrived in Plymouth in August 1573 with a most profitable spoil, to find that the relations of Elizabeth and Philip were now as cordial as eighteen months before they had been strained.

In accordance with the policy of the Queen Drake's exploit is now disavowed, but he is carefully kept in sight. He is mysteriously engaged, still harrying the Spaniard, off the Irish coast; he joins Essex some time in 1575, and two years later is organising a new venture to the West. He saw the Queen herself. Her attitude towards Spain once more offered opportunities to men of Drake's stamp. The Queen spoke of being revenged on Philip 'for divers injuries that I have received,' declaring that Drake was the 'only man who might do this exploit.' To which Drake answered, 'that the only way was to annoy him in the Indies,' and thereupon he sketched the plan of the raid into the South seas which had been his dream since, five years before, he had from "a peak in Darien" beheld, first amongst Englishmen, the broad Pacific stretching to Cathay. Cecil, as usual, was to know nothing of the exploit. He had still the same repugnance to irregular adventures, for which the Government might at any time be called to account whilst powerless to control their conduct. England seemed once more on the

The project of the voyage into the Pacific seas, 1577.

brink of open war with Spain, when in November 1577 Drake sailed from Plymouth for an unknown destination.

His departure and his destination had been kept a profound secret, but three people at least were in close touch with his proceedings: they were the Earl of Leicester, Walsingham (the Secretary of State), and the Queen herself, for all of these were partners in Drake's enterprise and had personally contributed to its equipment. No word was received from him until his ship anchored off Plymouth Bay on September 26, 1580.

Meantime he had performed an exploit which determined the entire policy of Elizabeth's reign, and indirectly therefore the course of English history since.

Drake's voyage of circumnavigation is, for various reasons, worthy of being regarded as the most striking and most characteristic of Elizabethan adventures. A brief study of it enables us to understand not a few of the typical features of the daring voyages of exploration, trade and reprisal which fill so large a space in our subject.

The equipment of the enterprise first deserves notice. Drake himself sailed in the "Pelican," renamed the "Golden Hind," of 100 tons, carrying 18 Its equip-
ment. pieces of cannon carefully chosen for their range and accuracy. With him sailed a galleasse of 80 tons, a barque of 30 tons, a store ship of 50 tons, and the "Benedict," a small pinnace of 15 tons, all armed with artillery. The crews, trained to arms, numbered 150. Drake was accompanied in his own ship by some 15 gentlemen cadets, who joined him to gain experience and from love of adventure. Amongst them was one Thomas Doughty, whom Drake was brought to suspect of incitement to mutiny and of treachery, and ultimately to try and execute on the high seas. Doughty's conduct seems to have implicated some great personage at home, possibly Burleigh, who may well have desired to prevent Drake from provoking Spain by an organised

corsair raid and have taken secret means to thwart the expedition.

The seriousness of Drake's purpose is further proved by the provision that was made for the repair and refitting of the ships in remote seas ; by the supply of small arms and weapons suitable for boarding an enemy's ship or for landing parties in force ; and by the dignity and state with which Drake, as the commander of an expedition under what was practically Royal sanction, surrounded himself on board.

Drake's object was twofold. In the first place he was determined to penetrate into that Pacific Sea which was maintained by the Spaniards as their own exclusive waters. The route by the Strait of Magellan had proved so perilous to navigators that it had come to be regarded as impracticable. Spain felt herself absolutely secure in the possession of the coast line from Mexico to Chile, without the need of guarding it by one single ship of war. Into this *mare clausum* (closed waters) Drake had, since his glimpse of it from Darien, been bent upon penetrating, for there, as he had learnt, could the sinews of the Spanish power be most surely cut asunder ; and this view he had urged upon Elizabeth and her ministers. But beyond this we find him already contemplating the more statesmanlike view of acquiring in the Queen's name fresh territories in the regions north of the Spanish settlements, and, if it were possible, of opening out a return route to Europe by the north of the continent. Drake is no longer merely the reckless captain satisfied to plunder and harass his old enemy the Spaniard of the Inquisition, he is henceforth the clear-sighted exponent of a new policy of national expansion.

From the Cape de Verde Islands Drake made for the Brazilian coast, sighting land in the neighbourhood of Rio Grande do Sul. In storms which beset them along the coasts to the south of the River Plate the ships of the squadron were more than once

Drake's objects.

Course of the voyage.

scattered, to the great hindrance of the voyage. There, too, the incident of the treachery of Doughty reached its grim termination. On August 20th, 1578, they sighted the Straits. On the 24th, landing upon the largest island in the passage, Drake solemnly proclaimed it English territory in the name of the Queen. After a most dangerous navigation open water was reached on September 10th, and Drake had realised his vow. Then occurred the greatest disaster of the voyage. One ship foundered in a north-easterly gale, which seems to have continued without intermission for nearly three weeks. The "Elizabeth," Drake's second vessel, was driven back upon the Straits, and, not sighting the "Golden Hind," ultimately sailed home across the Atlantic. Drake was thus left in the Pacific to carry out his enterprise with one ship alone. He had meanwhile discovered by accident that Tierra del Fuego was an island—not as had hitherto been imagined part of the great Antarctic mainland: a fact of first importance in the history of Pacific navigation.

On December 5th, 1578, he was off the little settlement of Valparaiso, and here, more than a year after his departure from Plymouth, for the first time came into touch with the Spanish masters of the coast. In the harbour lay a trading vessel of which Drake made an easy prize. In the warehouses of the port he found stores of gold and silver, and, what were not less welcome, of fresh provisions. Coasting northwards, Drake explored each inlet in the hope of rejoining his missing consort the "Elizabeth," picking up an occasional prize of silver by the way.

The plundering of the Spanish treasure ships.

At Callao di Lima Drake had news which sent him northward again at the utmost speed. The great treasure ship of the Pacific had sailed a fortnight before with the yearly produce of the Peruvian province. Heavily laden, practically unarmed, neither built nor rigged for speed, Drake counted upon overhauling her before she could reach Panama, where

her precious freight would be stored pending its transport across the Isthmus. The prize was secured without resistance and one main object of Drake's voyage accomplished. The "Golden Hind" was henceforward literally ballasted with silver, the total amount of the treasure in jewels and precious metals amounting to perhaps one million and a half of our money. In spite of pursuit, Drake, by the aid of a captured pilot and of charts which he had discovered on one or the other of his prizes, made the coast of Costa Rica and afterwards of California.

He found that the Spanish mariners in the Pacific were convinced that, owing to a north-easterly trend of the American coast, a passage was available from a point somewhat north of San Francisco into the Atlantic at Baccalaos (or Labrador). But having information from his prisoners of the route across the Pacific to the Philippines, Drake was already drawn to contemplate a return by the Asiatic seas, which by his notions could not be far distant. Meantime, being determined to explore the secret of a north-easterly return, he continued his northerly course to some point now impossible to fix, but probably off the Vancouver coast. The absence of any easterly trend, and persistent mists, fogs and storms thwarted his purpose. In a bay to the north of San Francisco Drake anchored about the middle of June 1579. His purpose was to attempt the return journey by the Spice Islands and the Indian Ocean. A month is spent in cleaning the hull of his one remaining ship, in refitting and provisioning; but his detention is marked by an incident of great significance. The Indians of North California, innocent as yet of the greed and cruelty of the Spaniard, welcomed the English crew with friendliness, and indeed with marks of religious awe. Drake's invariable humanity towards the native peoples enabled him to win the confidence of the Indian chiefs. They claimed the protection of Drake and his sovereign, and in the name

Attempt to
find the North-
West Passage
from the
Pacific side.

of Elizabeth he took formal possession of their territory, to which he gave the name of New Albion, mindful, as he says, "of what honour and profit it might bring to our country in time to come and to the use of her most excellent Majesty, he took the sceptre, crown and dignity of the said country into his hand." A monument was set up to mark the possession.

Proclamation
of the English
sovereignty
over New
Albion (Calif-
ornia), June,
1579.

On July 26th, 1579, the Pacific voyage was begun. Sixty-eight days they were out of sight of land. They first touched the Pelew Islands, and after sighting the Philippines, made land at Ternate in the Spice Islands. They were now within the limits of the Portuguese sphere.

He crosses
the Pacific.

Drake at once discusses with the Sultan of the island a treaty of alliance which should give England a foothold in Eastern seas. But Drake was anxious to be home again. A small island off Celebes served him for repairing and provisioning his ship and for refreshing his men, though the dangers of navigation in the Java seas nearly proved disastrous to the ship, its crew, and its freight. However, by good seamanship and good fortune he was at last enabled to steer a course into the open sea, and after touching at Java, where he had news of European ships hovering within inconvenient distance, he made for the Cape passage by a southerly route. At the end of September 1580 he was sighted off Plymouth Sound.

The importance of Drake's voyage of circumnavigation should be carefully seized. In the first place it presents to us most of the characteristic features of the Elizabethan voyage of adventure; such as the smallness of the craft employed; the reliance placed upon first-class seamanship; upon extreme care in preparation, equipment, rigging and armament; the provision made for repair and refit; the presence

The voyage
typical of
Elizabethan
adventures.

of skilled artisans, cartographers, gunners. We note further the difficulty of keeping ships together in foul weather; the delay in making for the rendezvous agreed upon; the risk of mutiny; danger from hostile natives; trouble due to the need of watering and provisioning, and from diseases peculiar to long voyages and tropical climates. In that century every voyage added something to the stock of geographical knowledge, and Drake had penetrated farther south, and, on the west coast at least, farther north, than any European navigator had succeeded in doing. He had, like almost every navigator, kept before him the vision of the North-West Passage; he had attempted to reach the Indies by the west, and for the first time had succeeded. The voyage is typical, too, of the irregular warfare with the Spaniard which marks all maritime adventure of the period. It has ceased to be mere reprisal; it is systematic, business-like, humane as regards life and liberty, and, though tinged with peculiar humour, is marked by strong and sincere religious feeling. Drake's evangelical fervour is excited by the cruelties of the Inquisition at Lima and the unholy living of its instruments.

But the voyage has a special character of its own: it marks a definite stage in the development of English policy.

The special
importance of
the voyage.

First, it was a determined attempt to force an open rupture with Spain, and Walsingham, not less than Drake, regarded it in this light from its inception. Burleigh for the same reason did his best to thwart it. Elizabeth, as usual, hoped to share its profit without paying its proper price.

Secondly, it was the first successful attempt of many to undermine the Spanish power by seizing its supplies of treasure. Hitherto the sea-rovers had mainly confined themselves to plundering the Spanish trader. Drake, now improving upon his exploit of 1575, attacks the Spanish Government monopoly itself, for the whole production and transport of precious metals was the exclusive privilege of the Spanish Crown.

Thirdly, Drake had revealed once more the helplessness of Spain at sea, and English seamen had now acquired that contempt for the courage and resource of the Spanish sailor which they never lost.

Fourthly, the achievement which left the sharpest impress was perhaps the treaty with the Sultan of the Spice Islands. The staid merchant regarded spices as safer merchandise than the bullion of prize-ships, and it is undoubtedly true that Drake's reports of the untold wealth of the Moluccas, Celebes and Java gave the first impulse to the trade of London with the East, whilst his agreement with Ternate formed a useful instrument of diplomacy.

Lastly, for the first time in our history, a native people upon another continent was received formally within the dominion of the Queen. Frobisher was about the same time acquiring uninhabitable tracts in Arctic seas. Drake felt that he was establishing a sovereignty which should enable England to rival Spain on her own grounds. The action of Drake in New Albion had indeed no result, but it indicates for the first time the presence of broader aims than those of mere reprisal, and must be viewed in conjunction with the deliberate projects which were taking shape in the minds of Gilbert and his friends at home.

For in Gilbert, Raleigh, and their friends we find the same restless temper of the age taking definitely the direction of expansion through colonization.

Sir Hum-
phrey Gilbert.

Sir Humphrey Gilbert, a Devonshire man of family and estate, who combined in true Elizabethan fashion a taste for learning and travel with skill in arms, had devoted himself especially to the study of geography and navigation; beginning, as a scholar of his day must, with the Greeks and Romans, he passed on to the Venetians, the Florentines and the French. Living as he did in a time of activity, and anxious to turn his enquiries, statesmanlike, to practical account, his researches issue in definite projects. In 1565 he

is found promoting a scheme for a North-West Passage to Cathay, under royal protection. A few years later he sums up his arguments for, (a) the practicability of the route, and (b) its political and commercial advantage to the State, in his famous "*Discourse to prove a passage by the North-west to Cathaia and the East Indies.*" The possibility of such a route Gilbert sets himself to prove by reasons wholly unscientific, but typical of the age, based upon the "nature of things" and upon untested traditions of travellers. When he comes to speak of the advantages of such an enterprise we are upon much more interesting ground. The "*Discourse*" sets forth the following positions:

His "*Discourse:*"
about 1575.

Gilbert's
propositions.

1. The discovery of a route free from the interference of "any prince living, Christian or heathen," will enable England to secure a share of the infinite wealth of the East.
2. The North-west route from England to the East, being so much shorter than any open to other countries of Europe, will enable us not only to compete with Portuguese or Spanish traders, but further
3. We should be in a position to trade with regions not yet reached by Europeans.
4. "Also we might inhabit part of those countries, and settle there such needy people of our country which now trouble the commonwealth, and through want here at home are forced to commit outrageous offences, whereby they are daily consumed with the gallows."
5. Such trade and settlement would be aided by the comparative nearness of these regions:
6. Which would provide a market for the large production of English cloth, making us thus less dependent on the demand from European countries.
7. English shipping and seamanship will be greatly benefited, to the advantage of national defence.

8. New industries may spring up at home to supply articles suitable to the needs of Eastern nations and various peoples to be found on the voyage thither; thus providing employment "for vagabonds and such-like idle persons."

We note that the arguments here brought forward are partly political,—the expansion of the nation and the strengthening of the navy; partly economic,—the opening of fresh markets and the consequent increase of employment; and that they contemplate not trade only, but the settlement of English citizens in lands at present unoccupied by Europeans. Now this latter point, to which special attention must be directed, is further insisted upon by other of Gilbert's friends and contemporaries, notably by Peckham (1583) and by Hayes (1583), who were both closely associated with him in his enterprise.

Peckham
and Hayes
upon Colonisa-
tion.

Peckham, who has Newfoundland in his mind, dwells like Gilbert on the national advantages to be gained by colonisation: the strengthening of the navy ensured by ample supply of shipbuilding material, by the acquisition of the great fishery, and by the seamanship there trained; nor does he overlook the motive of national pride in empire. But he dwells, as Gilbert did not, on the immediate inducements to settlers: for the gentry there are all the attractions of country life; for the farmer unlimited lands, most profitable for grazing and corn-growing; for the trader furs, skins and timber; for the fisherman the most famous banks in the known world. The natives will be converted, civilised, and taught agriculture and the mechanical arts. Hayes attaches the greatest weight to the religious motive, "which must be the chief motive of such as shall make any attempt that way." He urges that the obligation not less than the privilege lies with England to colonise the American continent north of Florida, on grounds of prior right of discovery, of geographical situation, of the fitness of national character, of economic need arising from the overplus of

population due to long-continued peace; "it seeming probable that the countries lying north of Florida God hath reserved to be reduced unto Christian civility by the English nation." He especially rebukes "the fault and foolish sloth in many of our nation choosing rather to live indirectly (*i.e.* dependent upon others) and very miserably to live and die within this realm pestered with inhabitants, than to adventure as becometh men to obtain an habitation in those remote lands in which Nature very prodigally doth minister unto men's endeavours."

These discourses, which fall within the years 1575-1584, reveal to us the motives which were actuating a notable group of Englishmen. When we examine their arguments in detail we find that they represent the chief grounds upon which colonisation has been encouraged ever since.

The motives for Colonisation as understood in the reign of Elizabeth.

We may sum up the reasons alleged for the policy of settlement, or plantation, as it was then called, under the following heads:

First: *National policy.* This country by right of discovery and of geographical situation has a natural claim to the settlement of the temperate regions of the West, which are at present unoccupied by Europeans. Such possession will secure to England a counterpoise to the power of Spain; will tend to an increase in the number of mariners and of ships, and to greater skill in seamanship; will further strengthen the nation by rendering us independent of European supplies of timber, cordage and all other raw materials of shipbuilding. So deeply is the conviction implanted that the wealth of England and her safety must be sought upon the seas. Nor is there wanting a distinct note of aspiration for an imperial position to rival that of Spain.

Secondly: *The economic condition of England.* A century of comparative peace had tended to a growth of population outstripping that of manufacture. Hence settlement will provide employment for the sons of well-to-do houses, as well as

for peasantry and an increasing class of "sturdy" vagrants, paupers, and even criminals. Already we notice the mistaken belief which so seriously hampered the efforts at colonisation for two centuries, namely, that the failures and outcasts of the mother country were good enough material for the critical work of founding a new state.

Thirdly: *Commercial advantages.* All classes of the community will find plentiful occupation in a new home. A demand will spring up for English goods, notably for woollens, and the needs of native populations may even create new trades in the mother country, which will naturally retain the monopoly of such commerce. Precious metals may be confidently looked for, and the store of gold and silver in the mother country increased rather than diminished. Articles, such as hides, spices, silks and sugar now imported from our rivals may be produced by English subjects settled in English lands, whilst the produce of the Newfoundland fishery will be secured to English fishermen.

Fourthly: *Religious motive.* The "compassion of poor infidels," who should be brought to Christianity and settled industry, was in this first age of colonisation a more prominent motive than it was later. It was not less necessary that the native should be saved from the errors of Rome, which would be his inevitable fate if England were forestalled by Spain.

The discourses of Gilbert and Peckham do not clearly distinguish between projects of settlement and voyages of exploration. The two will go hand in hand. To discover the North-west Passage and to establish a short route by the Behring Strait (Strait of Anian) to the China seas, far removed from the sphere of Spanish or Portuguese empire, was, as we know, the goal of all Elizabethan enterprise. It long continued to haunt the imagination of the practical East India merchant, and many years were to elapse before the leaders of English colonisation finally shook themselves free

Settlement
and explora-
tion of new
commercial
routes go hand
in hand.

from its influence. To-day the dream of an English route by the north-west is, however differently in form, yet in actual fact, realised by the railway from Halifax to Vancouver.

The mainland of America, north of the Spanish province of Mexico, was at this period practically unoccupied by any European people. The first definite attempt at settlement had proceeded from the French. In 1534 Jacques Cartier,

Early European Settlements in North American Continent, 1534—1562.

The French on the St Lawrence.

a sea-captain of St Malo, penetrated as far as the mouth of the St Lawrence, and coasted along the shores of New Brunswick. In the following year he ascended the river as far as Montreal ("the royal mount"). Five years later (1540) an organised expedition, including a body of intending settlers, and a military force,

with Cartier as captain-general, set sail. A site was chosen close to Quebec; but owing to jealousies between the seafaring and the military element in command disagreements arose, Cartier sailed away and before long the settlement itself broke up. The reasons are not quite clear, but we hear of bad administration and inadequate defence against Indian attacks. But whatever the actual causes, and our own experiences in Virginia later on will suggest more than one explanation, the colony died out soon after 1540, and at the time of Elizabeth's accession no European settlement survived upon the American mainland north of Mexico. For half a century French interests in that region were limited to a share in the Newfoundland fishery, an industry which attracted every summer the more adventurous fishermen from Western Europe, for whom it constituted a most instructive school in

The French and Spaniards in Florida.

ocean seamanship. The Spaniards had equally failed to make good their footing in the vast unoccupied continent north of the Mexican

Gulf. We have seen that the Caribbean seas were the true centre of Spanish interests in the New World, and

to protect them and the wealth they concealed from interference of other powers was the constant pre-occupation of Philip II.

Wisely therefore did the Spanish officials discourage settlement upon the great northern lands. Journeys of exploration had been made through the south-eastern region, which vaguely bounded received the name of Florida. But the Spanish adventurer was confronted by natives of a more vigorous type than those whom he had so easily enslaved farther south. Florida was fertile and could readily be made productive. But the Spaniard founded agricultural settlements only where slave labour could be had ; and the North American Indians quickly shewed that they could not be attacked with impunity, much less dispossessed or enslaved. There were indeed rumours of golden cities and a way to the South seas, but all attempts of Spain to explore or settle the territory lying between the Atlantic and the Mississippi ended in disaster. The most noteworthy venture of discovery, that of de Soto in 1559, failed, partly at least, in consequence of the cruelties of his followers towards the natives; he himself, a romantic figure, died in the forests, and a straggling remnant only reached the Gulf of Mexico. Of efforts at genuine plantation there is no record; and perhaps the Spaniard was already spoilt for the arduous and patient work of true colonisation.

With de Soto's failure Spain might possibly have finally abandoned the eastern sea-board, had not religious hatred supplied a new stimulus. In 1562 a body of French Huguenots sought, like the English Independents, sixty years later, freedom for faith and worship in the new world. They established themselves on the coast of Florida at the mouth of the St John's river. But their experience was not more favourable than that of their predecessors on the St Lawrence. They quarrelled with their Indian neighbours; they neglected to sow crops for their own support; they shewed, as Hawkins

reported, a marked want of energy and self-helpfulness. "They would not take the pains so much as to fish in the river before their doors, but would have all things put in their mouths."

Frenchmen have rarely been content to find a permanent home in a foreign land. It needed but little to break up the settlement. Next year they were succeeded by a larger party of emigrants; the more adventurous desired only to go in search of the fabled city; others mutinied, then abandoned the colony and took to buccaneering in the Indian seas. The leaders neglected the commonest needs of the plantation, which but for fresh aid from home must have perished. But this second effort at colonisation on the part of French adventurers was destined to a more tragic end. The story of it throws no little light on the feeling of French and English Protestants towards Spanish rule. The French Court in its bitter zeal for the Church warned Philip II of the existence of the struggling Huguenot settlement. The Spanish Government had been startled by the appearance of Hawkins in the Western seas; but a heretic and foreign community established at the very gateways of their own Empire demanded instant action. An expedition was despatched from Cadiz. The settlement was stormed and utterly destroyed. Such men as were captured were hanged from surrounding trees bearing each a label that they were hung there "Not as Frenchmen but as Lutherans." This outrage sent a thrill through France. A fierce revenge was planned; a daring young French soldier led on his own account an expedition against the Spaniards who occupied the rebuilt fort. These in turn became the victims of a surpris, and the Spanish soldiers were hanged as the Frenchmen had been two years before: the trees were marked with this inscription, "Not as Spaniards but as Murderers." The avengers made good their return to France.

Spain, however, retained a place of arms on the Florida

coast, a post of observation against intruders. But when Englishmen between 1570—1585 turned their thoughts to the task in which the French had twice so signally failed they found no European settlers to dispute with them the title to the Atlantic seaboard between St Augustine and the Northern seas. For the time the French had failed. Their effort had been ill-conceived and ill-carried out. For them too the day of colonisation was not yet come.

The first attempt to realize Gilbert's project was led by Frobisher, who in 1576—78, undertook three voyages for the discovery of a North-West Passage. He, like other adventurers, was furnished with funds by a group of merchants who were incorporated as the "Company of Cathay." He was empowered to annex and occupy territory in the name of the Queen, to search for precious metals and to open up a practicable route

The North-
West Passage:
Frobisher,
1576.

through the Strait of Anian to the Pacific Ocean. As an instance of the effort after expansion characteristic of the time Frobisher's voyages are of great interest. But their practical result was worthless. Labrador and Greenland, which he took to be the borderland of the continents of America and Asia, offered no prospect of settlement, although on the shore of Frobisher's Bay he (July, 1576) proclaimed the Queen's sovereignty. Nor was his search for "a sea passage to the West" of more avail. Frobisher, like other navigators, was hard to convince of the existence of an impassable ice-barrier between the northern waters of the Atlantic and Pacific. Like other explorers also he imagined a new world in which gold and silver were common constituents of the soil. On reaching Meta Incognita, the inhospitable site of his landing, his first care was to lade his ships with earth which his experts assured him was full of precious mineral, but which when tested on his return proved to be entirely destitute of value. Frobisher, too, although a brave and versatile seaman, had none of the qualities requisite to the leader of a colony.

Gilbert and
Newfound-
land. The first
English
Colony, 1583.

Meantime, after several failures to carry out his projects, Gilbert had succeeded in procuring a 'patent' or commission under Royal Seal in June, 1578. By its terms Gilbert is granted free liberty and license to discover "such remote, heathen and barbarous lands not actually possessed of any Christian prince or people as to him shall seem good, there to inhabit and remain and to take as many subjects of the Queen as shall willingly accompany him." Such lands shall form part of the Queen's dominions, and its population be of her allegiance. Its governors shall not offend against the peace which the Queen from time to time maintains with other sovereigns. Subject to one-fifth of all gold and silver ores the freehold of the soil and all its produce shall belong absolutely to Gilbert or his representatives. He shall exercise over all settlers a jurisdiction "as near as conveniently may be" to the laws of England, which shall include the exercise of public worship according to the Book of Common Prayer.

As a first step towards realizing his project, Gilbert created a joint-stock company in the usual manner. Sir Francis Walsingham was the chairman, and the shareholders were merchants and others, mainly citizens of Southampton, which was thus made the home trading port of the new colony. Not until 1583 did Gilbert succeed in landing a body of settlers upon the American mainland. On August 5th of that year his three ships with a company of intending colonists anchored in the harbour of St John's, Newfoundland. Summoning all the inhabitants and traders then in port he read the Queen's patent, and, in her name, took possession of the town and the territory within a radius of 200 leagues. He himself claimed the freehold of the soil, admitting all then settled on the land as tenants of himself and subjects of the Queen. The oath of allegiance was administered, the arms of England erected. Thus the first English colony in the true sense was proclaimed, and England took the first, though as it proved a halting, step towards territorial Empire.

Gilbert had organised his expedition in view of definite settlement, and in the hope of a friendly arrangement with the native tribes. He had started with a company of 200 men, amongst whom were craftsmen likely to be useful in a new settlement. But in spite of the favourable promise of the country, discontent and sickness compelled Gilbert to return, though with the confident determination to repeat his voyage on a larger scale and with better preparation in the following year. But on the return home the small ship in which he was sailing foundered in the night with all on board.

Gilbert's work, however, was not allowed to lapse. His place was taken by Sir Walter Raleigh, who now enters upon the scene of colonial adventure. In 1584 he obtains a new patent on the lines of Gilbert's and at once equips an expedition of exploration.

Raleigh and
Virginia, 1584.

Raleigh's captains instead of making the bleak coast of Newfoundland touched the American coast at the island Roanoke, off the shore of the present State of North Carolina. There Barlow and Amidas, as agents of Raleigh, landed, and took formal possession in the Queen's name. They returned with a glowing report of the natural fertility of the soil, the charm of the climate, and above all encouraging rumours amongst the natives of gold and pearls. The Queen herself suggested the name Virginia for the new discovery. On the 9th April, 1585, an expedition for settlement put to sea. 108 settlers had volunteered; the fleet of seven ships was under the command of Sir Richard Grenville; the colony was to be under the control of Lane. Grenville was a fighting sea-captain of Drake's type, without Drake's strenuous perseverance and in no way fitted for the sober work of plantation. Lane, too, was a man of true Elizabethan versatility, a courtier, a soldier of fortune, courageous, but restless and impatient of steady toil. The settlers themselves contained amongst them men who had "little understanding, less discretion, and more tongue than was needful or requisite." Others, again, were unwilling

to face the hard fare and the primitive conditions of an unsettled country and disdained work which promised no speedy return.

With this somewhat unlikely material Grenville landed on the mainland, to which the name of Virginia was extended. In the autumn the fleet returned to England, leaving Lane in charge of the settlers to winter in their new home. A fort had been built on the island of Roanoke for their security. The Indians, wrongfully provoked, were no longer friendly, means of subsistence were hard to procure. Lane, lured by reports of a gold mine, of pearl fishery and a strait leading to the South seas, endangered both his own exploring party and the garrison whom he had left behind.

In June, 1586, Drake unexpectedly appeared off the coast on his return from his great voyage to the West Indies of 1585. The settlers, hard pressed by the Indians, discouraged by the evident necessities of hard work, persuaded Drake to carry them one and all home with him to England. Early in July a relief expedition sent by Raleigh under the command of Grenville arrived at Roanoke to find the settlement deserted, and though he left behind him 15 of his company to maintain possession, Raleigh's first attempt at colonising America had failed. But his ardour was not to be damped. He made preparations for a strong permanent settlement. In 1587, 150 settlers, of whom 17 were women, sailed under his auspices for Roanoke. A rudimentary government was constituted, and a "city" called after Raleigh's name planned. Once more the emigrants were reduced during the winter to dire straits. It was now the year of the Armada, and, though relief ships were dispatched by Raleigh, they failed to reach America. Raleigh now reluctantly abandoned his Virginian enterprise. His "patent" was transferred to John White, who in 1589 started to join the colony, but yielding on the way to the temptation of buccaneering, arrived too late to save the settlers, of whom nothing was

Failure of
the Colony: its
causes.

afterwards heard beyond a vague tradition of captivity and massacre at the hands of their Indian enemies.

The first chapter in the history of English colonisation thus comes to an end. At the death of Elizabeth England possessed beyond the Atlantic nothing more than dormant claims to territories vaguely defined in Newfoundland and Virginia, with yet more shadowy rights in Frobisher's Bay and New Albion.

This was a time of experiment, of uncertain effort to attain an end not very clearly conceived. Amongst the men to whom these first attempts were due, some were thinking first of a shorter passage to the East, others of new markets for English goods amongst peaceful natives, others of the search for gold; the more restless were on the watch for a privateering venture on their own account. The necessities of a community in a distant land were ill-understood, and the patient endurance needed for its success lacked a sufficient motive. The settler was disappointed, or grew weary of exile; it was not difficult to admit a mistake and to return home. Englishmen of that age were not driven abroad by persecution, nor, in spite of the much talked of distress, by starvation; they were not deported by Government against their will. The enterprise itself was a voluntary business adventure and not an affair of State. The Elizabethan State, indeed, was too weak to attempt such undertakings, and the work was of necessity left to individuals. Private citizens with their joint capital projected and fitted out the expeditions of Hawkins, Frobisher, and Raleigh. If the Queen or her ministers were associated in them it was purely in their private capacity. The "patent" or Charter from the Crown implied, indeed, sovereign rights, but neither State initiative nor administrative control. Elizabethan England was backward, poor and thinly peopled; it was impossible for a responsible statesman like Burleigh to encourage the emigration of able-bodied men and women on a large scale, nor indeed was the right material forthcoming. Failing the discoveries of

rich deposits of gold and silver the men whom Gilbert and Raleigh wished to draw to Newfoundland and Virginia found stronger attraction in the chances of plunder on Spanish seas. For settlement implied patience, endurance, and, at best, the slow attainment of a modest standard of comfort. But the young men who followed Drake and Raleigh were discontented with all that was commonplace; they had a restless curiosity, a passion for adventure. So they went

“Some to the wars to seek their fortune there,
Some to discover islands far away,
Some to the studious Universities.”

(Two Gentlemen of Verona.)

But colonisation promised neither excitement, nor wealth, nor renown. Not until the peace with Spain (1604) and the failure of Raleigh's dreams had sobered men's spirits could the plodding work of settlement be taken up in earnest. By that time fresh motives were stirring amongst men of a different type from the brilliant leaders of Elizabethan adventure.

Meantime we must admit that Raleigh had higher aims than most of the group to which he belonged.

*Raleigh and
Guiana, 1595.*

Sir Richard Grenville, for instance, his old colleague of 1585, was only truly happy when chasing and fighting the Spaniard on the high seas, and it was thus that he met his heroic death off the Azores in 1591. To Raleigh the Spanish war meant more than reprisal, more even than a sound method of national defence; it was above all a means of securing territorial expansion. The glamour of 'empire' had taken hold of him, but it was always an empire which should be peopled by men of English blood. Virginia had failed, partly by accident of the time. Might not Guiana succeed?

Guiana, the region between the Orinoco and the Amazon, was as yet unoccupied, though regarded as within the Spanish 'sphere of influence.' In 1594 Raleigh sent out a trusted captain to examine the delta of the Orinoco. Next year he

secured a royal patent empowering him "to offend and enfeeble the King of Spain and his subjects in his dominions to the uttermost," and further to subdue and 'plant' heathen lands unoccupied by Europeans. The High Admiral lent a ship, Cecil contributed money, Raleigh put his all into the venture, of which he took the lead in person. The Orinoco was explored for 300 miles. Raleigh brought home encouraging accounts of the fertility of the soil, with strange tales told by friendly Indians of human monsters,

‘men whose heads

Do grow beneath their shoulders.’ (*Othello*.)

and still more exciting accounts of "the great and golden city of Manoa," whose King, it might be safely expected, "at the sight of a very small force would yield to her Majesty by composition so many hundred thousand pounds yearly as should both defend (*i.e.* ward off) all enemies abroad and defray all expenses at home." Should he resist he was perfectly defenceless and could be easily conquered. But, though such wealth naturally makes the first appeal, "for health, good air, pleasure and riches Guiana excels all regions," and is well adapted to English settlement by "soldiers and gentlemen that are younger brethren and all captains and chieftains that want employment." But Elizabeth did not listen; the defence of the kingdom did not allow of distant ventures till Spain should be further crippled. Raleigh was in high command in the great expedition against Cadiz (1596) and in the less successful one against the Azores in the following year. But Guiana was henceforth the preoccupation of his remaining years and bore conspicuous part in the shameful tragedy of his death.

Raleigh's pilot in the attack on the Azores (1597) was John Davis. He was one of the group of seamen who gained experience and renown in the hopeless search for the North-West passage to the East. Davis made three voyages between the years 1585-7 of which full records are left to us. These

The N.-W.
Passage.
John Davis,
1585-7.

reveal a man of intrepidity and skill as a mariner, and of that restless love of adventure so characteristic of his age. It is unnecessary for our purpose to follow the course of his explorations. He penetrated farther north than his great predecessor Martin Frobisher and like him gave his name to an important arm of the sea. With Frobisher he worthily heads the long roll of English mariners who with varying degrees of success but with equal zeal have endeavoured to force a way through the ice barriers of the arctic region of America.

But it is more important to understand the motives which during the 16th century and later directed English maritime adventure to a possible new route to the East. The discovery of the Cape of Good Hope had tended to the profit of the Portuguese monopoly and not to that of Europe at large. This trade monopoly was very stiffly maintained by a power whose real strength at sea was still further magnified by repute. The exclusive position of Portugal east of the Cape was practically admitted by England, up to 1580, as resting upon right of occupation, which was assumed to be far more effective than it was in reality. Not until Drake's return in 1580, coinciding as it did with the transfer of Portuguese dependencies to Spain, were the eyes of English statesmen and traders opened to the true strength of that occupation. But the Portuguese navy was still reported strong in eastern waters, her 'carracks' were huge and heavily armed. Moreover there were grave difficulties of navigation to be faced by an English merchantman venturing upon the Cape voyage. Portugal controlled—or claimed to do so—all practicable roadsteads and bays on the route, where ships' holds and keels could be cleaned, where shelter, fresh food and water could be obtained, matters essential to a long and trying voyage. Again, till late in Elizabeth's reign English captains seem to have been dependent upon Portuguese pilots, who were not to be trusted to handle

The arguments:

(a) Political,

(b) from Navigation,

foreign vessels in their own peculiar seas. To trade, then, by the Cape was a venture of great risk, and might involve fighting. This English traders of London or Southampton were anxious to avoid, and, in their desire for strictly commercial methods, routes and markets, sought for access to 'the infinite wealth' of the East by avenues which in virtue of discovery and of occupation might be recognised as rightfully English. Of the southern routes the African was closed by Portugal, the American by Spain, by its own natural terrors, and by sheer distance. The North-Eastern route and the land journey by Russia and Persia were either too costly or wholly impossible. There remained only the vast North Atlantic, which it was believed contained one or more hidden channels communicating directly with the China Sea, if indeed there did not exist a broad strait to the north of the continent corresponding to that which separated the southern half from the great Terra Australis extending to the Pole. Frobisher's map, at the end of the volume, should be studied for the Elizabethan view of the problem of the North-West passage.

In addition to reasons drawn from politics and from navigation there was the convincing economic motive.

The only product which England had to offer in exchange for foreign goods was woollen cloth of the heavier sorts. For this a market could only be found in cold, or at least temperate, regions, as for instance amongst the peoples of Cathaia, Tartary, or Japan. Further, in making the passage thither by the North-West, regions 'unoccupied by any Christian people' would most likely be discovered, where English settlers and friendly savages, won by them to civilised customs (*i.e.* the wearing of English clothes), would be natural purchasers of the same commodity. In this case, and in this case only, the distressing necessity of exporting hard money to foreign countries in exchange for cargoes of spices, silk or dye-stuffs would be obviated, and the national and private gain alike be free of its most serious drawback. The strength of Spain was

(c) **Economic.**

held to be due to the bullion which she so freely imported; how then could England compete with her if she, on the contrary, exported gold? Thus in January, 1601, we find the East India Company resolving "to maintain the trade of the East Indies, if it be possible, by the transportation and vent of Cloth and other native commodities of this Realm without any money at all, or else so little as may be conveniently tolerated": "which monies and coin they could not prepare but with great difficulty and trouble and not without some mislike of the transportation of treasure out of the land." To this end the Court decides to attempt once more the discovery of a North-West passage by which they may attain the countries of Cathaia and China, "being of that temperature which in all likelihood will afford a most liberal vent of English cloths and kersies."

The earlier voyages of exploration in the north-west Atlantic are thus associated with East Indian trade rather than with the extension of our interests on the American continent. Fro-bisher and Davis, like Francis Drake himself, were, in one aspect of their work, following clues by which Elizabethan enterprise felt its way to the true Indies. But the desired ocean route has never been discovered. The last year of Elizabeth's reign (1602-3) saw the Company's fleet trading for the first time in eastern waters, though the Queen was dead when the news of its success reached England: and the beginnings of the British power in the East are most conveniently reviewed in connection with the following period.

THE RISE OF THE NAVY.

The naval power of England in the modern sense dates from Henry VIII. He was perhaps the first English statesman to perceive that the policy of England must in virtue of the sea barrier

**The Tudor
Navy: Henry
VIII.**

which separated her from the Continent be mainly independent of European affairs. The loss of the French inheritance of previous centuries, the absence of blood relationship with foreign dynasties, the isolation of the English monarchy, due to the part taken by the country in the Reformation movement, all tended in the same direction. His sagacity led him to recognize the leading place which the Navy must occupy in national defence. There was a further reason for the creation of a standing naval force. The opening years of the century, as we have seen, were marked by a large increase in the sea-borne trade of the country. But foreign commerce was greatly hampered by the prevalence of piracy along the main routes of traffic. To patrol the seas, therefore, as well as to defend the coasts from invasion, were the twin objects of the early Tudor Navy.

Henry was himself keenly interested in the details of naval requirements. He summoned William Hawkins of Plymouth, fresh from his voyages to Brazil, to consultation. He founded schools of seamanship on the Thames, on the Humber and on the Tyne. “Nearly every year marked some advance, some plan calculated to make the Navy a more effective fighting instrument” (Oppenheim). But no step was of so great importance as the adoption from Venetian models of a new type of a trim fast-sailing ship-of-war. The Venetian galleon was modified to depend if necessary entirely upon sail, oars being practically discarded. Fifteen vessels of this type were constructed in the later years of Henry’s reign. The ‘galleasse,’ as it was called, was usually a three or four-masted vessel of 250 tons burden, of narrow beam and low free-board, and was the swiftest and most effective fighting ship then designed. In the famous sea-fight of August 1545 the sailing galleasse proved invincible in conflict with the largest oared vessels of the French fleet. It is from this year that we may date the acknowledged superiority of England upon the seas. We associate then the birth of

Advance in
naval design,
circ. 1540.

the maritime instinct in English policy with the naval enterprise of Henry VIII.

The Protector Somerset and Queen Mary were unable to maintain the Navy in adequate efficiency. Philip indeed in 1554 took steps to increase the fighting power of the English fleet which he wished to see a useful instrument of Spanish policy. But the loss of Calais proved that the Navy had fallen sadly short in organisation, in seamanship, and in vessels, of the high standard left by Henry VIII. But still at the time of Elizabeth's accession the English fleet was admittedly the best in Europe although but 22 ships in all were found to be actually fit for sea. One of the first acts of Elizabeth's reign was the preparation of what we should now call a 'naval programme.' Small, easily-handled vessels of the galleon type were planned, barques, which were smaller ships of war of about 150 tons, were to be added, with still smaller galleys or pinnaces which were mainly adjuncts to larger craft. It is to be noticed also that with the increase of the mercantile marine the larger English merchantmen were usually built and armed with a view to their service in action. In 1558 forty-five such vessels were available. Elizabeth extended a practice of Henry VIII in granting a bounty of five shillings a ton to the builders of vessels of over 100 tons burden. This subsidy was one cause of the rapid growth of the English merchant navy. It gave also to the Queen's Government a right to call in emergency for ships so built for national defence; a system which we have seen revived in our own day. The larger merchantmen, however, of the time were slow-sailing vessels, very broad in beam—'round-ships' they were called—and of little use in attack. Elizabeth found in them a cheap line of defence; she owned one or two herself, and was ready to hire them out at a rent or to contribute them as her share in a voyage of adventure. The Admiralty was in 1559 organised for the first time as a State Department, and it is officially declared that "in these days the Navy is one

Decay of
the Navy.
1547—1570.

of the chiefest defences of this kingdom." The Lord High Admiral is henceforth a chief minister of the Crown. This early promise of Elizabeth's reign was scantily fulfilled. For ten years little or nothing was done to render the Navy efficient. Not till the perilous condition of politics in 1569-70 startled them would Elizabeth and Cecil consent to the needful expenditure.

A better era dawns with the appointment of John Hawkins as Treasurer of the Navy and contractor for the building and repair of the Queen's ships. No one was better qualified for the practical duties of director of the Navy. His thorough knowledge of seamanship, his acquaintance with foreign types of warship and of trading vessel, his unique opportunities of obtaining skilled advice in designing rigging and armament, above all his integrity, made him invaluable at a critical moment in our naval history. With small resources at his disposal he worked his hardest to adapt the fleet to the needs of the new time and from his administration the true Elizabethan navy must be held to date. Wynter as master of naval ordnance was the colleague concerned especially with artillery, and both alike were intimate with the adventurous group which had gathered round Drake.

John Hawkins, Treasurer of Navy 1575. Period of high efficiency.

The type of war-vessel which found most favour with them, though perhaps twice the size of the galleon designed by Henry VIII, was small compared with the 'great ship' of Spain and Portugal or with the earlier Elizabethan warship. The "Revenge" was, on the eve of the Armada, the model of the fighting ship as understood by Drake. It was a ship of 441 tons burden, had a length of 92 feet, a width of 32 feet. Above the main deck two rising platforms, or fighting decks, raised the stern quarters high out of the water. The armament consisted of 34 large guns of varied pattern, carrying shot ranging in weight from 30 lbs. to 9 lbs. These were fired broadside whilst stern

The new ship of war: the "Revenge."

and bow were each armed with chasing-guns. On the upper decks quick-firing (breech-loading) small pieces were mounted. They served to protect the main deck in case the vessel were boarded by the enemy, and to clear the rigging of a hostile ship, while the broadside disabled the hull. In contrast with Spanish practice English ships were very heavily armed and manned in proportion to their size: and it is noteworthy that as late as the middle of the 19th century the 32-pounder, which is about equal to the Elizabethan 'demi-cannon,' was the ordinary weapon of the British man-of-war. There is indeed a remarkable similarity in type of offensive armament between the Elizabethan and the modern Navy.

The best master-artillerists were Italians: practised gunners were scarce, though England had great advantage over Spain in respect both of numbers and skill. At the time of Drake's return from his voyage

The organ-
isation of the
Elizabethan
Fleet.

round the world in 1580, the Navy consisted of 25 sail owned by the Admiralty, carrying crews of 7000 hands. This small nucleus could rapidly be increased by transforming merchantmen into war-ships by the addition of fighting platforms and deck protection. We must remember that an ocean-going ship was always armed, and was expected to be able to defend itself from attack, so that the line of division between a naval vessel and a merchantman was not very strongly marked. But the condition of the Navy caused increasing anxiety, as the absorption of the Portuguese fleet (1580) gave Spain, for the first time, the control of a first-class naval force. An important Committee of Enquiry, upon which Drake served, was appointed in 1583 and fresh energy was at once imparted to the Administration. Drake in the following year received a commission for the organisation and command of a fleet in western waters, with which he sailed on his great expedition to the West Indies. In 1585 he is appointed Admiral of the fleet operating against the Spanish coasts, and here we notice that combination of the official Navy with

volunteer auxiliaries, which is a feature of all naval operations of the age. The nucleus of the expedition consisted of six ships of the Royal Navy, four ships were contributed by the Levant Company, Drake himself added four at his own cost, and others were owned by private gentlemen of Devonshire. Drake, as Admiral, was in supreme command, but the maintenance of the fleet was only in part undertaken by the Government. The State thus provided the organisation, but private enterprise contributed to the expenses which might be made good by prizes and other profits of the venture. In this way merchant-ships and crews under the control of naval experts were prepared for the part they had to play in formal warfare. Thus it came about that although of the 100 or more vessels of war which engaged the Spanish Armada in 1588 only a small proportion, perhaps 25, belonged to the standing Navy—that is, were owned, armed and victualled by the Queen's Admiralty—yet at least fifty more were officered and partly fitted for action under the responsible control of Hawkins and Wynter. The strictly 'volunteer' vessels which joined the fleet of the Royal Navy, when the Spaniards were reported under weigh¹ were small and comparatively few in number, and, though useful for scouting purposes, contributed only in minor degree to the final triumph of the English fleet. In spite of the difficulties caused by the hesitations, counter-orders and parsimony of Elizabeth, whereby her own ships were sorely lacking both in provisions and in ammunition, the victory was in the minds of Drake and Hawkins never doubtful.

The victory
of 1588.

This historic triumph was not won by sheer force of patriotism, of religious enthusiasm, or still less of spontaneous, untrained energy. It was due on the other hand to patient foresight and organisation which had long been preparing for the struggle.

Its causes.

Foreign observers rightly attributed English superiority to these three things: first, skill in seamanship and gunnery;

secondly, experience in the designing and equipment of ships; thirdly, to a system of tactics which enabled the commander of each vessel to make fullest use of these advantages.

For fifty years English seamen had been trained in a hard but most efficient school. Shipbuilders of Plymouth and of the Thames had vied with one another in adapting their craft to the ever-growing needs of trade and warfare. In tactics a

The rise of
the English
school of naval
tactics.

departure no less important marked the Elizabethan Navy. According to the old tradition of warfare at sea a naval battle was intended to copy as nearly as possible an engagement on land. The object of a commander was to grapple and board the enemy and fight out the struggle hand to hand on deck. But Drake and Hawkins discerned that a fighting ship had a very special function of its own. The object of artillery was henceforth to demoralise the crew, to disable, to fire, and, if necessary to sink, the ship, of the enemy. Thus the vessel itself was the fighting unit and not the detachment of soldiers which it might carry. On board the Spanish galleon of war military authority, organisation, and discipline were supreme, whilst on the "Dreadnought" or "Revenge" the fighting order was determined solely by the special conditions of naval warfare.

The victory of 1588 was the triumph of Drake's ideas. His discomfiture off the Portuguese coasts in 1590, when he allowed himself to be rashly drawn into operations upon land along the Tagus, brought about a temporary return to a naval policy which Elizabeth herself had always preferred, namely that of preying upon Spanish commerce by volunteer fleets.

But the events of the last great expedition which Drake and Hawkins led to the West Indies in 1595 proved that the days of such strategy were passed. The Spanish Government had applied the lesson of the Armada with energy and precision. The

The last
expedition of
Hawkins and
Drake, 1595-6.

‘frigate,’ a fast-sailing cruiser of small burden, had now become the typical Spanish war vessel: squadrons of heavily armed craft of the new design convoyed the treasure fleets and guarded the chief harbours of the Indies, which were further protected by forts mounted with powerful guns. Thus the two Admirals found themselves unable to repeat their exploits of twenty or thirty years before. An attack on Puerto Rico was repulsed (1596); the road to Panama was stoutly barred by troops. Self-confidence gave way to dismay. Hawkins and Drake succumbed to the deadly climate, and the expedition returned, not ingloriously, yet baffled of its purpose. Meantime in his absence Drake’s own spirit had inspired a great stroke which has been called the Trafalgar of the Elizabethan war. The attack on Cadiz in 1596 was organised on the lines of Drake’s strategy. It was planned as an expedition of the Royal Navy, equipped and provisioned in the main by the Queen’s Admiralty; its purpose was to seek out the Spanish fleets, whether “in being” or in preparation, in their own ports and dockyards; to force them into engagement and to destroy ships and arsenals and works. The attack was completely successful. Though he had himself passed away, it was the final triumph of Drake’s principles; it was rendered possible by Drake’s influence and exertions. It may even be said that it determined for the future the offensive character of English naval tactics by which was finally established the English supremacy upon the seas.

Cadiz, 1596:
the final
triumph of the
Elizabethan
Navy.

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST PERIOD OF COLONISATION: 1603—1660.

ELIZABETH died on March 24th, 1603. It is difficult to realise as it deserves the contrast presented by the nation viewed at her accession and at her death. In 1558 the independence of England seems at stake. Now Scotland is her partner; Spain is on her knees, and without her neither the Papacy nor France counts against this country. Then religious disruption seemed imminent; now the Reform in a specially national form is secure. In 1558 the Navy was in decay and forgotten; now it dominates the sea and is the pride of the nation. A doubtful dynastic title is replaced by a settlement disputed by no one. The distress and social upheaval of forty years before has yielded to unprecedented advance in wealth and security. A national self-confidence now possesses the nation, exhibiting itself in literature, in adventure, it may almost be said in a new type of character. All these, the vigorous patriotism, religious freedom, personal energy, found their meeting-point in the efforts after national expansion, in the voyages of Drake, the schemes of Gilbert, the naval triumphs of 1588 and 1596, the founding of the East India Company. It is true that of actual territorial results nothing was to be seen when the "heroic age" came to an end. Newfoundland and Virginia were for the time abandoned, nothing had been yet heard from the adventurers in eastern seas. From Spain no formal

concessions were so far obtained. But the instinct of expansion had slowly grown, had revealed itself, had been severely tested; it needed only favourable conditions to rouse it once more to action and to stimulate fresh experiments.

With the accession of James I, as with that of Elizabeth, we find ourselves confronted by a new beginning. From the point of view of English expansion, as from that of foreign, religious, or constitutional policy, the year 1603 is something much more than a date in the history of dynasty. It marks a new age with new men, new preoccupations, new policies. Even though for a time certain leading figures remain on the stage, like Salisbury, we yet see them through a new atmosphere, in changed surroundings. If the old motives are still at work, hatred of Spain and sympathy with Holland, the adventurous instinct, the attachment to the Reform, they are mingled with others that are new, like religious separatism or the bitter rivalry with the Dutch at sea.

The Stuarts:
a new epoch in
expansion.

The interest of the political and religious struggle of the century has overshadowed the importance of the external growth of the English nation. In the year 1614 a certain Richard Martin was solemnly rebuked by the Speaker for daring to tell the House of Commons to its face that the struggling fortunes of Virginia were of more weight than all the "trifles" which usually occupied their attention. We can to-day see that the Palatinate or the royal marriage were less momentous facts in the reign of James I. than the rivalry of the Dutch in the far East and the fate of the settlers at Plymouth or Jamestown. Not indeed—to reaffirm an important truth—that the two sides of our history can be separated. The constitutional struggles and the influence in Europe of this country have always been affected in varying degree by the growth, the policy, and the experience of her offshoots across the seas. At the close of the nineteenth century we are more fully conscious of this truth, but the

fact itself, this action and reaction of mother country and daughter colonies, has always *been*. And to understand the nature and extent of this mutual influence we must begin by looking carefully into the early stages of our colonial story in the 17th century.

We shall find certain characteristics of English expansion which must be kept before us. In the first place, as compared with the Elizabethan age, we notice a deeper seriousness and a fuller sense of responsibility in the operations of plantation and foreign trade. There are fewer brilliant personalities, but there is far more united, persevering effort. The light-hearted, romantic enterprise of a Raleigh, the carelessly granted "patents" of Gilbert and Frobisher, are replaced by the strenuous action of a powerful corporation like the East India Company, and the solemn purpose of the Pilgrim Fathers.

Characteristics: (a) seriousness of purpose.

(b) Variety of experiments.

In the next place we are still in the experimental stage. Geography is, as regards the new worlds of East and West, still an infant science. 'The North-West Passage may be found through Hudson's Bay, the St Lawrence or the Chesapeake, and many attempts will yet be made to discover it. The traders to the East will try the Spice Islands, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, before they realise that the Indian Peninsula itself is their best sphere. What climate and soil best suit English settlement is yet undetermined. The economic possibilities of a new plantation have to be found by hard experience and after many mistakes. Different types of settler, different kinds of labour, free and slave, black and white, will be tried; and systems of land tenure and methods of production will be tested in their turn. What we may call the first principles of colonisation are yet unfixed; *e.g.* Virginia may reveal a wealth of gold and silver, in which case it will be appropriated by the Crown, like a Spanish dependency; it may

prove a trading centre, like a Dutch factory, and so be worked by a company; it does actually become a true colony. The religious community, the single-capitalist proprietor, the chartered company, each undertakes an experiment. Constitutions are sketched on paper, but as time passes colonial institutions ultimately take the shape required by the actual needs of the community. Under the English flag almost any experiment in national expansion may be tried; no controlling authority at home impresses uniformity of type; failure to succeed upon one line only suggests fresh enterprise.

Thirdly, expansion is determined in the main by commercial motives rather than by those of religion or of empire. It is curious to note how small a space military or naval objects have in the choice of new colonies. “Naval stores”—timber, hemp, pitch and so on—are alluded to now and again as desirable productions. Virginia was regarded by Governor Delaware as a “bit in the ancient enemy’s mouth,” that is, an advanced point against Spain. Plymouth, indeed, originated from religious convictions, but the motive of conversion of the heathen was rarely expressed and more rarely acted upon.

(c) Motives:
mainly Com-
mercial.

Proprietors and Companies at home look for profits upon their capital: the ‘plantation’ is regarded as a private estate to be worked for dividends. But the settlers, too, are men of business aims, with the Englishman’s desire for equal chances. Hence arises a conflict between Company and Settler for freedom of cultivation and trade: in the course of it proprietary rights tend to disappear. Then another claim to monopoly is gradually put forward against the colonist, this time on behalf of the mother country as a whole. The argument is something like this. Plantation is the joint venture of the home-land and the settlers; to these two alone belong the profits. Hence the export and import trade of the colonies, at any rate in Europe, must

The Com-
pany and the
Colony.

The Mother
country and
the Colony.

pass through English and not foreign hands. The King's custom-house, English shipowners, merchants and manufacturers, are entitled to the first share of the gains on colonial external trade: Havre and Antwerp must buy their tobacco or sugar in London or Bristol, not in Virginia and Barbados. There is no new principle in this; the Navigation Acts only codify and extend to new circumstances enactments long accepted.

Again, so strong is the trading motive that it severs traditional policy and leads in the East first, in Europe later, to war with the Dutch. So too the hostility of Boston and New Amsterdam in America, or the friendly agreement of French and English settlers in St Kitts, are both dictated by motives of commerce. And it is to be recognised that crimes inspired by lust of Empire or zeal for Orthodoxy can be surpassed in grimness by the cruelties of European peoples in pursuit of 'peaceful' trade.

Lastly, there is the international difficulty: the conflict
 (d) Vague- between rights, (a) of occupation, (b) of dis-
 ness of title. covery, (c) of native concession, which is not wholly unfamiliar to us to-day. It was not easy in the seventeenth century to decide what constituted rights of occupation; or, in the absence of exact logs, charts and maps to prove discovery or settle its extent; whilst the Christian powers recognised or ignored native rights as it suited their purpose. In this way Spain claims New England by virtue of the Papal Bull of 1493, or of the occupation of Florida; England by the discovery of Cabot, and by actual settlement; France by De Mont's patent (1603) from the French Crown, or the voyage of Champlain along the coast some two years later. Drake's treaty at Ternate is gravely employed against the Portuguese or the Dutch in the East; French and English alike quote agreements with Abenakis or Iroquois with equal insincerity. Virginia claims, both by charter and by occupation of the coast-line, a territory stretching back to the "South seas."

But French missionaries descend the Mississippi, and forthwith assert for Canada the ownership of its tributaries up to the ridge of the Alleghanies. Amidst this confusion and inconsistency, the one thing that clearly counts is effective settlement which can defend itself against attack on the spot or secure vigorous support at home.

The growth of a law of nations as affecting colonies is hardly even in its initial stage. Nor, had it existed, were European rulers in the seventeenth century, always excepting Cromwell, much better able to enforce it in a remote continent than they were a century before.

THE ENGLISH IN THE EAST.

The union of Portugal with Spain, by which Spain was established as a first-rate naval power, had at the same time laid open Portugal and her dependencies to attack from the enemies of Philip II.

England and
Portugal after
1580.

Englishmen did not overlook the fact that the Armada consisted largely of Portuguese vessels, that it was mainly equipped in the Tagus and that it sailed from Lisbon. It was natural, therefore, that its defeat should be followed immediately by active aggression on the part of English and Dutch adventurers upon the Portuguese trade monopoly in Brazil and the East Indies.

The nature of the Portuguese claim to their dominion has been already alluded to. We have seen also that the desire for a route to the East free from foreign interference had been the chief motive of English maritime enterprise for nearly a century. The victory of 1588, however, emboldened the conquerors to defy Portugal after the same fashion that Drake

had defied Spain, and to force their way by the Cape into the heart of her eastern possessions.

The Portuguese, like the Spaniards, founded their empire by the sword. But they were at the same time navigators and traders; and they did not regard their colonies, as Spain did, mainly as the means of supporting a European domination. Philip wanted, above all things else, treasure; but Portugal, whilst proud of her imperial position in the Indian Ocean, was keen to secure the lucrative trade in African negroes (of which Lisbon was as early as 1530 the great mart of the world), in eastern spices and in silks. At this period Portuguese emigrated in much larger numbers than either Spaniards or English; and in Brazil they founded permanent agricultural settlements, a true Colony which maintained itself against all European attack. But apart from Brazil, the Portuguese had but a precarious hold upon their foreign possessions. These were mainly military or trading posts, with or without a vague sovereignty over an undefined *hinter-land*, and, in Asia and Africa, restricted to coast districts, smaller islands, or useful harbours. The Government at Lisbon discouraged, like that of Madrid, private enterprise whether of individuals or of trading companies; it regarded its territories as so much Crown land to be exploited for the benefit of the exchequer. It distrusted its Viceroys and officials, who in turn made haste to be rich at the expense both of the home Government and the native communities. The Portuguese have always been hopelessly unequal to the task of administering the vast Empire to which they laid claim. In the 16th century they revealed no organising faculty, whether in government or commerce. Clever generals, bold seamen, sharp traders they produced indeed; but the art of 'governance' and the higher commercial instincts were alike wanting. When Drake in 1579 crossed their track their power in the East had reached, if it had not already passed, its culminating point. At that time all that was worth claiming

The Portu-
guese Colonial
Power.

along the ocean sea-board of Africa from Morocco to the Red Sea was, in name at least, theirs; and wherever a European state had asserted political or trading powers along the southern coasts of Asia from Aden to the Moluccas, that state was Portugal. Her eastern capital, religious, commercial and political, was fixed at Goa on the Malabar coast; and there she maintained a strong fleet.

Drake had brought home with him in 1580 not only a glowing report of the attractions of the eastern seas but an actual treaty, or what passed for one, with the native sultan of Ternate, a small island of the Molucca group (see p. 34). Letters also reached London from Englishmen settled in India, and from merchants and secret agents in Spain and Portugal who were quietly observing the profitable nature of the East Indian trade. One of these men, James Lancaster, was a typical seafaring trader of the Elizabethan age. He had taken military service in Portugal, and had abandoned it for some commercial position there. In 1591 he sailed as representative of London merchants on his first voyage to the East, penetrating, with much resistance from the Portuguese, as far as the Malay peninsula. In 1594 he was in command of an expedition to Brazil: he captured Pernambuco and returned with heavy plunder within a year. "Who so cowardlie as a Portingail?" writes one of his officers; "after the first bravado was past they were verie cowardes." Lancaster lost no time in urging the helpless nature of the Portuguese possessions upon his employers and other merchants at home. The Spanish war, which was now proving once more the incontestable superiority of England at sea, seemed to demand that the opportunity should be seized to break down once for all the Spanish-Portuguese trade monopolies in the West and East. But decisive action was stimulated by foreign rivalry. An association of Dutch traders had in 1595 despatched four

The earliest attacks upon the trade monopoly, 1591.

James Lancaster.

The Dutch traders in the East, 1595.

ships to the Indies by the Cape route, and on their prosperous return a second fleet of eight large vessels sailed in 1598. To English merchants the Eastern trade seemed too great for individual enterprise. A meeting was called by the Lord Mayor of London on Sept. 22, 1599, when it was agreed by the citizens that a company of traders should be formed, with a capital for the first venture of £30,000. This Company was, after delays due to reasons of State, formally incorporated on

The East
India Com-
pany of Lon-
don, Dec. 31,
1600.

Dec. 31, 1600, as "The Governor and Company of the Merchants of London trading to the East Indies." It was essentially a private association to which a monopoly was secured by

charter for fifteen years; its members were aldermen and merchants of all degrees in the City of London, with the careful exclusion of all representatives of official or courtly influence. This characteristic mark of one phase of English expansion—the free play given to individual energy with the minimum of State interference—distinguishes thus the foundation of the most significant private enterprise in our history, the East India Company.

The Com-
pany's ac-
tivity.

The records of its earliest years shew the extreme care which was bestowed upon its ventures both at home and afloat. The steps taken to raise capital, to secure freedom of action from the

Crown, to maintain the corporate nature of its trade, to select, fit out and arm vessels suitable for an adventurous traffic, to appoint captains, masters and factors of skill and integrity, to prepare letters and presents to native princes—indeed all points of business detail indicate the keen practical judgment which was at that time characteristic of the English and Dutch as contrasted with their rivals in France, Spain and Portugal.

The First
Voyage, 1601.

The first 'voyage' was ready by February, 1601.

The fleet consisted of four vessels, with a united company of 480 men, and carrying both money and English goods for trading purposes. James Lancaster

was 'chief governor' or 'principal merchant,' with supreme command; John Davis, the explorer, was chief pilot. The fleet weighed anchor off Woolwich on February 13th, but not until October following could Lancaster make Table Bay. Sickness and loss amongst the crews prevented him from touching Sumatra until June 1602, fifteen months out. In spite of Portuguese opposition the Sultan of Acheen accorded freedom of trade and security of goods and person. Bantam, on the north coast of Java, was the goal of the voyage: there three factors, the trading officers of the Company, were left behind to secure cargo for future ventures, and with full lading of pepper, cloves and other valuable merchandise Lancaster made his return in safety in Sept. 1603.

The first voyage of the Company was not only highly profitable in itself (cloves, for instance, at this time produced a thousand per cent. profit) but full of encouragement to the proprietors for the future. A second voyage, therefore, under Sir Henry Middleton, who had accompanied Lancaster, was quickly organised on the same scale as the first (March, 1604).

**The Second
Voyage, 1604.**

Sumatra was now reached in nine months: at Bantam the Factors were found safe and well, and the business of the Company fairly established there. Middleton passed on to Amboyna, and to the Moluccas. During April, 1605, the fleet is busy trading amongst the Spice Islands; Middleton produces Drake's treaty but fails to get leave to establish a factory in Ternate. For he finds himself already confronted by the true rival to English enterprise in the far East. Off Bantam he had been dismayed to see the Dutch Company's fleet of twelve vessels, with a tonnage of 5,500 tons, fully armed and manned, ready for fighting or for trade. Now the Dutch were still at war with Spain in Europe, and therefore with the Portuguese dependencies in the Indies, whilst James I., on the other hand (and therefore the English Company), was on terms of amity with both. Trading was thus a complicated matter for

the English factors, especially when actual fighting occurred between Dutch and Portuguese in the Spice Islands. Moreover the Dutch were very 'hard' traders; pushing, determined, and always prepared to use force, they were already feared and hated in the Java seas, and their presence proved no slight hindrance to the factors of the Company. However, Sir Henry succeeded in securing profitable cargoes; he had carried the operations of the Company as far East as the Moluccas, and had surveyed the ground for future enterprise. He reached Plymouth in May, 1606.

The first two voyages of the Company reveal facts of much importance. We notice, first, that the Indian peninsula itself lies at present outside the sphere of English enterprise; the islands of the far East offer a more profitable field. The Portuguese are not strong enough to oppose by force, but they raise difficulties in negotiations for trade with native states. The rivalry of the Dutch, on the other hand, is a far more serious obstacle. The qualities they exhibit are in the main those of the English trader, with less scruple and certainly with more tenacity; whilst in armed force and in numbers they are at a great advantage. Already they are the dominant European factor in the Eastern seas. The local princes consent with more or less readiness to trading, but it is evident that they will prove helpless in presence of European aggression. Valuable cargoes can be had at enormous profits. Acheen and Bantam afford pepper, Banda nutmegs, the Moluccas cloves and sago: and it is probable that with these the western market will be soon glutted. Resident 'factors' of the English Company with some difficulty set up centres for trade in native ports, and in accordance with the general policy of the Company avoid interference in native affairs. Although royal letters and presents shew that the race for treaties and concessions has already begun the Company does not aim at excluding foreign traders from sharing these privileges. A general support

The position
and aims of
the Company.

is accorded to it from the Crown, but it is expected to provide for its own defence, and cannot count on any strong diplomatic backing in disputes with Dutch or Portuguese. The business-like character of the enterprise stands out in the instructions given respecting the nature of the trade to be sought for, in the stress laid upon spices and silks rather than upon gold or pearls. There is no question of El Dorado or of Empire; romance has given way to the sober calculations of the City merchant. 'Plantation' is not thought of, the climate alone, curiously far more fatal to the English than to the Dutch, forbids it.

The prevision of Sir Henry Middleton as to the true obstacles to English trade in the far East was soon verified. Within twenty years the Dutch to a great extent closed the seas eastward of Sumatra to the East India Company. The Dutch were people of a different stamp to the Portuguese. They had passed through a severe school under Philip II. Not only had they been forced by invasion to look for subsistence from foreign trade, but religious and political struggles had hardened their temper. Thus they were fiercer than Englishmen in their Protestantism, more tenacious of their independence and of that trade by which alone they could make both religious and political freedom secure. They had been the ship-owners and sea-traders of Western Europe for nearly a century, and had suffered greatly from the union of Portugal with Spain, which not only closed to them the port of Lisbon, but enabled Spain for the first time to drive their merchantmen from the seas. Sheltered in a sense by their friendship with England they eagerly seized the opportunities given them by the ruin of the Spanish navy (1588-1596). Their energies were turned to the East. Their East-Indian ventures were from the first (1595) organised upon a far larger scale, were more frequent and were more strongly armed than those of the East India Company of London. In two years

The conflict
with the
Dutch.

(1602-3) they despatched twenty-six ships as against four which sailed from the Thames. The Dutch E. I. Company indeed was not founded until 1602, but once established the Government lent its whole support both at home and abroad to the enterprise. Like the English, the Dutch attacked the Portuguese monopoly in the name of open trade, and not with the aim of political empire. But by 1605 they had discovered that the native princelets could not secure, and that the Portuguese would not allow, freedom and equal rights of trade. Only a strong and independent State can guarantee to a foreigner commercial rights free of molestation from its own subjects or from other foreigners ; and can at the same time protect itself from the conversion of a trading privilege into political power. The East India Company at this period honestly believed that the free and equal trade which they sought with eastern peoples was possible, and that acquisition of territorial rights was needless and undesirable. But the Dutch quickly made up their minds, first that no native State in the far East was strong enough to secure to foreigners any treaty rights whatever, and secondly that no European trader would hesitate to infringe such rights unless upheld by forts, ships and cannon. Not only were they clear sighted to perceive the facts, but they had vigorous captains with overwhelming force at their command on the spot. They wanted monopoly of the spice trade, and that in the islands implied sovereignty. English merchants did not perceive till too late that their only chance lay in enforcing a similar monopoly within a corresponding territorial limit, such as Java or Sumatra. Nor, in forming an estimate of Dutch policy in the far East may this be forgotten : that no European nation, not Spain at her worst, hardly even the African slave-trader in his palmy days, bears a heavier reproach for calculating and persistent cruelty, for utter indifference to human life, for unholy means employed for sordid ends than does the 'peaceful and God-fearing planter,' trader and administrator of the Dutch colonies in the 17th century.

In 1609 the Dutch began by seizing the little Banda group: by 1612 they were at open war with the representatives of the English Company. After 1615 they are found treating English vessels as lawful prizes to be sunk or appropriated, and ports offering them shelter are destroyed. Negotiations for a settlement were opened in London in 1618. The Dutch envoys, keen, thoroughly-informed negotiators, knew precisely what they wanted, and persistently refused to be diverted from their point. James, preoccupied and indifferent, yielded, in spite of the Company's protests, every point that was vital: he was satisfied with a general promise of a share in trade without territorial foot-hold, the Dutch insisting with success that but one fortified post (and that was at once rendered ineffective) should remain in English hands. As a consequence of the treaty of 1619 English trade east of the strait of Malacca sank into insignificance. The Company retained Factors at Amboyna, Bantam, and at a few other points, and they owned practically one tiny island in the Banda group. But the foundation of Batavia in 1619 and the murder of all English merchants at Amboyna in 1623, secured to the Dutch the practical monopoly of the eastern islands, which form still the richest colonial possession of equal area possessed by any European state. The lesson was a severe one, but it has not seldom been forgotten since. Ignorance of the true situation on the spot, contempt for expert knowledge, the desire to be rid on any terms of one difficulty because attention is demanded by another, lastly a tendency to cling to a principle once sound but already rendered obsolete by facts:—English colonial policy has many instances to shew of failures of this type, of which that of James I in his dealings with Holland is the earliest example.

The stress of Dutch competition in the far East had meantime brought about results of the highest importance to the future of the English Company. The desire to open up a field of operations in

Policy of
the E. I. C.
1608—1613.

regions where the native powers were strong enough to grant and to enforce their concessions and where the Dutch were not as yet in possession led to various experiments. The route by Cape Horn since Drake's experiences of it in 1580 was considered impracticable; but the North-West Passage was contemplated once more; Sir Henry Middleton examined the Red Sea ports in 1609, and repulsed by the Arab Sultan of Mocha conducted piratical operations off Aden, though without finding encouragement from the Company. A voyage to Japan in 1611, not without profitable returns, revealed however the determined hostility of the Dutch, who were there before us.

In 1608 Captain Hawkins commanding the "Hector" reached the Swally roads off Surat. Finding it impossible to open trade, owing to the Portuguese who represented him to the native authorities as a pirate, Hawkins sent on his ship to Bantam, and himself travelled to Agra armed with one of the royal letters with which James kept the Company's captains supplied. This was favourably received by the reigning Moghul, but did not attain the object desired, as the Portuguese representatives at the Court prevented the grant of permission to trade, and ultimately forced Captain Hawkins to withdraw. But the report of his experiences emboldened the Company to vigorous action. A fresh 'voyage,' comprising four strongly manned and armed vessels, under Captain Best, a fighting sailor, sailed for Surat in Feb. 1612. The Factors landed early in September, and found the governor of the Moghul favourably disposed. Suddenly a Portuguese trading fleet, under armed convoy, appeared off the mouth of the Taptee. Best seized his opportunity. The Portuguese had hitherto succeeded in maintaining their monopoly of trade—they had at Surat no territorial rights—by dint of bluster, misrepresentation and intrigue. The naval fight which now ensued astonished the native authorities, for the victory of the English vessels—insignificant in size and armament by the side of the great ships of their enemy—was overwhelming.

Surat.
Swally Fight,
Oct. 1612.

The battle in the Swally Roads and Downton's victory in 1614 in the same waters were of decisive importance in the history of our position in the East, and from a naval point of view have hardly less interest than the far better known events of the heroic time of the Elizabethan war with Spain.

Negotiations with the Moghul were now promptly concluded. In January 1613 the Firman or imperial decree was received at Surat granting a site for an English factory there under the protection of the Governor. From this time therefore dates the formal beginning of the establishment of the British on the continent of India.

Much light is thrown upon the Moghul court and rule at the period when the English first enter upon the scene of Indian history by the journal and letters of Sir Thomas Roe. He had been sent as Ambassador by James I at the instance of the East India Company in 1615 to strengthen the position of the English Factory at Surat and generally to counteract the Portuguese influence at the court of Agra.

The
Moghul
Empire.

The Moghuls were Mahommedan invaders whose Empire, dating from the early years of the 16th century, had extended from the Punjab over the Ganges plain eastward to Assam and southwards to the Taptee. At this period (1615) the great Moghul Jehangir, son of Akbar, was engaged in reducing by arms and intrigue the independent kingdoms of the Deccan. The earlier Moghul sovereigns were men of striking personality. Akbar showed the qualities of a great and enlightened ruler. His sincerely tolerant spirit and his administrative ability enabled him to retain the allegiance of the Hindus, whose religion and institutions he respected and whose ancient dynasties in many cases, especially in Rajputana, survived in a feudatory relation to the conqueror. Such kingdoms, where a prince was strong, might be practically independent. Elsewhere Nawabs or Subahdars governed provinces under the central control of the

Akbar,
1556—1605.

Emperor or Padishah, ruling from Agra or Delhi—a control, the effectiveness of which varied with the distance from the seat of government, with the strength of the Nawab or of the reigning Moghul. Jehangir had succeeded Akbar when the English Company first set foot in India. A wholly unworthy successor of that great ruler, he maintained his power by cruelty and intrigue. Indifferent rather than tolerant in creed, vindictive and sensual, hated by the Rajpoot princes, dreaded by his own sons, he was the more or less willing tool of unscrupulous adventurers of both sexes. Rajahs, nawabs, nobles and traders alike had to walk warily. Flattery and bribes were the avenues to power in a court which was in external surroundings perhaps the most gorgeous known to history. The fabric of the Empire though outwardly secure was unstable, and could not have withstood a determined attack from without or from within. But the European powers were too distant, the Hindoo feudatories too weak; no new dynasty beyond the Hindoo Koosh had yet arisen keen for the spoils of the great plains. The Moghul kingdom was destined to another century of existence, till it fell from sheer corruption before the assaults of the Mahrattas and the masterful interference of a handful of traders and soldiers from the far West.

Into this strange world, impressive by sheer bigness, by its wealth, its population, its seeming authority, but yet in reality weak from lack of unity, of the concept of patriotism and of physical or moral vigour, the sturdiest races of Europe had now begun to intrude.

Surat, the first chief port of the Moghul Empire, was the most promising centre of trade that could have been chosen, in spite of the rivalry of Dutch and Portuguese who had both trading agencies there. Thus Surat as the oldest Factory of the Company on the peninsula, the nearest to home, and planted in the midst of an industrious and peaceful population, kept naturally the

Jehangir
1605—1627.

Early
extension
of English
Trade.

position of chief establishment of the Company in India through which all the trade between the East and home for a long time passed. From it were opened in subsequent years inland agencies at Ahmedabad and Agra, and factories along the coast at Bombay and Calicut, from which were drawn such goods as cotton cloth, indigo, spices, saltpetre and opium for the lading of the Company's fleets off Surat. Gambroon on the Persian Gulf was opened as a factory under Surat in 1632.

As early as 1612 the Company had attempted trade at Masulipatam on the east coast; a Factory was established in 1622, and enlarged on the model of Surat in 1632.

But it was overshadowed by the acquisition, by purchase, of Madras in 1639. This consisted of a strip of land along the coast six miles long, by one mile broad, near the Portuguese settlement of San Thomè. Protected on two sides by a narrow channel from the mainland, and commanding it, was a small island, less than five hundred yards in length. This, walled and fortified, became Fort St George. For the whole area a yearly rent was paid to the neighbouring Hindoo raja. When he was conquered by the powerful Sultan of Golkonda the English claimed to retain their sovereign rights subject to the original payment. The progress of the Factory was not rapid, although in 1653 it became a Presidency with control over Hoogly, Patna, and Balasore, and all the stations of the Company on the Coromandel coast.

The
Coromandel
coast:
Madras,
1639.

In Bengal the Portuguese had a fortified post at Hoogly, 120 miles from the sea, which was destroyed by the Nawab of Bengal in 1632. In the following year the English built an unfortified factory at Piply near the mouth of the Hoogly, but the trade was much harassed by the impositions of the Nawab. In 1640 Dr Boughton, the surgeon of one of the Company's vessels, was able to render some service to a daughter of the Moghul; the reward he asked was privilege for the Company to trade on the Hoogly free from duties, which meant freedom

Bengal:
1633.
Hoogly:
1640.

from arbitrary interference of the imperial governor. Thus arose the factory at Hoogly, followed by other posts on the waterways of Bengal, whence silk, indigo, and saltpetre (much in demand for gunpowder in the civil wars) were exported *viâ* Surat to England. All were merely trading posts, undefended, without any territorial rights, and were administered under Fort St George. But the trade was profitable and capable of great expansion.

The Factory at Surat—the model upon which the English trading centres in India were organised—was a self-contained society administered as a detached portion of British territory. A certain degree of state was maintained, and degrees of precedence amongst the representatives of the Company were carefully observed. The President, as the chief merchant, or agent, was called, and the whole staff were lodged at the expense of the Company in the Factory itself, which was built round a square court, the ground-floor being used as warehouse and offices. The President was assisted by a Council of four senior Merchants, who formed the highest grade of officers, below them ranking the Factors, Writers, and Apprentices. The President in Council of the Factory at Surat is the direct antecedent of the Governor in Council of the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras and the Viceroy in Council at Calcutta.

The business of the Factory was transacted by the Council in formal meeting, at which all details of trading were settled. Goods were purchased at Surat through Hindoo traders called Banyans, and consignments received from Agra or Calicut. These were then sorted, valued, and repacked for the London market. In the same way English products, of which cloth was the chief, were received and forwarded as required to suitable places of sale. This work was done either in the Factory itself or under the protection of the fort of the city.

The scale of salaries was low; for instance, the President of Madras received in 1670 only £300 a year, and a principal

A Factory,
1613–1670:
Surat.

merchant as little as £50. But such sums in no way constituted the real incomes of the Company's officers. Private trade, which might compete with the joint-stock ventures of the East India Company, was rigorously forbidden; but merchants and factors might engage in native traffic from port to port, and the habit of receiving presents from Hindoo traders was not repressed. The Company indeed by its low rate of pay was responsible for much irregularity of this kind.

Madras, though less prosperous as a trading centre, had the distinction of a territorial possession: and the President was a military governor and civil administrator as well as a commercial agent.

Fort
St George.

The island of Fort St George was the English settlement, garrisoned, fortified, and ruled by the Company as an English military post. The adjoining strip of mainland was inhabited by natives; the Collector of Customs, the junior member of the Council, was magistrate of the 'Black Town,' and organised and controlled the native police. Popular religions, customs, and language were respected, and on a small scale the problems of British Indian administration had begun.

The original constitution of the E. I. C., like that of all the great Elizabethan 'regulated' Companies, followed the lines of the English guild. The object of the guild was to unite for mutual advantage all citizens pursuing a common industry. Each member retained his separate position as trader or artificer, but agreed to obey certain conditions in conducting his business in return for the benefits of corporate defence and opportunities of united enterprise. Neither guild nor 'regulated' Company was in any sense a partnership or a modern joint-stock association. The first members of the East India Company were the merchants who signed the petition for the Charter in Sept. 1599; these admitted new members by payment, by apprenticeship, after terms of service, or by nomination. From the outset it was stipulated that owing to the risks and uncertain-

The E. I. C.
a 'regulated'
Company.

ties of a distant enterprise all members should refrain from private ventures, but should take shares in such 'voyages' as were duly approved and organised by the elected officers of the Company.

Until 1612 these 'voyages' were entirely independent of each other. Members who desired—or could be persuaded—to join invested their capital (from *£25 to £1000*) in a venture prepared by Committees of the Court of the Company. The profits of the voyage were divided amongst those who had thus subscribed, and varied from 95 to 235 per cent. upon the investment. From various causes it early became common for members to carry over their investments from one voyage to another and thus retain a continuous interest in the Company.

In this way by 1612 the system of subscription for a series of ventures was definitely substituted for the original method of separate 'voyages.' This was called "investment on the joint-stock." Factors, captains, officers in India and at home could be thus continuously employed, and permanent organisation secured. The new financial working coincided in time with the formal establishment of the Factory at Surat (1612—13); and continued until the Restoration.

Meanwhile the Company shared naturally in the misfortunes of the body politic. It suffered from the evil government of James I, who not content with flinging away the English position in the far East shared in Buckingham's specious plunder of the Company in 1624, when *£20,000* was extorted. Charles I infringed the charter by granting a patent to a rival association in 1635, and so encouraged "interlopers," or outside adventurers, to complicate the already difficult problem of the Company in India. During the Civil War apart from obvious causes the Company so suffered from the glut of Eastern products in European markets that membership could be obtained for a few shillings.

The period
of separate
voyages, 1600—
1612.

The period of
the joint-stock
ventures, 1612—
1660.

The Crown
and the Com-
pany.

Under Cromwell prosperity began to dawn again. The interests of rival British traders were, after the Dutch Peace of 1654, absorbed by the E. I. C., which obtained a new charter from the Protector, according once more the full monopoly of trade with the Indies.

A third step in financial organisation was thereupon gradually taken: shares instead of being withdrawn on the termination of a fixed period began to be sold on the market, as in a present day joint-stock Company. The capital thus by degrees became fixed and was utilised on behalf of the whole body of proprietors.

The beginnings of the proprietary basis, 1660.

THE ENGLISH IN NORTH AMERICA.

Raleigh's Virginian colony, failure as it was, had never been forgotten, and isolated attempts to renew it marked the first years of the 17th century. The peace with Spain (1604), which was interpreted to admit the right of English settlement in such parts of the New World as lay outside the sphere of Spanish occupation, gave at once a different character to the enterprise. The rapid increase in the wealth of London and the chief sea-ports, the foundation of the East India Company in the interests of peaceful trade, and its early success, the example of the Dutch adventurers, the cautious and pacific temper of the new King all combined to modify the romantic spirit of the heroic time just passed by the sober commercial motives which characterise the new age.

Altered conditions of Colonisation.

In 1602 and again in 1605 a landing had been effected on the American coast some distance to the north of the old Virginian settlement and called by its discoverers New England. Taking warning from the activity of the Dutch, the Earl of Southampton and Sir F.

First Charter of Virginia, 1606.

Gorges, the energetic governor of the port of Plymouth, invited the aid of Chief Justice Popham in securing from James I a charter for a plantation, to be established within the limits of the 34th and 45th degrees of latitude, that is between the north boundary of the present state of South Carolina and the coast of Nova Scotia. The area is enormous ; but it was felt in those days of geographical ignorance that it was safer to include too much than too little. The Charter was granted in April, 1606. It was proposed to found two settlements, one in the northern region, which, however, at the present stage, came to nothing ; and one farther south, though the actual locality was undetermined. It is solely with this latter colony that the history of the Virginia Company is concerned. Its first settlers sailed from London in December, 1606, and steering a course by the West Indies reached in April, 1607, the mouth of Chesapeake Bay. On May 13th, a spot to which the name of Jamestown was given was chosen, on the bank of a navigable river (the James river), as the site of the new settlement, and the continuous life of the English people across the seas was begun.

The most notable of the original members of the Company, the holders of the King's 'patent,' or Charter, were Hakluyt and Somers. Richard Hakluyt had been for five-and-twenty years an ardent enthusiast in the cause of maritime discovery, and was personally acquainted with all the chief explorers of his time. His collections of narratives, taken down in many cases from the lips of the navigators themselves, are an invaluable source of information on Elizabethan voyages. His name adds the element of lofty patriotic motive to the Virginian enterprise. Somers, on the other hand, by his military career and bold adventures in the Spanish Indies brought with him more than a tradition of the days of Drake. The practical side of the venture is represented by Sir Thomas Smith, the leading spirit of the East India Company ; Popham, the Chief Justice ; and

Objects of
the promoters.

the London and British merchants who sat with them on the Council. The objects of the Company were not at the outset materially different from those of Gilbert and Raleigh (see p. 37). The settlement of a new English community beyond the seas had been the central aim of Raleigh. "I shall still live to see it an English nation," he had written to Cecil at a time (1602) when such a prospect seemed most visionary. If less was said about checkmating Spain and glorifying the English Crown by vast acquisitions, it is still an object of the Company to provide a career for needy gentlemen, to open a new market for English cloth, to produce ship-building materials. Exploration will reveal the possibilities of the country, and the Directors speak in the old vein of discoveries of gold and, restless under Dutch rivalry, of a new way to 'the South seas,' with which no European power might interfere.

The causes of failure in the past were imperfectly understood by the promoters of 1606. It has now long been realised that the development of a new colony is in the absence of precious metals a tedious and mostly an unprofitable process. The co-partnership under the new charter was better fitted than a single proprietor, such as Raleigh, to meet the inevitable loss of the first stages of settlement. This was one step in advance. In the next place the control of the plantation both in England and on the spot was very carefully considered and provided for. We must remember that the work of administering a community of Englishmen in a distant land was an entirely new problem; nor did the experience of Spanish or Portuguese dependencies afford much help in solving it. We were entering, therefore, of necessity on an experimental stage in colonial government, and during the century which followed a variety of types of organisation and constitution are put into practice on American soil. The charters of Gilbert and Raleigh had left all questions of govern-

First Constitution of the Colony: the Double Council.

ment vague and undetermined : and the absence of recognised authority was one of the causes which led to the collapse of their schemes. The experiment of 1606 erred in the opposite direction, for a most elaborate constitution was provided. The important feature consists in the two Councils, the one at home the other in the colony. The '*Royal Council of Virginia*,' sitting in London, contained fourteen or more members, nominated by the Crown, and including such prominent men as Sandys, Gorges, Sir Thomas Smith, and other promoters of the enterprise. This was the true controlling power, directed by the King ; it was practically a new Privy Council for Colonial affairs, and as such not amenable to Parliament. Its first function was to elect from the settlers a *Resident Council*, who should appoint their own President. To this Council was entrusted the local administration, though all regulations passed by them were to be submitted to the King and Council at home for ratification. The right of trial by jury and the supremacy of the Church of England were stipulated for. But official appointments, taxation, trade and the general policy of the enterprise were entrusted, not to the practical men who found the money at home, nor to the colonists themselves on the spot, but to a mixed body presided over by the King, in which officials rather than men of business predominated.

It is easy to criticise this first charter of Virginia as the
Its defects. work of a narrow, despotic mind, and to blame the Company for accepting it on such terms.

But Englishmen, at that time, as often since, were too eager to plunge into the practical task before them to raise difficulties in advance on abstract matters of government. The business men who promoted the Company desired above all things a strong central authority under which the settlers would be set free for the work of exploration and industry. But this was exactly what this cumbrous constitution did not and could not secure. Six months were occupied in obtaining instructions from home, whilst emergencies required prompt action. The

power of the President was limited, whilst the chief need of the colony was the strong hand of a capable leader.

The original settlers numbered about 140 persons. The majority of them were gentlemen in needy circumstances, the 'failures of the family' at home, and, like so many emigrants since, ignorant of, and averse to, the rough manual work which every new colony demands of its members as the price of subsistence. The one strong man amongst them was Captain John Smith, and he landed as a prisoner put under arrest by his colleagues on the voyage. Smith's career had been a romantic one, even for that age. A soldier of fortune in the Low Countries and in Hungary, a prisoner in Russia, a castaway in the Mediterranean, a captive on point of execution by Red Indians, his adventures proved him a man of self-confidence and resource, of endurance and daring courage. Experience quickly shewed that upon qualities of this kind rather than upon constitutional privileges must the infant settlement be built. Smith consequently took the lead in affairs to which he was entitled and in 1608 was made President. By this time death or desertion had deprived the colony of nearly all its foremost men; and to Smith's influence alone was due the continuance of the plantation. More settlers now arrived; but they were still men of the wrong stamp, impatient of authority, bent upon searching for gold, disdainig hard work, and looking for needful supplies, not to sowing and planting, but to the arrival of relief ships from London. The Company at home saw no signs of profitable returns, and there seemed every chance that the fate of the old colony of Raleigh would be repeated.

But the enterprise was in the hands of men who were not to be daunted by initial mistakes. The elaborate constitution was seen to be unsuited to the primitive needs and the small scale of the actual settlement. A radical change was demanded.

Fortunes of
the Settlers.

Second
Charter. The
Company
supreme, 1609.

The King was already aware that no money was to be had from Virginia for years to come, and his interest in the colony ceased. In 1609 a new Charter is granted : and the second experiment begins. Hitherto the Company itself, that is the proprietors who found the capital, promoted the emigration, kept up communications and found the supplies of the plantation had been without direct share in its control. In future the Virginia Company, as represented by its Directors, was to be the administrative body : nominating a Governor of rank and experience, with assistant officers, as its authority on the spot. Public spirit was aroused ; the proprietors were now headed by Salisbury himself ; Bacon was amongst them ; the leading politicians, the chief merchants and merchant companies are on its list. The venture had taken deep hold upon the nation ; it was no longer the romance of a few enthusiasts but the business-like effort of earnest and practical men.

The Company made Sir Thomas Smith its organising chief at home : Lord Delaware was sent out as Governor, supported by able and experienced administrators. The constitution was of the simplest. The Council of Directors was vested with entire control, subject only to the general territorial supremacy of the Crown. The Governor, as their representative, had authority to impose martial law and to compel obedience to regulations promulgated by himself to meet the crisis which threatened the very existence of the colony.

General
success of
the Colony,
1609-1623.

Within ten years the settlement of Virginia was an established colony, with a large measure of prosperity, a characteristic trade and a rapidly growing population : it was a bit of England across the seas, with English life, customs, and above all an English parliament. The period of strong government was marked by its own special troubles. Repressive regulations produced discontent ; Indian risings, the constant terror of the American settler, were subdued with difficulty ; plain agricultural work was neglected ; it was still difficult to secure the

right type of emigrant. But, on the other hand, a new spirit of determination began to actuate the settlers; the grant of freehold tenure in lieu of tenancies, by infusing the motive of private ownership, stimulated improvements.

Tobacco was found to be a very profitable and successful crop. Cattle were imported and thrived; and with the increase of tillage provided food sufficient for the population. Further, the Bermudas had been annexed to the Crown in 1612 and were handed over to the Company; and the colony was strong enough to attack and destroy (1614) the tentative settlements of the French on the coasts of Maine and Nova Scotia which lay within the original limits of the Company's Charter.

The Council of Directors in London was slowly learning how to meet the growing needs of the colony. Sir Edwin Sandys, a man of statesmanlike perceptions and a strong opponent in the Commons of the royal policy, was made Treasurer: and under his influence the next important stage in Colonial government was reached. In 1619 instructions were sent to the Governor that an assembly of burgesses of the colony should be summoned to meet at Jamestown. Each free settler had the right of voting; each county and hundred returned two members. There was but one House. The rights of the new body were defined under three heads: 1. To put forward in the form of regulations the instructions sent out from the Company. 2. To add regulations of their own. 3. To draw up petitions to the Company. The grant of self-government is clearly tentative: the aim is to facilitate the task of the Governor and of the Company in London, and to prepare for a larger devolution of central authority. The first Assembly shewed itself of practical temper, and devoted its time to framing ordinances of immediate necessity, affecting tenure of land, relations of employer and servant, intercourse with Indians, and the control of dangerous idlers.

*Beginnings of
Self-Govern-
ment, 1619.*

It is impossible not to feel the historic interest which

attaches to the birth of the eldest of the many daughters which have sprung from the 'Mother of Parliament' amongst peoples of other race and speech as well as of her own. It was certainly no mere coincidence that the Assembly of Burgesses of Virginia was called into being at a time when our own House of Commons was putting forth a new and vigorous life.

Although it was not perceived at the time, the new status of the settlers thus secured was in reality incompatible with the sovereignty of a Board of Directors in London. Two general aims had actuated the Virginia Company in procuring the Charter of 1609. The first, the effective control of the colony from home; the second, the profit to be drawn for its proprietors from the soil. On the true lines of English development the principle of self-government had now come in to supersede external control. To this extent then the sovereignty of the Company was bound to disappear, to be merged in the more elastic supremacy of the Crown. There might have been, perhaps, for a while longer a place for its mercantile functions, just as the commercial privileges of the East India Company survived the lapse of its political power. But in the history of the English beyond the seas we rarely find that monopolies of land or trade are tolerated when once self-government, even in germ, has been attained. We shall see the same instinct at work in Barbados and the Carolinas.

The fall of the Virginia Company was probably, therefore, in any event only a question of time. This, however, will not blind us to the remarkable place which this important Chartered Company fills in the history of the Empire. As often since, a company stepped forward to take risks and try experiments which the English Government would not, and indeed could not, undertake. The Virginia Company embodied a union of national

**The Third
Constitution:
Crown and As-
sembly, 1623.**

**The Com-
pany and its
work.**

aspiration with mercantile aims, and was an attempt to secure the permanence and organisation which marked Spanish colonisation without the cramping effects of rigid State control. The Company had succeeded in its work even at the moment of its dissolution. That this was hurried on with slight regard to the great services which the Company had rendered, or to the immediate interests of the planters, or the actual rights of the proprietors, may be conceded. Possibly Spanish intrigue had something to do with the time or manner of the revocation of the Charter. The Assembly itself deprecated (1623) the change on behalf of the colony. Parliament, had it been able, would undoubtedly have interfered. But however we may condemn the motives of James I in the matter, beyond doubt the assumption by Crown and Assembly of full responsibility for its affairs was not only advantageous but essential to the unfettered growth of the new community. The success of the Company was due in no small part to the accident which brought men of the stamp of Delaware, Dale and Sandys into a leading place in its councils. A period of mismanagement, a change of policy, or the pursuit of narrow mercantile results on the part of the Directors—always within bounds of possibility—would inevitably have brought about a crisis, and the peaceable transition now effected might have been no longer feasible.

The charter was revoked in 1623, and the new constitution formally proclaimed in May, 1625. Henceforward Virginia was governed by a Council of twelve members sitting in London, practically as a Committee of the Privy Council. By this Council a Governor and twelve assistant officials were appointed to represent the Crown on the spot, conducting the executive and judicial business of the colony. The colonial 'Governor in Council' thus makes his first appearance. The Assistants seem to have been nominated in part from amongst the resident colonists with some regard to their fitness. The House of Burgesses enlarged its functions. It proceeds to

*The New
Administra-
tion, 1625.*

assert, without protest (1623), and re-assert (1631—1642) its exclusive claim to levy internal taxation. As the colony grew it claimed the further right of appointing its own officials. Failure to secure this caused friction from time to time between the Governor and the Assembly, who quickly realised with their fellow-citizens at home that self-government is incomplete unless to legislative and fiscal rights is added that of electing and calling to account executive officers.

The development of the colony was henceforward in the main uneventful. The Indian massacre of 1622, terrible as it was, was followed by a punishment so severe that no similar danger was afterwards experienced, and, before long, the Indians are found voluntarily surrendering their lands in return for the protection of the Government. Virginia, indeed, adopted towards the natives a policy of fair dealing and humanity which was exceptional in that age, and not invariable to-day. The result was that the growth of the colony proceeded unchecked: new land was broken up, and plantations, cut off from their nearest neighbours by miles of forest, were settled in easy security from attack. The Virginians, often thus isolated from each other and rarely concentrated in townships, busy and prosperous in their private affairs, developed special characteristics of their own.

Virginia is a land in which a long seaboard and frequent rivers have determined the nature of its settlement. Its fertile soil is widely distributed, and for the most part readily accessible by water. Hence it was a colony of scattered manor-houses and estates rather than of townships and of small holdings. Its proprietors were men of country tastes and some wealth with the traditions of the English squire. Very early in its history the social institutions of Virginia were fixed once for all. Negro Slavery, dating from 1620, although for some years comparatively unimportant

Character-
istics of Vir-
ginia.

Its people.

in extent, strengthened a tendency already at work. The discovery that tobacco was the crop which Virginia could most profitably produce conduced to the establishment of the planter system, under which an estate of 100 or of 1000 acres was devoted to one crop cultivated by indentured servants or negro slaves. Town life hardly existed. Jamestown was but an untidy village: the centres of society and political power were the hospitable manor-houses of the planters. Society fell thus into three classes. At the head stood the planter aristocracy, who claimed the Royal Governor as their social equal, and who administered the functions of English quarter sessions through the unit of the parish and the county. Below them came the indentured servants: these were mostly English agricultural labourers or farmers' sons, some were orphan and destitute children, a few only were wastrels or respited prisoners. All were bound for varying terms of years, at the end of which they became citizens and in many cases owners of land. The best of them then merged by degrees into the lower grade of planters, or became overseers on large estates. The worst formed the class of "mean whites," despised alike by planter and by negro. Lastly came the negro slave, a small class down to the Restoration, but after that date rapidly increasing in proportion to the white population.

There was no trader or artisan class. The Church of England was established by law in the colony; and, as in England, dissent but not Catholicism received a contemptuous tolerance. Politically the sympathies of Virginia were royalist, and whilst cavalier exiles were welcomed, Cromwell had to threaten attack before the Commonwealth was recognised at Jamestown. But the planters were not keen politicians. The inevitable disputes of Governor and Assembly seldom became acute, and the proceedings of the Legislature are generally uninteresting. Government was a means to order and security, not a battleground of political or religious differences. Virginia, although

Politics and
Trade.

a self-governing colony, was essentially an oligarchy, with the strong and weak points of a government by landowners. Its administration was free from sordid motives: it was marked by a strong vein of colonial and imperial patriotism, and, under the direction of a succession of governors of ability, the actual work of government was well done. If the large majority of the population stood outside the franchise, the same was true of the mother country. The expansion of the colony westwards was hampered by no European rival, nor by hostile Indians, who were few in number and less vigorous than the Iroquois of the north, whilst the waterways gave ready access as far as the Alleghanies. Economically Virginia prospered exceedingly: her staple product was in regular and increasing demand in Europe, while the conditions of climate and of labour ensured an even supply. Trade restrictions imposed by the Commonwealth, confirmed at the Restoration, and accepted with frequent protest, had little effect upon the prevailing industry. But, whether as selling his own product or purchasing supplies from Europe, the planter dealt direct. There were no manufacturers, merchants or middle-men: and, as in all new countries, the professional class was limited mainly to officials. The increasing employment of slaves narrowed the range and depressed the inventiveness of production; for individual enterprise, which turns to one experiment after another in order to develop new sources of wealth, was impossible in a country where free labour and a middle class hardly existed. Public education was ignored; and as late as 1670 a Governor could boast that there was no printing-press in the colony. Leaving out of sight the great fact of slave labour, Virginia reproduced politically and socially many of the features of an European aristocratic state.

The adjoining colony of Maryland belongs to the Virginian type. It originated as a proprietary colony under charter from Charles I, by which Lord Baltimore, the owner, was vested with right

Maryland:
1632.

of peace and war, of martial law, appointment of judges, conferring of titles. A representative assembly was established on the Virginian model (1647), with the proprietor as Governor. But the characteristic contribution of Maryland to the English colonisation was the frank acceptance of toleration in religious opinions. Lord Baltimore was a Catholic, and in Maryland Catholics and Protestants lived in a harmony unknown to the Old World. This distinction, not less than the general type of government, the character of its cultivation, slavery and the interposition of the Dutch, effectually severed Maryland from the Puritan colonies of the north.

Meantime another experiment in colonisation inspired by different motives was being tried: the settlement of the Pilgrim Fathers at Plymouth in New England. Since the year 1606 there had existed

The New
England Colo-
nies.

in Holland certain congregations of English independents who had emigrated in search of the freedom of worship denied them in their own country. In Leyden, their chief centre, the exiles formed an

The Pilgrim
Fathers.

organised community gathered round their church; but experience had disappointed their hopes of realising the ideal of a community separated from the world which had led them to abandon their English homes. They longed for a new land where distractions would be fewer, and where especially the children might be more surely brought up in devout and serious temper. Guiana was suggested, New England, or the Dutch colony on the Hudson. The Leyden congregation was English still in instinct and by family ties. Virginia was fixed upon. Friends in England formed a company to find capital for outfit and vessel, the concession from the Virginia Council was obtained, and in the "Mayflower"

the emigrants bade adieu to Europe on Sept. 6th, 1620. On Dec. 11th one hundred and two settlers landed at a spot, called by them Plymouth from their final port of departure, within the bay sheltered by Cape

Plymouth,
Dec. 1620.

Cod from the open sea. It was far to the north of their intended destination. The severity of the climate dismayed the new-comers and proved fatal to many of them. But the settlement was laid out and log huts built, and the community organised. When in the early summer the "Mayflower" set sail on her return, not one settler turned back. Bradford the Governor, and Standish, who had charge of the defence, were the two men on whom the chief responsibility rested, and both had exceptional gifts for their task. The neighbouring tribes of Indians were enfeebled by sickness and war, and fortunately proved friendly rather than hostile.

Before landing, each member of the band of emigrants had signed a joint agreement "to combine themselves into a civil body politic.....and to frame such just and equal laws.....from time to time as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the colony unto which we promise all due submission and obedience."

Plymouth was known to be outside the limits of the Virginia Charter, and legal status was sought from the lately formed "Council of New England," a company incorporated in 1619 to take over the territory lying between the Hudson and Nova Scotia, and which proved to be a much less enterprising and capable body than the Virginia Company. From them the Plymouth Company in 1621 obtained its patent, confirmed and extended ten years later.

The growth of the new colony was not rapid. Fresh settlers came out, but the loss by death had been considerable. The principles upon which the settlement was founded forbade the usual methods of recruiting the population. Indentured or slave labour was not thought of. All settlers were on a footing of equality; the plantation was a co-partnership in which individual property in the soil was admitted only by degrees. The task of securing bare subsistence was itself an absorbing one: there was no surplus, for some years at least, available for

Progress of
the Settle-
ment.

trading or export. The proprietors of the Company at home were no doubt sympathisers, but as men of business they looked for some return on the capital they had subscribed. But New England produced no profitable crop like tobacco; the fisheries though promising needed time for development. Within seven years the London shareholders surrendered their entire rights to the actual settlers. The affairs of the colony now became more prosperous. Its religious and political aims were henceforward independent of outward influences. New emigrants arrived and more land was broken up: freehold tenures stimulated industry. Other townships were gradually formed and a little trading with the Dutch and with the natives became possible. The Plymouth settlers indeed proved excellent material for the making of a new community. Their tastes were mainly for country life. They were inured to self-denial, thrift and hard work. Above all they were at the outset an organised body, with common aims and beliefs, animated by the highest motives and accustomed to act together for the joint welfare. As we should expect from their antecedents the Plymouth colonists promptly applied their instincts of self-government to the administration of their settlements. At first the Governor, elected by the original settlers, presided over an Assembly of all the freemen, which retained the power of making laws and regulations, but delegated executive and judicial powers to an elective body consisting of the Governor and seven 'Assistants' called the "Court." Representation was within a few years rendered necessary by the rise of new townships at a distance from Plymouth; and in 1638 the Deputies elected by all householders virtually took the place of the primitive meeting of the whole body of freemen. As contrasted with Virginia we shall see that all the New England settlements revealed from the first the kinship with their Puritan brethren at home in attaining directly a self-governing administration. In the case of Plymouth the New England Company at home, busy with

Institutions.

further schemes of settlement, wisely allowed free play to an experiment which gave them no trouble and served to prove the possibilities of their great territories. The general authority of the Crown was thus the only exterior authority to which the colony was amenable: and this was rarely exercised in opposition to the avowed policy of the colonists themselves.

The plantation at Plymouth had encouraged other attempts at settlement upon the same coast. Amongst these was the acquisition (1625) of a site in Massachusetts Bay by a handful of Puritan emigrants from Dorsetshire who gave to it the name of Salem.

The Massachusetts Company was formed by a small group of ardent Puritans, who, however, remained members of the Church of England. A patent from the New England Company, confirmed and enlarged by Charter in March, 1629, gave control of the proposed colony to a Governor, Deputy Governor and eighteen Assistants, with liberty implied to erect in the colony itself the seat of administration. As the majority of the shareholders in the new venture joined the settlement, the existence of the Company in London, which organised the undertaking in the first instance, soon terminated. The character of the original founders shews that the Massachusetts colony was built of material of a type new in English plantation. For the first time we meet with merchants, clergy and country gentlemen, with their families, bringing to the common task means, education and governing capacity. The motive which united them was not different from that of the Plymouth settlers ten years before. But the political condition of England had in the interval become still more discouraging to men of earnest and thoughtful temper. Disaster in the shape of absolutism and of revolution threatened the nation, and orderly English freedom seemed possible only in the New World. It was no light cause that brought men of the stamp of Winthrop, a landowner of Suffolk, to sacrifice established position, and

The Massa-
chusetts Com-
pany: 1628-9.

1620—1650.

Map of the New England region, showing Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. Key locations and dates are marked:

- MAINE
- Portsmouth 1630
- Salem 1630
- absorbed by Massachusetts 1641-3
- R. Merrimack
- THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS
- Cape Ann 1623
- Cambridge
- Boston 1630
- Plymouth 1620
- Cape Cod
- PLYMOUTH
- Providence 1636
- RHODE ISLAND

Scale of English Miles

0 10 20 30 40 50

Scale of English Miles

| | | | | |
|----|----|----|----|----|
| 10 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50 |
|----|----|----|----|----|

face, in middle life, the hardships of a pioneer in New England. He and his companions were alike Puritans, drawn mainly from the Eastern counties, and it was not concealed that settlers of milder views would find scant welcome. Some amongst them were, like Endicott, men of fierce uncompromising convictions with whom a question of Church order or Biblical controversy was the chief concern of life.

In September, 1628, Endicott reached Salem with a first contingent of 60 settlers. By the autumn of the following year over a thousand emigrants in all had landed in Massachusetts Bay: amongst them Winthrop, the first governor under the new charter. Salem now became secondary to Boston, the site of which was chosen by Winthrop. Boston was henceforward the seat of administration and the chief centre of trade. Four years later the colony included some 16 townships with a total population of 4,000, all of them Englishmen. In respect of education, means and position, the settlers at Boston and Salem were superior to those of Plymouth. In seriousness of purpose and in cohesion they surpassed the Virginians. In the words of Endicott himself: "It is not with us as with other men whom small things can discourage or small discontents cause to wish themselves home again."

The Colony
founded.

The political institutions of Massachusetts took definite shape at an early stage. Under the charter of 1629 the Governor was appointed by the Company in London, but in the following year the entire administration of the colony was vested in the actual settlers. The Governor and his Executive Council or Assistants were henceforward elected by the whole body of freemen; and the freemen were speedily limited to such heads of families as were enrolled Church members. The franchise, in modern language, rested partly on a religious qualification. With the growth of townships the primary assembly or direct form of popular government, became as in Plymouth unworkable;

Its govern-
ment.

representation was introduced, in true English fashion, on a question of taxation. From 1634 a miniature House of Commons, elected by ballot, met yearly at Boston; the Governor and Assistants, after a short interval, formed an Upper House. Although almost republican in character, it is characteristic that the leaders of opinion repudiated as a calumny the term *democracy* as applicable to their Government.

As religious motives had given birth to the colony, so
Religion. the influence of the Churches and their pastors governed its political and social life. It was inevitable that Puritan churchmen should, once severed from the historical associations of their old home, become, like their fellow colonists of Plymouth, Independents in Church government. Revolt against repression in England by no means implied religious tolerance in the New World. Public opinion in Massachusetts was intolerant by conviction, and neither politician nor pastor raised a voice for freedom of worship. On Rhode Island alone were religious disabilities, at least for Protestants, unknown.

As in England, the township was the political unit and the
Local in- main centre of political education. Civic rights
stitutions. were as jealously guarded as those of the colony. The contrast with Virginia in this respect is most marked. The Massachusetts township was not an accidental growth. It was created by a definite act of the Colonial Government. The church and town hall were its primary centres. Needs of defence and of religious worship encouraged municipal life. A settler acquired land only as a citizen of his township. Part of the newly-proclaimed area was allotted to such citizens in freehold tenure; part of it remained the common property of the freemen who had rights of pasture or tillage in succession: again reproducing features of an English borough. The large estates of Virginia were unknown in New England, and settlement was pushed westward to the primeval forest as the needs of the population

demanded the formation of fresh townships. After the year 1640 the stream of immigration ceased. There were now in Massachusetts 20,000 people almost exclusively of English and Puritan origin. The appropriated area extended some 35 miles inland from Boston. The characteristic features of the colony were already fixed.

The true lessons of English expansion are to be learnt partly by watching the development of political institutions, but not less from the quiet uneventful progress of agriculture and industry, from the pioneer work of the outpost settlements, and from the various expedients by which economic, social or educational needs are met by a new community. New England was at this period chiefly a forest country and the land was won to cultivation by hard and perilous toil. As compared with Virginia or Lincolnshire, the soil was poor and the climate rigorous. Large properties worked by imported labour were unknown: the yeoman, the farmer who owns his farm, was the characteristic settler. For a century agriculture formed the chief occupation of the colonists. Industries were few. There was no mining, few handicrafts. Fisheries and ship-building were, however, important occupations. Large classes of goods were always drawn from England. The artisan and labourer in Massachusetts had better opportunities than in England and might rise to high position. Slavery was rare, was comparatively humane, and almost entirely domestic, whilst traffic in slaves was forbidden. Thus the relations of classes were not unlike those at home. Birth and official position gave social precedence. The clergy, often men of education and force of character, formed the only professional class. New-haven and Boston were progressive towns, while Plymouth stood still. Before the end of the century Boston was recognised by all the colonies east of the Hudson as their social and intellectual centre.

Character-
istics.

The citizen of Massachusetts was marked by a desire

for learning which has generally characterised Scottish rather than English Puritanism. As early as 1636 a sum of £400, equal to a year's public revenue of the entire colony, was voted by the legislature of Massachusetts for the establishment of a high school or college, which in the following year was further endowed by a like large sum. John Harvard, who, before emigrating, had taken his degree at Cambridge, established a new Cambridge close to Boston. The college now took the name of its benefactor. For a long time its chief service to New England lay in the supply of an educated ministry, whilst its nearness to Boston, and the connection with it of the leading families, tended to infuse a strong element of culture into the social life of the capital—an influence which Harvard has never ceased to exert.

Common or public schools of two grades were compulsorily established by order of the Massachusetts Assembly in 1647; Newhaven had a free school as early as 1641, and the example was followed elsewhere. Plymouth lagged behind, for it was by the middle of the century sinking into an inferior position and contributed little to the progress of New England. The printing-press was set up at Cambridge in 1638.

The law of New England was, like its political institutions, the Common law of the old country slightly modified to meet the needs of the new. But in not a few things controlled in England by public opinion alone, the New England State interfered by statute. Manners, dress, amusements, social customs were, in Salem or Plymouth, a matter of State regulation. The motive of such interference is to be found in the special circumstances under which the group of New England colonies took their rise.

New England at this period presents us with Puritan society in its sterner aspects. The community had set out

Harvard College: 1636.

Schools.

General aims of the Colony.

to establish an ideal of corporate life and a standard of belief and of conduct to which each individual was required to conform. The leaders desired to exhibit such a righteous nation as the law-givers and prophets of Israel had portrayed in the Old Testament. But the colonists were Englishmen as well as Puritans. Side by side with their religious and moral aims went an instinct of political freedom, of local government, of individual enterprise in trade, a love of order and honest administration. If opinion repressed freedom in religion and thought, it not less provided in its zeal for learning the instrument by which in respect of worship and belief the rights of the individual would later be fully won.

The expansion, indeed the very existence, of the settlements demanded a careful handling of the native question. The Indian tribes of the coast of The Indians. Massachusetts had been enfeebled by war and disease, although to the west and to the north they were vigorous and dangerous. The New England town was invariably built with a view to defence against sudden attack. The Indian rarely accepts civilisation, and retreats before the white man. To the pioneer settler he was at first an uncertain neighbour; he soon became a dreaded enemy. Trading with him was limited in every colony by law. In a fitful and half-hearted way it was attempted to Christianise him. But the gradual appropriation of his hunting grounds led to outbreak and massacre which made a peaceful relation precarious and for long periods impossible. Differing in this from his French rival the New Englander seldom succeeded in making the Indian either a tool or a friend. The pioneer settlements were but slowly pushed towards the west, and in them the finer qualities of the colonists were trained. By endurance of hardship and peril, the hunter, the fur-trader, the woodsman, gradually widened the bounds of the English world, and what was once won was never, in spite of massacre or burnings, again lost to civilisation.

From Plymouth and Massachusetts in their turn began a migration to the unoccupied regions on either side. Some time before 1633 the Dutch, established since 1607 on the Hudson, had built a fort on the Connecticut River. Thither also pioneers from the English settlements made their way between 1633 and 1640. In 1639 Connecticut, recognised by Massachusetts as a separate colony, drew up a formal constitution which is described as 'the first truly political constitution of America.' The Governor and Council were elected by the freemen; no religious test was imposed on the electors, who from the outset returned local representatives to an Assembly. The townships received rights of municipal self-government. Not only governor and legislature but all officials and magistrates were subject to popular election and control. The colony of Connecticut with Newhaven, afterwards incorporated with it, became the frontier post of English settlers against the Dutch.

The settlements afterwards known as Rhode Island, Providence and other townships on the Island itself, had their origin (1636—1640) in the religious bitterness of Massachusetts. Roger Williams was an opponent of that identification of the Church and of the State upon which the leading colony based its institutions. Being expelled with other sectaries Williams founded the settlement at Providence in which, on grounds of abstract right, fullest liberty of religious opinion was permitted. The experiment served as a safety-valve for the controversial fury of New England. The colony was regarded with aversion by the Independents and its progress was hindered by its discordant fanaticisms.

To the north of Massachusetts settlements were formed by groups of Englishmen sent out under the auspices of the New England Company, who were joined by religious exiles from Boston. They occupied merely a narrow fringe of land round Piscataqua

Connecticut:
1633.

Rhode Is-
land: 1636.

New Hamp-
shire and
Maine: 1615.

Bay and the river which flows into it, forming civic communities altogether independent of each other. Even when absorbed by Massachusetts in 1643 they retained much of their original autonomy. These townships were the nucleus of the later province of New Hampshire.

Maine was at this time one vast wilderness of forest, through which two rivers of importance made their way to the sea. The coast was rugged and offered little attraction to settlers. Sir Ferdinando Gorges, Governor of Plymouth in England, had been for years a leading promoter of American colonisation. Between 1615 and 1630 certain ventures to the coast of Maine were undertaken from England at his initiative. He became proprietor of a large area north of Piscataqua Bay, to which Charles I, by Charter in 1639, attached rights amounting to sovereignty. A small number of settlers migrated from England; they were not Puritans, and, severed from the New England colonies to the south by dangerous coasts or dense forest, lived apart from the general current of American colonial history. The scattered plantations of woodsmen and fishermen failed to prosper, owing no doubt to conditions of soil and climate and to the attractions of the more favoured colonies of the south. The chief importance of Maine lay in the fact that it formed a natural bulwark of New England against the French.

The coast line from the little river St Croix to a point south-west of Newhaven was thus appropriated by English settlers. The next stage in the history of New England was reached, when in 1637-38 Connecticut approached the Court of Massachusetts with proposals for joint action. The motive lay in the practical needs of common defence. Two European nations were rivals of the English in the settlement of the middle regions of North America. The Dutch had as early as 1607 begun to occupy certain posts along the Hudson: in 1622 they built and fortified, in spite of protests from London, their chief

Motives to
Federation :
1637-1642.
a. The Dutch.

place New Amsterdam at the mouth of the river. The Dutch colony was directed with less of that strenuous and pushful energy which was characteristic of their East India Company. However, the fur trade, shipping and agriculture afforded profitable occupation to a sturdy though not numerous body of settlers. These had in the Hudson their natural trade route to the interior, and to the valley of this great river, and the coast line adjoining, their settlements were mainly confined. The fur traders however penetrated at an early date into the basin of the Connecticut river, where the Massachusetts men found their stockade at Hartford in 1632. The great water-ways were the only routes by which the dense forests of the north-west could be penetrated. Men from New England were already settled at the mouth of the Connecticut, and a boundary dispute therefore was inevitable. If the men of New Amsterdam were hard, the pioneers who had gone out with the deliberate purpose of pushing forward the bounds of the English race were harder still. The Connecticut did not fall to the Dutch although they retained Hartford for a time as an isolated trading post.

There was however greater danger from the French. The valley of the St Lawrence was separated from New England by a densely wooded region impassable except by consent of the Indian tribes. The French had between 1603 and 1608 succeeded under the leadership of Champlain in making good their attempts to effect a settlement along the great river. Quebec was settled by him in the latter year and received permanent garrison. The great district of Acadia, including the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia of to-day, was proclaimed a French colony and a strong settlement planted at Port Royal. This was destroyed by the Virginian colonists in 1614, but Acadia was formally recognized as French in 1632. For twenty years before the founding of Boston the French were actively at work along the basin of the St Lawrence and its southern tributaries, and were

b. The French.

already looking forward to a descent by the New England water-ways to the Atlantic coast. Their early voyages along the coast as far south as Cape Cod formed later on the foundation of vague claims to New England. Such was their activity that in the year 1638 it was already plain that the expansion of the English settlements would in no long time find in the French frontier a barrier to further advance, whilst there was the still more serious danger of a French descent upon New England across the watershed of the St Lawrence.

The Indian danger was closely associated with these encroachments. The French character has generally lent itself more readily than the English to friendly relations with uncivilised peoples. It was no less true in North America in the 17th century than it is in Western Africa in the 19th. In Canada or New France, the French settler not seldom intermarried with the Indian. As hunter or trader he lived in their villages for months at a time; he learnt their language, taught them Christian doctrine, made allies of them. The Jesuit was in turn missionary and political agent, and as Catholic and as Frenchman had no scruples in directing the forces of savagery against the heretics of New England.

c. The Indians.

Besides the needs of defence against foreign enemies which might become urgent at any moment there were possible difficulties with the autocratic *régime* of the mother country. Charters were far from secure: Laud had shewn himself eager to deal with Massachusetts when opportunity offered. The first attempt at creating a Colonial department of the English Government in 1634 was inspired by his desire to bring New England to its proper obedience. The demand for the surrender of the charter of 1629 was ignored in Boston and royal action was prevented by the Scottish troubles. But to avert future dangers of the same kind co-operation was specially desirable.

d. Inter-
ference from
home.

Articles of confederation were agreed upon in 1643. The instinct of independent government was so keenly felt in the individual colonies, that the outbreak of the Civil War alone availed to bring about adhesion to a scheme of conjoint action. Plymouth, Newhaven, Connecticut and Massachusetts were the four parties to the union: Rhode Island and Maine were expressly excluded. The right to manage internal affairs was abundantly secured: but a league for offence and defence, mutual advice and succour, was organised. Commissioners, two from each member of the league, met when needed to determine affairs of peace and war, division of spoils, extension of the federation and all matters hanging therefrom. Fighting levies and war costs were proportioned to the adult male population. Herein lay the germ of many disputes. Massachusetts contributed most both in men and money. Her position gave her the dominant voice in deliberations, and no important step in policy could be taken against her will. The main achievement of the union which lived a vigorous life for 20 years and lingered on till 1684, was the war with New Amsterdam in 1652, when the English boundary was pushed up within ten miles of the Hudson. Besides, the existence of a united policy tended to preserve the colonies as a whole from capricious interference from home. The union was interesting as the first experiment in federation, and revealed at once capacity for combination in the presence of external danger, and the tenacity of the instinct of autonomy which rendered that combination precarious and rarely effective.

**Newfound-
land and Lord
Baltimore,
1612-1632.**

A few words will suffice to describe the efforts at settlement north of New England. Newfoundland, since its discovery by the Cabots, had been known to Europe chiefly for its valuable fishery, which attracted every summer boats from English,

Breton and Basque harbours. After Sir Humphrey Gilbert's death his rights fell into abeyance. Bristol merchants seem to have attempted settlement in 1610: but in 1612 Sir G. Calvert (afterwards Lord Baltimore) acquired the island by patent from James I with wide privileges of self-government and of trade. Baltimore, himself a Catholic, induced certain co-religionists to accompany him: this caused misgiving in Virginia and Plymouth and in the plantation itself. The hardships of the climate and the constant attacks of the French during the war of 1625—1628 drove the founder to seek more genial surroundings. The island produced nothing but furs and was difficult of exploration. With the King's consent Baltimore withdrew to Virginia and ultimately to Maryland, and the sovereign rights of England were again dormant. The island never passed into the hands of another power, but it remained, as before, without organised occupation, until the Peace of Utrecht.

De Monts, a comrade of Champlain, had, under a patent from the French Crown, in 1604, a year of great significance in French colonisation, settled a few Nova Scotia,
1621. fishermen and woodcutters at a spot on the Bay of Fundy, named by him Port Royal, now called Annapolis. The settlement, a struggling hamlet, was destroyed by a crew of Virginians under Captain Argall in 1613, on the plea that the new-comers were "intruders," a plea which was equally true of the English themselves in the eyes of French and Spanish diplomats. In 1621 James I granted to Sir William Alexander and his Scottish co-adventurers a great area bounded by the St Lawrence, the river St Croix in Maine, and the Atlantic, claimed by the French as their province of Acadia and now called New Scotland or Nova Scotia. The charter was enlarged by Charles I by grant of rights of defence against Spain and France, and many Scotch settlers were taken over. The war with France at once involved the settlers of the two powers in America. Quebec was taken in 1628, and

with Quebec the whole of New France was lost to the French Crown. For a short time French sovereignty in America was at an end. In 1629 a British Canada Company for fur-trading was founded, in which Scotland was specially interested. But by the Peace of St Germain's (1632) everything
Acadia,
French, 1632.
 was restored, in spite of urgent protests from the Scottish promoters, and Alexander's colonists returned. The English Crown now retained nothing on the mainland north of the Kennebec river in Maine. While Frenchmen explored the Great West of Upper Canada English enterprise was opening up a new field far to the south, in Spanish waters.

THE ENGLISH IN THE WEST INDIES.

Before the death of James I the Spanish sphere of influence in the West Indies had been avowedly
The West
Indies, 1605.
 invaded. The Spaniards, in their desire to secure the mineral wealth of the mainland and the possession of the larger Antilles, had neglected as unimportant the outer fringe of small islands known to English navigators as the Leeward and Windward Islands. At the beginning of the 17th century the natives of these islands remained still undisturbed. They were of a fiercer nature than the helpless tribes who had so quickly died out in Cuba, and European sailors who touched at Dominica or Barbados had found them hostile and dangerous. The settlement of these islands therefore falls within the period when the Dutch and the French, rather than the Portuguese and the Spaniard, were the active colonising peoples.

We may note, in the first place, that the West Indies which now form part of the Empire belong historically to three groups. First, islands originally settled and always retained by men of English race; such as Barbados. Secondly, islands settled by Spaniards and acquired by English conquest; such as Jamaica and Trinidad. Thirdly,

islands colonised by English, French or other Europeans, and afterwards passed from one power to the other as so many items of international negotiation ; such were St Lucia, Grenada and most of the smaller Antilles.

The second fact of importance is involved in the geographical position of the West Indies. They formed the first avenue of approach to the American continent in 1492. The voyage thither always involved less risk, hardship and delay than the north Atlantic passage to New France or New England. The geographical position also links closely together the West Indies with Western Africa. The voyage from Europe was usually made by the Canaries or Cape de Verde Islands, an easy route with a short ocean passage and a generally favourable wind in the north-eastern trade. The face of the West Indies turns really to the East, and thus the Portuguese, essentially, in the 16th century, an African power, early acquired Brazil ; and Hawkins, as we have seen, a trader to North-west Africa, extended his affairs to the Caribbean Sea. Even in our own time naval strategy regards the Cape de Verde Islands as a natural base of operations in Central American waters. This geographical connection gave rise to and perpetuated the most important economic factor in the development of the West Indies—negro slavery.

Thirdly, they were, with their adjoining mainlands, for a long time regarded in Europe as the most valuable part of America. It was, for instance, debated in 1763 whether Canada might not be profitably exchanged for one or more West Indian islands. It is necessary, then, to put aside the present-day conception of the relative significance of New England or Canada on the one hand and our struggling West Indian possessions on the other.

The first soil in the West Indies proper claimed for the English Crown was Barbados in the year 1605. But the landing of Sir Olave Leigh was not followed by effective occupation till 1624, when

The importance of
Barbados.

one Richard Courten, a London merchant, despatched a body of settlers to take possession of the island. Courten acted by the authority of the Earl of Marlborough, to whom James I had conveyed by charter territorial rights over the island. It is characteristic of Stuart indifference to English expansion that two years later Charles I granted an almost identical patent to the Earl of Carlisle, by which he acquired all Caribbean Islands not actually occupied by Spain. The disputes between proprietors were ultimately compounded at the expense of the settlers in Barbados. Barbados has never either by capture or by treaty passed to the hands of a foreign power. By the year 1636 there were 6,000 English settlers in the island. London merchants took up blocks of land from the proprietors and sent out settlers at their own expense. Political troubles at home stimulated emigration, which during the Civil War became still more active. Men of means, largely Royalist country gentlemen, carried what wealth they could get together to invest in plantations, worked like those of Virginia by imported labour, white or black. Before the end of the century Barbados had the reputation of being one great garden, a rival in fertility to the Dutch Spice Islands. The planters were in the main substantial people, anxious, like the Virginians, to be left alone to develop their industry. But, like them also, they were keenly alive to the advantages of self-government. In 1639 they had already attained representative institutions; they had their usual quarrels with the Governor from home, and found the proprietary rights a burden which in 1663 was commuted for an annual charge. The Royalist sentiment of the people led to the proclamation of Charles II in 1650, and the Anglican settlement was reaffirmed. But under threat of attack by the Parliamentary fleet in 1652 a compromise was arrived at by which Barbados retained her powers of self-government and was guaranteed against interference from the home Parliament, in which, as she protested, the island had no representatives.

The chief industry of Barbados, typical in this respect of the West Indies generally, was sugar-growing, introduced apparently about 1640 from Brazil, and worked on a large scale by slave labour.

The elements of its population.

The victims of political crises at home were in the second half of the century constantly exported to the island, as by Cromwell after his reduction of Ireland and of Scotland; those who survived the voyage and the hardships of their new life attained, after a period of service, both liberty and citizenship. Scotsmen, it was noted, proved more useful settlers than Irishmen. A system of kidnapping in the large English towns provided other elements of similar temporary white slavery, which was usually more cruel, by reason of the climate, than indentured service in the tobacco-fields in Virginia. These white bondservants, attaining their freedom after a term of years, proved as a whole a better element of the population than the corresponding class in Carolina. The negro was commercially worth more than the white servant, and gradually took his place. Before the end of the 17th century he constituted two-thirds of the population of the island.

The trade of Barbados, like that of other American colonies, was, before the Navigation Acts, almost exclusively carried on by the Dutch, who, from their

Its trade.

busy trading centre at Curaçoa conducted nearly the whole of the intercolonial trade of America, and supplied both English and French settlements with European produce. The sugar trade between America and Europe was almost entirely in their hands. The threat of the English Parliament to forbid the trade of Barbados with the mother country was a more bitter cause of hostility than the execution of Charles I and a more potent argument for compromise than the English fleet.

In Barbados, as in Virginia, the English colonist is seen in his practical aspect. He is a man of business to whom self-government is a means to the main end of developing the possibilities of the new

Practical character of the settlers.

home; a working compromise outweighs with him all questions of abstract political right; though nowhere, unless in Virginia, was the sense of English kinship more keenly alive. The Barbados planter founded a family, and, though with frequent visits to England, identified himself with his new home. In all important respects Barbados was, throughout the 17th century, the social and political centre of English influence in the West Indies, and, next to Virginia and New England, the most prosperous and best-known English colony. She sent forth in her turn groups of settlers who set up new communities not only in other islands, but as far away as Carolina and the colonies northward. The island, which is about the size of the Isle of Wight, is still notable for the density of its population and the high cultivation of its soil.

St Kitts (or St Christopher) was actually the first island to receive English settlers. The date of the first landing is given as 1623. Two years later, with Barbados, it was taken under royal protection, and in the same year the French formed a rival settlement on the other side of the island. The French 'Company of the Islands of America,' formed by Richelieu, and the Earl of Carlisle in England both obtained royal charters in the same year. But their representatives on the spot, being practical men, agreed to divide St Kitts between them, with the further proviso that war between their respective nations in Europe should not necessarily involve the island. This agreement is but an avowal of the principle, accepted both before and subsequently to this period, that the colonies of European states do not always follow the mother country in observing a state of peace or of war. The other islands of the Leeward group were partly settled from St Kitts: Nevis in 1628, Antigua and Montserrat in 1632, Dominica receiving its settlers from the French plantation in the same island.

The first attempt to colonise St Lucia in 1638 originated

from St Kitts and the Bermudas conjointly; Grenada from the French island of Martinique in 1650. But in the case of these two islands, as also of St Vincent, the occupation was mostly of an ineffective temporary kind. Both the English and the French Crowns included them within the Commissions granted to their respective Governors, and their final destiny was determined as English possessions by war rather than by settlement. The growth of population was more marked in the Leewards than in the Windwards. St Kitts, the most fertile of them, and Antigua, were most favourably known to London merchants. In all cases the negroes formed by the end of the century some three-fourths of the population. This at once indicates the nature of the cultivation. Sugar was, as in Barbados, a staple crop worked by slave labour with a small admixture of indentured white servants. But indigo, tobacco, ginger, were also produced, though in much smaller quantities.

The Wind-
ward Islands:
1638.

The political institutions of the smaller islands have not the same continuity as those of Barbados, partly for reasons arising out of the haphazard nature of their settlement, and partly from their changes of European ownership. A definite attempt at federation of the Leeward group, with, at the same time, the uniform creation of local assemblies, was instituted in 1689. A Legislature of two chambers, one nominated by the Crown and one elected by the planters, was provided for each island, whilst a federal Legislature representing the whole group under the presidency of a Governor-in-chief was appointed to meet as required. The difficulties of intercommunication, the absence of any specific business, and the futility of combination for defence against an European fleet rendered federal action nugatory.

Their insti-
tutions.

The relative positions of the French and English settlers in the smaller Antilles clearly left room for future dispute. As a matter of fact the islands were, with the notable exception of Barbados,

Their foreign
relations.

tossed from one power to the other as the result of war or negotiation. But for the most part the Leeward Islands remained English. The activity of the planters at St Kitts first aroused the Spaniards to the fact that their sphere of influence was suffering encroachment. An attack on this island in 1629 was disastrous to the plantation, for 600 Englishmen were carried off to Spanish prisons. Charles I, as usual, ignored the outrage, whilst Cromwell recalled it as one of his grounds for his war with Spain. It was not until the Treaty of Madrid in 1670 that Spain formally recognised the presence of her European rivals in the Caribbean Sea.

The Bermudas form a natural halting place between the North American colonies and the West Indies, and their history has an interest hardly surpassed by any of the English settlements in the American ocean. The Spaniards, dreading with good reason the storms that swept their coasts, gave them that evil reputation which Raleigh, Lancaster, and Champlain confirmed by their reports, and which survives in Shakespeare's "storm-vexed Bermoothes" (*The Tempest*, produced 1611). The wreck of Sir George Somers on his way to Virginia (1609) proved a turning point in the estimation of this isolated group. Becoming favourably known both in Virginia and in England for their equable climate, the absence of natives and great wealth of game, they passed first into the hands of the Virginia Company in 1612, and shortly afterwards, as the "plantation of the Somers' Islands," were made over to a separate company. The settlers were not numerous but conducted profitable trade in tobacco with the mother country, and following the example of Virginia they acquired representative government a year later, as early as 1620. The population consisted of planters cultivating their own land or managing estates of the freeholders at home, worked by white bondservants of the usual West Indian type, and even by Indian slaves shipped from the American mainland. Disputes were frequent between

The North-
erly islands:
(a) the Ber-
mudas: 1609.

Puritan and Royalist Churchmen, the latter of whom were in the majority. The islands yielded allegiance to the Commonwealth, but only, like Barbados, under threat. As the population increased (about 15,000 were found at one time within the small area of 19 square miles) the relations between the settlers and the Company became irksome. Once more the rights of distant proprietors and their trade monopoly gave way before the demands of the settlers. The Company was dissolved in 1684 and the Bermudas became a Crown colony.

The Bahamas, a much larger and more frequented group, has the distinction of including the first land sighted by Columbus in the eventful voyage of 1492. But after being depopulated by the Spaniards for the supply of slave labour to Hispaniola, they seem to have been neglected until the planters of Bermuda established settlements on two or three of the islands between 1646 and 1666. The Bahamas therefore were left untouched by the main stream of European colonisation. Not until 1670 were the islands definitely incorporated as a colony under the patent of the Carolina Company (see p. 146). The charter provided a representative body and an executive of the usual pattern. The Company made no efforts to develop the islands. The settlers were few, were adventurous rather than industrious, and earned a reputation for piracy and wrecking, to which the geography of the group readily lent itself. Under these circumstances neither political nor agricultural progress was feasible. The Company did nothing for the colony, which, as a nest of pirates, was sternly taken in hand by the home Government in the reign of George I.

There remains the most important of our West Indian possessions: the island of Jamaica. The Spaniards had done little or nothing to turn to account the great fertility of this island, which they regarded chiefly as a place of call and centre of supply for

(b) The Bahamas: 1646.

Jamaica: conquered 1655.

their fleets. Agriculturally Jamaica was neglected by them for Cuba and Hispaniola. The latter island was the objective of the expedition of 1654 fitted out by Cromwell to punish Spain for repeated outrages in West Indian waters. Defeated in their main purpose the fleet captured Jamaica without difficulty in May, 1655. The treaty of Madrid (1670) confirmed the conquest.

Charles II in 1662 appointed the first civil governor, with an executive council of judges and administrative officials, with an elective assembly. It was specially proclaimed that all freeborn English subjects, *i.e.* all children born of English parents in Jamaica, should have full rights of British citizenship. The conflicts between the assembly and the home Government were frequent and acute. It was attempted to place Jamaica on the footing of Ireland, in the sense of making legislation for Jamaica depend upon the initiative of the English Parliament. The colonists, now a prosperous and energetic body, secured by their persistence a renewal in 1680 of their earlier privileges. The island had contained at the time of its conquest but a handful of Portuguese and half-caste Spaniards, part only of whom submitted. The first step taken by Cromwell was to invite Puritan settlers from New England who should give a Protestant stamp to the colony. This had but slight effect. The population was chiefly collected from such unpromising sources as political victims from Ireland, vagrants from Scotland, criminals and wastrels from the streets of London, who provided the labour for planters of experience from Nevis and the Bermudas. Ample room, a fertile soil, and a strong government served to unite these incongruous elements into a fairly prosperous community. A standing danger to the colony was created by the maroons, the slaves of the Spanish planters who had fled to the mountains upon the English conquest. Conciliation failed from the outset. Reduction by force proved for a century and a half tedious and difficult, and not till the middle of the 19th century was

the breach between descendants of the fugitive negroes and the English community finally healed.

Jamaica sugar early commanded a preferential price in London, and after 1660 tobacco and indigo were neglected for the cane. Sugar plantation, as Its in-
dustry. elsewhere, implied slave labour. Negroes rapidly outnumbered the whites. Kingston, founded after the destruction of Port Royal by earthquake in 1692, became the chief centre of commerce and of social life. Its irregular trade with the American colonies was, as to Barbados, an important source of wealth, which was further increased by its friendly connection with the Buccaneers, who were the strongest power in the Caribbean Sea in the latter portion of the 17th century.

THE HOME COUNTRY AND ITS COLONIAL POLICY.

The motives to English plantation were at their original formulation in the sixteenth century (see p. 40) conceived by the mother country in no narrow or self-regarding spirit. There were probably Relations
of England to
her Colonies :
Commercial. always two currents of opinion on the subject; the one looking to the expansion of the English name and race, and drawing but slight distinction between the interests of the colony and those of the parent state: the other, slowly becoming the dominant view, holding a plantation as contrived in the special interest of home prosperity. Lord Bacon, in his *Essay* on Plantations, and Sandys, the broad-minded Puritan leader, took the nobler view, and could "look at the mother and the daughters with an equal and indifferent (*i.e.* impartial) eye, remembering that a colony is a part and member of her own

body." But the trend of opinion in the Government, the City of London, amongst merchants and promoters of colonisation, took by degrees another direction, and found by the middle of the seventeenth century its expression in the Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660.

It must be clearly understood that the spirit of the Acts was in no sense revolutionary. As far back as the reign of Richard II (1382) it was enacted that no goods should be exported from, or imported into, England except in vessels whose owners were subjects of the Crown. This attempt to increase the mercantile marine was repeated in subsequent reigns, and notably by that master of statecraft, Thomas Cromwell.

Lack of English vessels, however, rendered the law ineffective, but the principle was never lost sight of. Early colonisers held out the increase of shipping as one of their chief aims. The growing trade of Virginia, Barbados, and Massachusetts inevitably raised the entire question of trade policy. A statesman of the 17th century could argue that the colonies, so far from being exceptionally oppressed after 1651, had been exceptionally favoured before that date: for the Act of that year simply asserted a principle of trade legislation accepted by Englishmen for 200 years.

The trade relations of England to the colonies involved, first, the interests of the Crown. By their charter or otherwise specific privileges were granted by the king; such as relief in payment of import dues for a long term of years, aid in securing settlers, restrictions on growth of tobacco in England, heavy duties on that of Spanish origin, and so on. Again, the king undertook the diplomatic or military support of the settlers in disputes with France, Spain, or Holland: for without the protection of the English name weak and isolated settlements might fall an easy prey to ambitious powers. In return for these advantages the Crown began to look for

Traditional
trade policy of
England.

1. Colonial
trade and
Crown
revenue.

compensation in the customs payable upon colonial imports into England. By 1620 it was perceived that much revenue might accrue from tobacco. In 1621 it was ordered by the Privy Council that all Virginian tobacco exported must be first landed in England and pay duty. This was opposed both in Virginia and in London, as 'contrary to the rights of free Englishmen,' who were entitled to sell their products where they pleased; in 1624 it was further ordered that no foreign vessels should be employed in trade between Virginia and Europe, but this was promptly ignored. Customs duties were favourable to Virginia and Barbados: their tobacco in 1631 paid one shilling per pound, reduced later to fourpence; the Spanish product paid two shillings, and its import was expressly limited by law. In 1636 one Virginian cargo alone paid £3,300 in customs duty. By the middle of the century it was generally accepted that the Crown was entitled to its dues on the entire produce of a colony exported to Europe. It was not yet admitted that such produce must pass first of all through an English customs-house.

The Navigation Act of 1651 was passed not in the interests of the State revenue but in the interests of English shipping. The Act, indeed, had a double motive. Its aim was, in the first place, to punish the Dutch for their hard, exclusive policy in the far East, especially for the judicial murders of Amboyna in 1623. These outrages had left on the English mind of that age the impression which the events at Cawnpore produced upon the generation that saw the Indian Mutiny. In the second place, Englishmen perceived that, so far from stimulating the national marine and enriching English merchants, our colonial prosperity mainly profited our rivals the Dutch as the great ship-owning power of the world. This Parliament determined to remedy. The Act required that all goods brought into this country from Asia, Africa, or America shall be imported direct, *i.e.* by sea-routes, in ships owned, captained

2. Navigation Act, 1651, and English shipping.

and chiefly manned by English subjects, including in these, of course, our colonists. The blow to Dutch shipping was overwhelming, and threatened it with financial ruin. The first Dutch war (1652-54) was the immediate result. But it gravely affected the interests of the colonists. The Dutch were the carriers of America and of Europe. Their freights were the cheapest, their warehouses the most commodious, their markets the best frequented. The loss of the advantage of this efficient transport involved to the planter both delay and increased cost in handling his produce. English shipping had now a legal monopoly of the national over-sea commerce, and it was wholly unequal to the sudden demand. Hence came higher prices for colonial produce in Europe, with consequent smaller trade, diminished profit to the planter, and risk that new and competing sources of supply might be created. The Dutch and the French, for instance, at once began to grow tobacco. Had the Act been rigorously enforced, the trade of Virginia and Barbados—the island trade was exclusively Dutch—would have been utterly disorganised. But the colonies, aided by their Governors, evaded the Act; and Virginia and Barbados, though with increasing difficulty, continued, for a time, to export to New England or to Europe as before.

3. Navigation Act, 1660, and English trade and manufacture.

The second Act, passed immediately on the Restoration, again shows how strongly commercial motives controlled colonial policy. It was enacted (1) that certain “enumerated” products—sugar, tobacco, dyes, ginger, but excluding grain and timber—should be exported only to England or to another colony; to further secure this, foreign factors were not allowed to reside in an English colony; (2) that all commodities imported into a colony must be shipped from England only. The provisions respecting the employment of English vessels were reaffirmed. The object of (1) was to make England the central selling market of the Empire, of (2) to make England the chief source of manufactured goods consumed.

Thus the three points which must be kept clear in estimating the relations of mother country and colonies in financial and commercial aspects are these: (a) the Crown right to customs on colonial produce; this is accepted: (b) the desire to stimulate English and colonial shipping—partly at least from motives of national security: (c) the claim of merchant and manufacturer at home to the first profits upon colonial products and requirements. As yet there was no question of manufacture in the colonies; when need arose that was sternly repressed. But the policy of trade ascendancy and the mercantile system is now formally expressed; and it is in the power of the steadily increasing middle-class to apply the policy with selfish rigidity in its own interests. Although the effect of the Acts upon the growth of the merchant shipping of the country was most favourable, the colonies, often supported by their Governors, regarded their operation with intense resentment; and we are already in presence of one, perhaps the chief, of the deep-seated causes which led up to the crisis of 1776. We have long since recognised that this narrow policy, whilst it may be explained, is in no way justified, by the traditional principles of primitive English trade. Yet we must not forget that the ministers of Charles II or George II were but pursuing a system upon which, in a broad sense, France and Germany base their colonial empires to-day.

General effects of policy of trade ascendancy.

Speaking generally it is true that plantations in their earlier stages are costly experiments to their promoters and unprofitable to the sovereign. This fact gives the clue to the policy of James I and his son in colonial affairs. James was incapable of taking a large view of any subject; and when he interfered in this particular department his motive was generally unworthy or evil. In hope of revenue he had at first patronised the Virginia Company; as none came he ignored it; at a hint

The attitude of James I and Charles I to the colonies.

from Spain he suppressed it. He was indifferent to the Dutch charter of New Amsterdam, to the loss of the far-eastern trade, to the outrages at Amboyna. To gratify the greed of Buckingham he deliberately robs the East India Company, in 1624, of £20,000; to curry favour with Madrid he executes Raleigh. The navy reaches a depth of inefficiency unknown since Henry VIII took it in hand. If James would not defend his subjects abroad, Charles could not. The navy, indeed, received attention under the impulse of Selden's famous claim for the English monopoly of the Channel and the North Sea; for ten years at least toleration and wholesome non-interference marked his policy towards Virginia and New England. But the careless grants of patents to courtiers continued: as in the case of Barbados (see p. 114), and of the East Indies (p. 80). America is regarded by the king as a convenient safety-valve for religious or political discontent. Canada, captured in 1628, is promptly restored to France, and Nova Scotia and its settlers left to their fate. Under Laud, however, a new spirit animates the home Government. In 1634 a Commission was issued to him and other officers of State for making laws and orders for the government of plantations, with power to impose penalties for ecclesiastical offences, to call for Charters and to revoke them. This was an attempt to apply a policy of 'Thorough' to England beyond the sea. Massachusetts was at once called to account, but refused to remit its Charter for review. The troubles in Scotland and Laud's execution put an end to a policy which had not originated, perhaps, with the king. But the New England settlers were henceforth actively hostile to the monarchy, and supplied, in Vane and others, powerful helpers to the Puritan cause.

In Cromwell we see an imperial statesman of the first order: "perhaps the only Englishman who has ever understood in its full sense the word Empire" (Egerton). The fleet is rapidly brought to a state of efficiency. Barbados, Virginia, New England,

Cromwell
and the Em-
pire.

accept the authority of Parliament. The outstanding claims against Holland for the Amboyna murders are presented, and quickly settled (1654) by the cession of a large sum: her fleet after an isolated victory in the Channel is humiliated by Blake (1653): the Navigation Act of 1651 proves in its working a still more disastrous blow. Against Spain Cromwell wages war in the old Elizabethan spirit. Jamaica is acquired as a set-off against many grievous outrages in the Caribbean Sea, notably that of St Kitts in 1629 (see p. 118). Throughout his policy, indeed, Cromwell continues the school of Raleigh, with its union of religious zeal, imperial spirit, and mercantile aims. Foreign powers perceive that England has once more a man in command—a ruler who can fight both by sea and by land, who will not yield a foot of the English inheritance, and who, patriotic and incorruptible, is untouched by the dynastic and personal motives which governed his predecessors. At the Restoration the fall of Spain, the decline of Holland, the security of the English in America, the growth of our ocean commerce, are the dominant facts in policy.

THE NAVY OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE PROTECTORATE.

In the history of the English Navy the decade 1649–59 is hardly less memorable than that of 1586–96.

Under Charles I Buckingham alone endeavoured to restore the Navy to efficiency; after his death the fleet steadily decayed with the increase of the domestic troubles. Up to 1642 one or at most two ships were built yearly; after that date none were added. But from 1649 ships were ordered ‘by tens at a time’; in one year (1654) twenty-two new vessels—equal to one half of the navy of 1647—were launched. Under the Commonwealth naval policy was clearly conceived and carried into execution with a

A period of
great naval ac-
tivity 1649—
1659.

persistence impossible even to Hawkins and Drake. A powerful fleet was maintained ready for action in the Downs, guarding Dover and the Thames. Cruisers patrolled the entire coasts of the kingdom. The Mediterranean for the first time saw a permanent English squadron, whilst another was stationed in the West Indies, detaching vessels to watch for privateers as far north as New England. This naval activity was primarily compelled by the defection of a part of the royal fleet in 1648 under Prince Rupert. But here, again, the commercial motive became as usual the dominant one; and the navy was maintained as part of the policy by which the Dutch were ousted from the carrying trade of the English world.

The strength of the navy which was thus ready to hand to enforce the purpose of the Navigation Act was revealed in the war with Holland which the Act provoked. In 1650 the Dutch were far the strongest maritime power in Europe; as a nation they were rich, enterprising and united. England was distracted, weak at sea, and financially ruined. But the energy of the Admiralty was astounding. In two years, by dint of first-rate administration and of good seamanship rather than of superiority of commanders, the Dutch were brought to sue for peace. It is instructive to note the causes of this success. Naval officials were now chosen by merit, not as for fifty years past by court favour; officers had learnt their work, often no doubt on land, under Fairfax or Cromwell, in a stern school; they were prompt, energetic, patriotic, like all Cromwell's men. Sailors were on the whole well treated and regularly paid. Ships were new and of good design; stores plentiful; artillery and powder of the right type and amount. Naval repairing bases were properly equipped with plant and artificers. The Dutch, on the other hand, though with four times the number of seamen to draw upon, including the best naval material of all—the deep-sea fishermen,

The Dutch
war 1652-4.

Reasons for
English suc-
cess.

with better command of vessels and building yards, and with infinite ready money—yet lacked organisation and swiftness of executive. Perhaps also they were too rich to venture much, and recognised that they were now not dealing with James I. So when their slow-sailing, heavily-laden merchantmen were caught in the Atlantic or in the Channel and sold in the Thames and at Portsmouth—1500 prizes in all were taken from the Dutch during the two years, 1652-4—they found it best to yield. Their power was not destroyed, but the misery inflicted on the industrial population, dependent on foreign commerce, by the loss of the command of the sea compelled the Government to sue for peace. Nor was Cromwell keen to fight the Protestant Dutch; it was hardly his war. So the Dutch captains, sorely grudging, dipped their flag in salute of English vessels when they passed them in the Channel and the North Sea, in recognition of the supremacy of England in the narrow seas.

To Cromwell the enemy was Catholic Spain. The Dutch peace therefore, brought no remission of activity.

Naval ship-building was centred in the Thames and at Portsmouth. Cromwell had at his com-

*The Navy
under Crom-
well.*

mand half-a-dozen new vessels of over 1000 tons burden, carrying on the average 80 guns apiece; a much larger number of smaller ships of 500 tons or thereabouts, and a cloud of small fast-sailing craft, gun-boats or light cruisers, designed to chase privateers. The type of armament had not been greatly modified since Elizabeth's day. The demi-cannon, firing a 30 lb. shot, was still the usual heavy ordnance; the culverin, with a 17 lb. shot, the long-range chaser. For their tonnage Cromwell's vessels were heavily armed and cumbrous to look at. As the Protector revived the Elizabethan policy in foreign affairs, so his Admiralty, officers and crews were filled with the spirit of Raleigh and Grenville. One of the admirals writes before setting sail, "All that look towards Zion should hold Christian communion—we have all the guns aboard."

The cost of the Navy was appalling. Even in these days of heavy naval estimates we are startled to read that in 1653 out of the total national revenue of £2,600,000 £1,500,000 was devoted to the Admiralty. In the Protectorate this proportion was by no means exceptional; and debt was incurred in addition. Cromwell, we must remember, was the one ruler of this country who has succeeded in making England dominant at once by land and sea in European affairs. The task would, we cannot doubt, have proved too onerous even for him to sustain. The burden of it was borne for a time by the proceeds of confiscated estates—a draft upon national capital. And the taxation that gradually followed, with the growing weight of indebtedness, contributed prominently to the unpopularity of his rule and to the Restoration which followed.

The Navy
and its cost.

CHAPTER IV.

1660—1740.

THE SUPREMACY OF THE MERCANTILE INTEREST.

DURING the period 1660—1740 the relations of England to her Colonies become more clearly defined. We may distinguish three stages: from 1660—1675, the period of intelligent colonial policy; from 1675—1690, the period of reaction; from 1690 onwards, the period of rigid trade ascendancy.

The *régime* of the Restoration is not usually regarded by us with much satisfaction. But viewed on the side of the expansion of the Empire the reign of Charles II. for the first fifteen years commands something akin to respect. The colonial policy of his ministers was seriously conceived and intelligently carried out.

Colonial
policy, 1660—
1675.

In the first place plantation was, as never before, undertaken as a National policy; mainly, no doubt, in the commercial interests of the kingdom, but from the motive also of the expansion and defence of the Empire. Existing colonies received systematic attention. The Navigation Act of 1660, the new East India Company Charter, the organisation of a rudimentary Colonial Department, the support given in high quarters to the new ventures of Carolina, Hudson's Bay, Pennsylvania, suggest the many-sided activity of the administration in colonial affairs. Again, such men as Clarendon, Shaftesbury, Sydney, and Locke concern themselves not only with general policy but with the practical details of colonial administration; and until we come to the elder Pitt

Characteris-
tics:
(a) keen inter-
est in Colonial
expansion.

we meet with no other statesman of note of whom this can be said. Clarendon said of himself that 'soon after the Restoration he used all the endeavours he could to bring his Majesty to have a great esteem for his Plantations and to encourage the improvement of them.' Clarendon showed indeed a broad and intelligent spirit in his colonial policy, and in Shaftesbury he found an able colleague and successor. It is hardly too much to say that no English politician for three-quarters of a century took so informed and statesmanlike a view of the relations of England to her colonies as did these two distinguished men. That they regarded the colonies as bound up with the mercantile prosperity of the kingdom and with national defence, and that they were, therefore, rarely able to see questions purely from the side of the colonist, is explained by the circumstances in which England found herself at the time. No European country, least of all this country, was strong enough or rich enough to afford a colonial policy which should be guided solely by the interests or sentiment of the colony itself.

Hence the statesmen of Charles II. showed no intention of abandoning the attitude of the Commonwealth towards the Dutch. If the army was disbanded, the navy was kept ready for action; the Dutch war which ended with the treaty of Breda (1667) was essentially a war for trade and sea-dominion. The Navigation Acts of 1651 and 1660 were supported on the ground that the Empire could only be defended by aid of an overwhelming mercantile marine. Over-sea commerce and the security of the realm were thus two sides of one and the same necessity. The ability of the Dutch to menace our shores twice within a few years seemed to prove this, and compelled the broadest minds of the day, not more in the interests of the kingdom than of the colonies themselves, to persevere in spite of all risks with the policy of the Navigation Acts. 'A flourishing marine the sole defence of the realm' was the watchword of the time, and its cogency outweighed all colonial pleas for trade equality.

(b) The motive of Trade and Defence.

The Acts were not framed merely on economic grounds, and to condemn them by such arguments is, whether easy or not, perfectly futile. Fiscal policy in the 17th century was a weapon of national defence. Undoubtedly, as a measure of protection for the mercantile marine of this country, the Navigation Acts were an extraordinary success.

As, however, we might expect, the mercantile interest in Court and Parliament pressed the doctrine of Trade Ascendancy in a narrower spirit than the statesman of the day: and in the course of the following century it was this spirit which dominated national policy. The famous *Discourse on Trade* by Sir Josiah Child, banker, and Governor of the East India Company, is as typical of this period as is Gilbert's *Discourse* of that of Elizabeth. "It is evident that this kingdom is wonderfully fitted by the bounty of God Almighty for a great progression in wealth and power, and that the only means to arrive at both or either of them is to improve and advance trade." The example of the Dutch is ever present to his mind. The increase of their shipping, of their home and foreign trade, "is the envy of the present, and may be the wonder of future, generations." One cause of this lies in the practical temper of their statesmen: "they have in their greatest councils of state and war trading merchants, that have lived abroad in most parts of the world, who have not only the theoretical knowledge, but the practical experience, of trade, by whom laws and orders were contrived and peace with foreign princes projected." In particular the Dutch excel as ship-builders; their vessels cost far less to build and to work than English shipping. They are successful as traders, they command large capital, and rates of interest are much lower there than in England. Their government is cheaply done, light customs dues encourage imports, and religious liberty attracts people of energy from every intolerant state in Europe. On the other hand they make poor colonists: Tobago and Curaçao show none of the progress of Barbados

Child's *Dis-*
course, 1668.

and Jamaica. He comes directly to the point of his argument: "for my part I am of opinion that in relation to Trade, Shipping, Profit and Power, the Act of Navigation is one of the choicest and most prudent Acts that was ever made in England, and without which we had not now been owners of one-half of the shipping nor trade, nor employed one-half of the seamen which we do at present." He instances Barbados: before 1651 nine out of ten of the ships laden there were Dutch, now they are English. The objections of the colonists he frankly allows: but it is an indefensible policy which 'exports men' (*i.e.* establishes plantations) for the sole benefit of Dutchmen. Child, like most English public men—Clarendon and Cromwell amongst them—does not like the attitude of New England. Their products competed in West Indian markets with those of the home country; they were skilful evaders of the Acts of Navigation; whilst they shared their advantages to the full in the stimulus given by them to the ship-building industry. Yet, as a careful business man, Child does not forget that New England is an admirable customer for English manufactured goods; and he cautiously urges that if any reformation in the trading relations of those colonies is attempted, it must be done "with great tenderness and very serious circumspection."

(c) The Colonies and the Acts of Navigation.

The *Discourse* enables us to understand the bitterness with which the colonies, without exception, regarded the Acts of Trade. Child, typical in this respect of the entire mercantile interest, does not properly realise the distinction between a trading Company like the East India Company and a corporate body of the English citizens settled in a new home. A Colony was to him, first of all, an investment by the State of men and money in a venture abroad, a course which could only be defended so long as the new community increased the wealth of the mother country. It is easy to see that by 'wealth' a broad-minded statesman might mean one thing, a keen but

narrow man of business something very different. As by degrees statesmen ignored the colonies the business man's view governed English policy. Here lay the real sore that rankled in the colonial mind: that men of English blood, carrying the name, the race and power of the kingdom to the verge of the wilderness, should be treated as competitors and not as equals; and that their part in the Empire should be regarded only in terms of the commercial interests of the mother country. It was a sympathy with this feeling that called for such protests as that of Willoughby, the Governor of the Caribbees (1667): "Whoever he be that advised his Majesty to restrain and tie up his Colonies in points of trade is more a merchant than a good subject."

True as it undoubtedly is, that the growth of merchant shipping placed our naval power on a secure basis and rendered the Treaty of Utrecht possible, the colonist may be excused his scepticism of the motive. The Barbados planter remembered the solitary bomb-ketch that represented the navy in West-Indian waters; the Boston trader felt sorely the indifference of the Admiralty which allowed French privateers from Port-Royal or Louisbourg to harass New England shipping without let or hindrance.

The latter years of the Stuart kings were marked by methods of colonial administration wholly different from those of Clarendon or Shaftesbury. It was a period of reaction both at home and abroad. The power of the Crown was unchecked, and was exercised in utter disregard of colonial rights or interests. The Governors are men of lower stamp, often grasping adventurers; charters are ignored, favouritism, corruption, rapacity are rife wherever the Crown can protect its creatures. The neglect of the navy, so pronounced in the last years of Charles II, is indeed to some extent remedied under his brother; but, apart from this, the last Stuart king had little claim to consideration at the hands of the colonist. The traditional

The period
of Reaction,
1675—1690.

distrust of the English Crown, so evident in the subsequent history of certain colonies, rested on their experiences of the royal advisers and Governors, and of the King himself, in the few years immediately preceding the Revolution.

As a result of the Revolution settlement, Parliament dis-
 places the King in Council in control of the
 Colonies and chartered Companies. The change,
 no doubt, made for political freedom by relieving
 the Assemblies from the caprices of the Sovereign and his
 favourites. But at the same time the mercantile interest
 through the House of Commons at once acquired the chief
 voice in colonial policy. The need of an ocean trade was
 now an imperious one, for the struggle with France required
 new resources; the National Debt could only be met by larger
 revenues, to be obtained directly and indirectly from over-sea
 commerce. Governors of the Plantations rarely identify them-
 selves with the political and material interests of the com-
 munities over which they are placed. They are rather the
 temporary guardians of the rights of the Crown. They re-
 present the narrower mercantile principle now dominant in the
 England of the Revolution: that the colonies should be kept
 in strict dependence upon the merchant and manufacturer of
 the mother country. The enforcement of the Navigation Acts
 becomes their more prominent duty, and they are instructed to

**Rigid Trade
Ascendancy,
1690—1740.**

report on attempts to establish industries which
 might compete with home products in colonial
 markets. Thus in 1699 Parliament was moved
 to prohibit the export of woollen goods made in

**The Com-
mons and
Colonial
Industry.**

Virginia; in 1719 a Bill actually passed both Houses (with-
 drawn) to forbid the erection of iron-works in America; by Act
 of 1732 hats of colonial manufacture might not be exported
 from one colony to another, nor from any colony to Europe. At
 the same time duties were imposed to restrict the trade, profit-
 able and customary, if not strictly regular, between America and
 the French West Indies in sugar, spirits and other produce.

This interference with internal affairs was always resented, but, as it concerned trade and did not directly involve taxation, the legal right of Parliament was not seriously questioned. Even so staunch a friend of the colonies as Chatham, whilst opposing legislation of the mother country which affected colonial revenues, approved it in all that concerned colonial trade on the ground that it formed a constituent part of the commerce the Empire.

The effect of the Treaty of Utrecht was to produce in England a sense of security as against all foreign rivals. England had now proved herself to be the one sea-power of the world; though neither she herself nor her rivals realised at once what that implied. Two important lessons of the 18th century were outlined by the war of the Spanish Succession. They were, that *without control of the sea* (a) colonial possessions are a definite source of weakness to an European state, and (b) foreign trade is a precarious basis of national prosperity. The visible spoils of the war were not large. Gibraltar was acquired from Spain. In America the chief problems were still left open, such as the boundaries of Acadia and the title to the Mississippi and the Great West. The Assiento Treaty accorded more tangible gains, finally surrendering in principle the doctrine, against which Hawkins had fought long ago, of the *Mare Clausum* of the Spanish West. The right of English merchants to general trade with the American dependencies of Spain was now, however meagrely, admitted for the first time.

Treaty of
Utrecht, 1713.

The Walpole era was marked generally by indifference to colonial questions; even so prized an acquisition as Acadia was treated with neglect, and seeds of future difficulty thickly sown thereby. The Duke of Newcastle was the Secretary of State responsible for the colonies from 1724. He stands in the history of the century as the type of ministerial *laissez-faire*. But his colleagues, the King, and Parliament itself showed no deeper concern in the lot

The Walpole
Era and the
Colonies.

of the English beyond the seas. Governors were too often carelessly chosen and ill-supported. Their despatches, if read, were ignored; the sentiment of the colonial tie was lost in its business aspect, and but for the menace of the French the American colonies might well have dropped off from the Empire half a century before 1776. Political indifference coupled with selfish trade interference was the characteristic of colonial policy at home from Utrecht to the fall of Walpole. From national unconcern sprang inevitably in the eighteenth century official jobbery.

We may here note the gradual formation of a department of the colonies during the period 1660—1740. The beginnings of a Colonial Department. Plantations, it must be remembered, were until the Revolution of 1688 strictly within the control of the Crown, acting through the Privy Council.

The Long Parliament had (1643) established a special Commission to deal with colonial affairs; upon it sat such men as Pym and Cromwell. This temporary body was at the Restoration (Dec. 1660) replaced by a new *Council of Trade and Plantations*, which contained representatives of the great incorporated Companies and other merchants, following in this respect the example of the Dutch Government. The functions of this Commission were, in form, only advisory, action being taken by the principal 'Secretaries of State'; but the instructions under which the Council was constituted were very wide. The members were directed to enquire into charters and administration, to consider trade, production, emigration; and to acquire such information as would enlighten the colonial policy of the Crown. Further, it was specially authorised to enforce the working of the Navigation Acts. The proceedings of this Commission are fully recorded and reveal an astonishing activity in colonial questions, indicating the new place which these affairs occupied in English policy. Any risk that this departure might imply paternal control after the fashion of Louis XIV. in Canada, was sufficiently guarded against by

the well-understood temper of the colonists themselves. One result of this Commission may, perhaps, be seen in the wide choice of Governors, who at this period (1660—1675) at least, included many men of high stamp, who united a loyal adhesion to the Crown with outspoken championship of the best interests of the colonies. Governors of this kind were rare in the half century which follows. After 1674 the same functions were exercised once more by a Committee of the Privy Council, which in turn was superseded by a new *Board of Trade* in 1696. The exclusive prerogative of the Crown in colonial affairs had now ceased, and Parliament for the first time took cognisance of Plantations. Industrial interests, henceforth an increasing factor in the Commons, claimed to be considered in all colonial questions; which indeed came now to be regarded as but a subordinate element in the commercial policy of the State. And from Utrecht to the revival of the struggle with Spain for the right of trade in the American tropics (1739) the plantations occupy little place in the minds of administrators at home.

The 'Board of Trade' and Colonial questions, 1696.

THE AMERICAN COLONIES: THE OLD PLANTATIONS.

The history of the New England colonies during this period claims attention chiefly in two aspects: the temper of their relations, political and commercial, with the mother country, and their conflict with the French, upon the issue of which their expansion vitally depended. Massachusetts as the leading colony will serve as the best illustration. The independent spirit of the colony had been fostered by the confederation of 1641, which was partly due to suspicion of the policy of Laud and his sovereign. But neither the Long Parliament nor the Protectorate was regarded with much confidence in New England, in spite of Cromwell's known attachment to Independency. In truth before 1660 the politicians of Boston were already disposed to regard England mainly as a conveni-

Massachusetts after the Restoration.

ence for defence against the Dutch and the French. For various reasons—of policy or of necessity—the colonies had been in the main left to themselves. Massachusetts had enjoyed a charter of exceptional breadth, and her leading men, often of great practical power, had quickly realised that for defence or for administration the mother-country could do little for so distant a possession. It is well to remember that Cromwell was hardly more content with this independent spirit of Massachusetts than were the statesmen of the Restoration. Notwithstanding religious repression at home, the policy of the new time in colonial affairs was avowedly one of toleration. Now Massachusetts was a conspicuous offender against the first principles of religious freedom. The suffrage was confined to professing Independents, who were in 1675 not more than one-sixth of the adult male population; the Church of England, Presbyterians, and Baptists were subjected to disabilities of different degree, whilst the avowal of Quaker opinions was met by banishment, flogging, mutilation, or even, up to 1660, by hanging. Taken in connection with the outrages perpetrated under charges of witchcraft, one of the strangest forms of religious mania, which disgraced certain of the Puritan leaders in Salem and Boston in 1692–3, these persecutions shew Massachusetts to be distinctly behind other colonies in respect of liberty of conscience.

Meanwhile Clarendon had three definite ends in view in colonial policy. The first was to secure toleration for the Church of England. The next was to emphasize the supremacy of the Crown by the enforcement of a right of appeal from colonial tribunals to the supreme Courts of the mother country. The third was to bring about a strict observance of the Acts of Trade in New England. There was thus little sympathy felt in Boston for the new *régime* at home. In 1664 a royal Commission was despatched to America to facilitate the new policy. Rhode Island and Connecticut were indeed brought into more friendly relations with the Crown; Massachusetts

remained obdurate and suspicious. The Commission effected practically nothing in respect of the three chief aims of the Government. But indirectly it had weakened Massachusetts by detaching Connecticut and Newhaven from active share in the Federation; it had, further, served to reveal in Massachusetts itself the existence amongst the better educated and less rigid sectarians of a sentiment of attachment to the mother country. Though represented by a party small in number and of no great influence in affairs, this sense of kinship might have developed into a political force had not the action of the Navigation Acts so sorely tried it.

For the Acts of 1651 and 1660 were the cause of bitter resentment. New England indeed produced none of the enumerated articles, but she imported from the West Indies in exchange for fish, hides and corn, cargoes of sugar and tobacco, which she exported to Europe often with entire disregard of legal restrictions. Of Massachusetts it was reported to the Home Government that no notice is taken of the Navigation Acts (1675). Her imports from England, however, were very large, and the business-like advisers of the Crown were careful to deal gently with Boston in the matter. In the absence of a Governor to represent Crown interests a surveyor of customs was sent to Boston in 1678 to check if possible illicit shipment of goods. But it was impossible to suppress a traffic in which valuable profits were to be made and which public opinion in all classes of the community approved. Massachusetts was to the end conspicuous in ignoring the Acts and in carrying on in defiance of French or Spanish regulations a lucrative trade with the West Indies or with Canada. Walpole was too wise to interfere, and Newcastle too indolent. But the attempt by Grenville to suppress it under the name of smuggling effectually alienated New England. Rhode Island meantime was rapidly becoming the centre of piratical ventures, which found their way as far as East Indian waters.

But a more serious blow to friendly relations with Massachusetts was dealt by Charles II. in the withdrawal of the Charter itself by an arbitrary act of the Privy Council. In 1686 the first royal governor, Andros, was sent out in control of the whole group of colonies between Maryland and Acadia. It was a revolutionary age, and the revocation of popular rights was fairly complete. If, on the one hand, religious liberty was established, on the other, self-government, freedom of political opinion, executive and judicial rights were swept away. But this was a mere incident: the Revolution of 1688 restored prescriptive privileges with the marked exceptions that the Governor was henceforward appointed by the Crown, and the franchise freed from religious tests. Massachusetts was henceforward on the footing of an ordinary Crown colony; its self-government in local affairs was not again endangered; it gradually extended its control over the executive, especially in matters of expenditure of revenue and in military defence; and its practical independence was threatened only by the pressure of mercantile interests in the English Parliament and the aggression of the French and their Indian allies by way of Canada. In the eighteenth century with the growth of New York and Pennsylvania, Massachusetts lost its unique position amongst the American colonies; as wealth and culture increased, wider views in politics and religion found acceptance. Like every other colony it had its usual disputes with the Governor, revolving round the question of his stipend, or complaints of illicit trading, or the arming of the frontier posts. At certain critical periods the Assembly of New York or Pennsylvania made the position of the Governor almost impossible. But Massachusetts, as became its trained political instincts, was in an emergency the first to rise to the occasion: bickerings gave way to the practical work of attack or defence; and

The Charter
of Massachu-
setts cancelled,
1683.

Restored,
1692.

Massachu-
setts, 1700—
1740.

in joint action Massachusetts was the one colony to be relied upon. Hard, sturdy, often illiberal, with little feeling for history or for racial kinship, Boston was after all actuated by keen political common-sense, and was rarely factious. Disliked, not wholly understood, by Englishmen, it was not doubted that the New Englander was the finest type of colonist which the mother land had sent forth.

It was natural that between Boston and the Stuart court there should be neither mutual confidence nor identity of interests. But Charles II. had good reason to respect the privileges of Virginia. The "Old Dominion" had shewn itself thoroughly loyalist in the Civil War; it had yielded to the Commonwealth (1652) only under force; it had welcomed the Restoration with effusion. Some thousands of Cavalier refugees had settled on her lands, and Virginia was rapidly becoming the chief contributor, through the Customs, to the royal exchequer. Yet Virginia suffered worse things at the hands of the Crown even than New England.

Virginia and
the Restora-
tion.

A striking figure in colonial history, Governor Berkeley, represented the Crown in the colony between 1660 and 1677. He belongs to the class of Governors,—becoming steadily rarer through the next century—who identified themselves in sentiment and interests with their provinces. Roystering and ignorant though he was, Berkeley was no place-hunter or bankrupt courtier anxious to make money and be gone. He was a shrewd administrator, though apt to ignore instructions from home and popular feeling on the spot. He kept his House of Burgesses sitting for sixteen years without re-election. An Indian rising caught him unprepared. Manors were burnt and settlers killed. Discontent amongst the colonists became open revolt (1676). The Governor repressed the rising with extreme severity: he was recalled in disgrace in 1677. The colony quickly recovered and the Indians once more resumed their friendly attitude.

Meanwhile a transaction had been effected at home which throws a vivid light on colonial policy as understood by Charles II. In 1672 he conferred, of his royal bounty, upon Lords Arlington and Culpepper the entire freehold of Virginia. By this truly astonishing deed of gift the king deprived the colonists of all legal title to their lands and homesteads, ignored the patient toil of 60 years of settlement, and placed 50,000 of his subjects at the mercy of two adventurers. It is true that the new landlords of the colony commuted—as the best terms they could get—their rights for tobacco duty and pensions. But in 1682, to the disgust of the colony, Culpepper came out as Governor, with instructions, in effect, to make self-government in Virginia a nullity. It must be remembered that though Virginia had a legislative Assembly it was without control over the executive except through the right of refusing supplies. A Governor bent upon a policy of repression had many opportunities of carrying it into effect. He need not call an Assembly for a series of years; he could collect and spend the revenue last voted; appoint judges, land officials, local authorities. There was no town life with its organised opinion; there were no Church communities with their training for political action.

The true example of royal “oppressor” belongs, however, to the following reign. In 1684 James II. despatched a man of his own temper to succeed Culpepper. Lord Howard of Effingham was not less rapacious and arbitrary than his predecessor, whilst he was lacking in all art to conceal his purpose. He made no pretence of public interest or of respect for constitutional right. The landowning class was thoroughly roused. Howard was a Catholic; still worse, in their eyes, he was personally corrupt, overbearing and contemptuous. To the aristocrats of Virginia, as to the country gentlemen of England, Protestantism and honest government were dearer than the Stuarts and their creatures.

Not until the Revolution settlement and the appointment of Nicholson, a colonial administrator of great practical ability, did Virginia once more settle Virginia,
1688—1740. down into that political quietude which generally marked her history. But the conflict through which the colony had just passed left an ineffaceable impression. What had happened under Charles and James might always happen again. Political interference, however, on the part of the mother country now ceased entirely. The Governor came gradually to be at the mercy of the Assembly, upon which he was dependent for the cost of government and for his own stipend. Under the circumstances good men were hard to find who would face the worry of the position. In truth, after 1700, in all matters outside the sphere of trade, Virginia, like her neighbours, was left in practical independence.

Meantime the colony was extremely prosperous. By the end of the 17th century she had a population of 100,000, of whom only 7000 were negroes, and perhaps 1000 more of other nationality than British. Her Indian troubles were forgotten. For it must be noted that the Assembly had set an admirable example of honest and humane treatment of the native races. Laws were not only passed, but were strictly enforced, against kidnapping and enslavement of Indians, against their illegal ejection from their lands, and against unlawful imprisonment. Settlers of high position were severely punished for breaches of these laws. In 1655 steps had been taken towards the education and civilisation of the Indian communities, and, later on, wide territories were permanently allotted to them. Virginia reaped the reward of this policy in a singular degree of security, which enabled settlers to extend their plantations to the very foot of the Alleghanies. We must not however forget that Virginia rejoiced in the absence of all foreign rivals on her frontiers; the Indian, therefore, at this period escaped the dangers which beset him farther north as the tool of French intrigue.

The growth of negro slavery became more rapid after 1700,

cheapening the production of tobacco, which continued to be the one crop of the colony. As early as 1673 this product paid £150,000 a year in customs duties in England. Neither education nor religion filled the place that they occupied in New England. The College of William and Mary was set up in 1693 in the new capital of Williamsburg: but it was little more than a school, and, as an intellectual influence on the colony, it was of small account. As hitherto, the manor houses were still the centres of social life, of political discussion, and of education, for the Virginian planters.

THE AMERICAN COLONIES: ADDED BY SETTLEMENT OR BY CONQUEST.

The region lying to the south of Virginia included the site of Raleigh's abandoned colony. It was important that this area should not fall to Spanish occupation, and as far back as 1629 it had been granted under patent by Charles I and called Carolana. No settlement was then effected; but during the period of religious troubles which ensued small parties of harassed dissenters from Virginia, and of Quakers and Baptists from Massachusetts, established themselves about 1654 on the Albemarle river and Cape Fear. In 1663 Charles II granted the entire region between Virginia and Florida, stretching back to the Pacific, to a small body of Proprietors, amongst whom were Clarendon, Albemarle and Ashley, afterwards Earl of Shaftesbury.

The interest of Carolina lies in its economic developement rather than in its political history, which may be at once briefly set out. The northern settlements along the Albemarle river became the North Carolina of a later day, and those to the south of Cape Fear

(Cape Fair on our maps) were the nucleus of South Carolina. The former colony was for a century struggling, thinly peopled, backward, practically a failure. Its chief town, Edenton, had at the end of half a century only fifty miserable houses.

The settlers, drawn in but small part from England, included much doubtful material from other colonies, the best element being supplied by the exiled Population and Govern-
ment. Quakers from New England. The Proprietors were represented by a deputy of the Governor of the province, who resided at Charlestown in South Carolina. An Assembly of twelve members had a voice in the appointment of one half of an Executive Council; and, as in other proprietary colonies, was generally at issue with the owners and their nominee. The Proprietors, finding the Plantation profitless and the settlers hard to manage, neglected North Carolina. An Indian war (1711) sorely tried the stability of the colony; the more energetic inhabitants abandoned it for more thriving ventures. The feeble control of the Proprietors was terminated by Crown purchase in 1729 to the common advantage. North Carolina represents the proprietary system at its lowest level.

It must be said that the colony lay under marked disadvantages. Separated by swampy forests from Virginia and from Charlestown alike, lacking Character-
istics of
North
Carolina. good harbours, destitute of sturdy pioneers able to resist the enervating climate, without capital, or influence at home, with bad repute for enterprise or cohesion, the Albemarle settlements failed to attract immigration. Of the few surplus products furs only had export value. Negro slavery degraded free labour; and there were no large plantations to develop organising capacity. If the Indians were as a rule friendly, that again was due to the lack of enterprise which left the interior wholly unexplored.

In the plantation further south, afterwards South Carolina, the Proprietors pursued a different policy. Instead of being content with hap-hazard settlement from other colonies, they

despatched an expedition of discovery (1666), and on its report formally invited emigrants from the mother country and from Ireland to join others from Barbados in an organised colony on the Ashley river. The Governor was a Nonconformist from Bermuda; and the religious policy one of general toleration. The purpose of the settlement was to form a true colony, with agricultural and commercial pursuits. Liberal grants of land were made to settlers, and indentured servants were assured of a hundred acres at the end of four years' service with loans of tools and other supplies. Restraint was placed on absentee ownerships, on intercourse with Indians, and, though not very successfully, on attempts at enslaving them. To the Proprietors the enterprise was first of all a mercantile venture; but there is a generous breadth of political wisdom in their instructions; and for the first five-and-twenty years they were fortunate in their choice of Governors. The chief town was Charlestown, later on the dignified social capital of the South. The colonists were reinforced by Huguenots, sent out at the instance of Charles himself, who introduced wine and silk culture, and by traders from New York.

Politically the Carolinas derive a certain interest from the famous Constitution elaborated by John Locke in 1669 and the following years. It is, however, a matter mainly of speculative importance, for its actual application was deferred until the colonies should be sufficiently developed, and when the period arrived the settlers had already worked out their provisional institutions to their own satisfaction. Some trouble, however, was caused by determined attempts of the Proprietors to impose certain parts of the aristocratic ideal of Locke upon a working administration of the usual colonial type. It was entirely in accord with the English temper that government should be regarded by the colonists as a piece of business machinery, and not as a matter of theoretic completeness and symmetry. Like

The
Southern
Plantation,
1666. The
Settlers.

Locke's
Constitution,
1669.

Gorges in the case of Maine, Locke did not realise that he was dealing with a handful of settlers whose chief concern was with subsistence and defence, and whose only views on constitutions were that, being on the spot, they themselves knew far better what was suited to their requirements than philosophers and kings three thousand miles away. So far as it attracted attention at all in the colony, the Constitution was thoroughly distrusted, and such attempts as were made at applying it were finally abandoned before the end of the century.

The actual government of South Carolina consisted of a Governor, appointed by the Proprietors, an Executive Council of ten, half of them elected by the freemen, and a representative Assembly of twenty. Judiciary and executive were in the hands of the Council, who formed a kind of Upper House. There is nothing which can be called oppressive in such a constitution, and the proposals of the Proprietors for the general conduct of the colony are marked by practical wisdom. The New England type is preferred to the Virginian: stress is therefore laid upon urban centres for defence, organisation and trade. Variety of products is to be studied and intercolonial trade encouraged. Although trade is the inspiring motive, a true colony, and not a series of mercantile posts after the Dutch fashion, is contemplated. Great care is taken in securing settlers with knowledge of special industries. At the outset grants of land were confined to the area within 60 miles from Charlestown. Population grew slowly. By 1700 there were hardly 1200 freemen, with perhaps 8000 negro slaves; the latter tending, as always, to restrict the immigration of white labourers and artisans. By the Peace of Utrecht the colony had barely 12,000 inhabitants in all.

The actual
Government.

Aims of the
Founders.

Progress
of the
Colony.

In 1680 a small Scottish settlement, which formed the extreme southern outpost of the plantation, was destroyed by a Spanish force from St Augustine in Florida; the charge, probably

true, was that of the connivance of Charlestown in the piracy then rife in Spanish waters. Indian wars were exceptionally frequent, and now and then disastrous. The natives were provoked by slave-hunting raids of the settlers. For Carolina planters of the early period found that Indians made tolerable slaves, and not only worked them in gangs along with negroes, but exported them to Nevis and St Kitts. The Indian war of 1716, due to the steady encroachment of the settlers upon territory hitherto unexplored, seriously endangered the entire colony. Queen Anne's war had renewed the trouble with Florida. In 1706 Charlestown was besieged and defended itself with gallantry and success; the peace of 1714 encouraged westerly expansion and renewed immigration.

Politics at Charlestown turned as elsewhere in America on the relations of Governor and settlers. After the Fall of the Proprietary Government, 1719. 1700 these became steadily more acute. In 1719 a crisis was reached. The conflict arose upon the powers of the Colonial Assembly to extend the sphere of self-government by creating local elective bodies, a step rendered necessary by the expansion of the occupied area. An Act to that effect was vetoed by the Proprietors through the Governor. The Assembly thereupon assumed entire control of the administration, ignored the Governor, and without violence or vague assertion of abstract rights, demanded the position of a colony in direct relation to the Crown. The Colony was singularly united; Ministers and Proprietors at home acquiesced, and with the least possible disturbance of existing forms the political rights of the Company ceased. The Government sent their most capable colonial official to superintend the new order of affairs, and in 1729 the proprietary rights in the soil were definitely surrendered.

No page in the history of the Carolina Company is so instructive in relation to colonial development as that which recounts its dissolution. The Proprietors had for thirty years gradually abandoned the task of controlling their distant com-

munity, they had allowed local responsibility to grow up, and the time inevitably came when the colony consciously outgrew its tutelage. The events of 1719 were in no sense a revolution, but only a recognition of actual facts. Both in aim and in manner the conduct of the Assembly was essentially practical and essentially English.

South Carolina, though of the same general type as Virginia, differed from it in some important respects. Virginia was from the first, and remained, essentially English in population. It continued to receive, in spite of the growth of negro slavery, a large influx of white labour, out of which grew a middle class. Further, Virginia had one staple product; its plantations were large, isolated, and self-dependent. Carolina on the other hand had a mixed population. Its leading class was mainly of West Indian origin, planters familiar with the slave system in its full working. Indian slavery was not rare, white field-labour, bond or free, was not available owing to the climate; such of it as there was shared the discredit of the enslaved race. In Carolina the planter was less wealthy and had less scope for ability than in Virginia; rice was not so profitable nor so widely grown as tobacco. The slave-holder had his town mansion in Charlestown, and often cultivated his estate by overseers, not unlike the lords of the soil in southern Italy. For a time the Indian trouble checked the growth of settlement, and the Spaniard had to be reckoned with in case of war in Europe. The population was less scattered than in Virginia; hence there was a fuller social life, more luxury, less energy.

Character-
istics of
South
Carolina.

The Slave-system was the key-stone of the economic edifice: it reached its highest development in the rice-fields and cotton-plantations of the great southern colony. There were but two classes: the planter and the slave. By the middle of the eighteenth century South Carolina had become the very type of the aristocratic slave-holding community.

The
Slave-
system.

The first community of Europeans to be merged by conquest into the empire of England was the Dutch colony on the Hudson. Jamaica, indeed, had been taken in war ten years before, but its Spanish sovereigns had left the island practically undeveloped. Its conquest, therefore, was hardly more than the acquisition of so much virgin territory by force of arms instead of by settlement. It did not imply the absorption of an organised colony of Europeans. But the New Netherlands in North America belong to the group of which Canada and Cape Colony are other examples—communities of European stock added to the realm of England by the fortune of war.

The Dutch settlers were, as we have seen (p. 108), at a very early period forced back by the men of Connecticut to the basin of the Hudson; whilst on the south-west their immediate neighbours were certain scattered communities of Swedes, who began to settle along the Delaware in 1638 under charter from Gustavus Adolphus. At the Restoration, however, these had been forcibly incorporated into the Dutch colony (1655), which was now separated from the nearest English territory, Maryland, by the unoccupied area afterwards Pennsylvania. The Dutch thus formed a barrier between the New England and the southern colonies, whilst in the Hudson they possessed the direct line of communication between New France and the Atlantic seaboard. Canadian governors early recognised the import of the Dutch colony to the interests of French expansion: they urged its purchase as a means at once of dividing the English and subjugating the fiercest of their Indian enemies the Iroquois, whose homes lay in the dense forest region between Lake Champlain and Lake Erie.

The Dutch settlers in North America were, like their brethren in South Africa, sturdy rather than energetic. The more enterprising of their race turned to sea-trading, and to the development of

New York:
1665: a colony
won by con-
quest.

The Dutch
colony of New
Netherlands:
1624—1665.

Its charac-
teristics.

rich tropical dependencies by forced labour, rather than to plantation with its slow and meagre returns. As in the case of other European states Dutch expansion proceeded by the method of monopoly. Their West India Company (1624) granted tracts of land along the Hudson to proprietors of a feudal type, lords of the soil who enjoyed almost sovereign rights over their cultivating tenants. The absence of that stimulus which, apparently, nothing but the ownership of the land can give to settlers in a new country, hindered the growth of agriculture. What energy there was was directed to the fur trade, to irregular traffic with Spain, to privateering, or the carrying trade between Europe and Virginia. The Governors of the Company were generally arbitrary, jealous of popular opinion, and ignorant of the real needs of colonisation.

The hostility of England and Holland in Europe in 1652 at once provoked its counterpart between the colonists of the two countries. Peace, however, was concluded just in time to save New Amsterdam from Cromwell's fleet. But the fate of the colony was inevitable. For it was (*a*) a menace to New England, (*b*) a standing obstacle to the enforcement of the Navigation Laws, (*c*) the certain prize of French ambition in the near future. When Charles II renewed the war with Holland in 1663 the entire colony, from the Delaware to the border of Newhaven, fell without resistance before a small body of colonial troops. Swedes, French refugees, German Protestants, and the majority of the mixed population welcomed the conquest, and to the dismay of Canada the English became, by the Treaty of Breda (1667), the lords of the entire coast-line from Florida to the Bay of Fundy. Geographically, at least, the unity of the English in North America was secured.

Acquisition
of the Colony.
Treaty of
Breda 1667.

The Dutch territories were, in accordance with the colonial policy of the day, handed over as a proprietary province to James, Duke of York. Thus the Delaware settlements formed the province of

The English
administra-
tion.

New Jersey, and New Amsterdam became New York. It is important to notice that no interference with landed rights or religious privileges took place; but gradually local units of administration, the township and the county, superseded manorial jurisdiction of the Dutch families. Self-government, as worked out in New England and Virginia, was thus in local affairs grafted upon the existing institutions. A colonial legislature was, however, not yet conceded, supreme power resting with the Governor and his Executive Council. On the whole, in the transitional state of affairs, with a population much divided in interests and in language, wholly unused to responsible control of affairs, and separated by wide areas, as well as by racial antipathies, the form of government thus introduced was probably the best available. With the influx of settlers from New England a demand for self-government of the usual colonial type arose and was acceded to in 1683. The "Charter of Liberties" indicates a liberal conception of proprietary government. The Duke retained the freehold of all unallotted lands, the Customs dues, and the right of veto upon legislation, but subject to these reservations, the popular Assembly acquired the usual privileges of taxation and legislation as understood in an English colony. A cardinal fact lies in the equality of all settlers, irrespective of nationality. The English free-man or freeholder shared the franchise with German, Swede, or Dutchman: a characteristic of English expansion which marks it off in spirit and in method from that of Holland or Spain.

But New York experienced, along with the other colonies and the mother country herself, the baneful consequences of James II's reign. The new charter was within two years revoked. A period of irregular and arbitrary rule followed. But political oppression once shaken off at home, the liberties of the colonies were quickly restored. Under William III Parliament re-established the main provisions of the revoked charter. Henceforward New York, now a Crown colony,

suffered rather from the neglect than from the undue interference of the home Government.

The industries, like the population, of the Dutch colonies of New York and New Jersey, were more varied than in the English plantations. Cattle-raising, wheat-growing, fur-hunting subsisted side by side with ship-building, coasting trade, and some small manufacture. The Dutch land-owning class was still socially predominant; in a few instances their manorial estates have remained intact well into the 19th century. The English, chiefly in New York and the coast districts, were engaged in trade. Irregular if not piratical ventures were openly winked at. New York, from its importance in foreign commerce, took before the close of this period a cosmopolitan character and rivalled Boston and Charleston as a provincial capital.

The industrial growth of New York, 1667—1740.

The politics of the colony, after the Restoration of 1688, turned mainly on the Navigation Acts, the relations with Canada and the Indian trade, and the position of the Governor. On the first question enough has already been said (p. 134). As regards the second, public opinion was sharply divided. By the end of the 17th century Puritans from New England were already dominant in New York and in the sea-coast townships. By sentiment and interests they differed from the stolid ultra-conservative Dutch of the old colony. The latter, who were more numerous on the Upper Hudson, where on the edge of the wilderness stood their quaint town of Albany, refused to take active interest in the struggle with the French, which was a matter of life and death for Massachusetts. Not only were they strong enough in the Assembly to hinder adequate measures of frontier defence, but, in foolish disregard of their own safety, they neglected to secure the good-will of the Indians of the "Five Nations," whose power formed a natural bar to French invasion. Thus a Governor anxious to cooperate

Its politics: the French struggle.

with New England for joint protection was sure to be thwarted by the self-regarding instincts of the Dutch.

The colony of New York indeed illustrates clearly the difficulties which beset the colonial government of the time. The Governor had a dual position.

The position
of the
Governor.

He was in the first place the agent of the Crown and the guardian of its rights; in the next place he was the chief of the executive of the colony, and as such dependent for means to carry on the administration upon an Assembly jealous of the royal power in all its forms. It was easy then to utilise the needs of the Governor—including his own natural requirement of salary—to secure the concession of privileges which he had no power to grant. Nor had a royal Governor, during the first half of the 18th century, the consciousness

Lack of
support
from home.

of strong support at home. Allowing for the difficulties arising from slow and uncertain communications Imperial authority suffered from the fact that no responsible statesman of position at home had either interest in, or a first-hand acquaintance with, colonial affairs. It is not to be wondered at that, under such thankless conditions, men of high character and capacity are seldom met with amongst colonial Governors during the Walpole era. Yet it was undoubtedly true that, compared with any other colonial administration of the day, that of England was conspicuous for its liberality, its elasticity, and its integrity. That the working compromise between colonial liberties and Imperial responsibility should not be promptly reached, or consistently carried out on either side, is hardly a matter for surprise.

In 1681 a charter was granted to William Penn, the Quaker, of 47,000 square miles of territory lying between Maryland and the colonies lately acquired from the Dutch. The sea front was limited to the estuary of the Delaware, but westwards and northwards the new plantation stretched across the Alleghanies to the head-waters of the Ohio and the shore of Lake Erie.

Pennsylvania,
1681.

The object of the King was simple. He owed Penn, as heir of Admiral Penn, £16,000, which it was more convenient to pay in any way rather than in cash. Penn had for some years been interested in America on behalf of his fellow Quakers, who acquired for purposes of settlement part of the late Dutch possession known as the Jerseys. The Quaker migration to this region, dating from 1670, was of a similar origin and type to that of Plymouth and Massachusetts half-a-century before; it was religious and political in motive rather than commercial. Penn now seized the opportunity of exhibiting in the new colony of Pennsylvania, on a larger scale, the political and social aims which mark his career. He framed a "holy experiment" in government, in which freedom of faith and full civic equality and responsibility should be the prime articles. It was the democratic ideal as understood by Sydney and his friends. The new community should respect the rights of the natives, should abstain from war, and should welcome as settlers all who acknowledged a Divine order of the universe. At the head of the colony stood the Proprietor, and so long as he remained in perfect sympathy with the spirit of the constitution difficulty might be evaded. The Council and Assembly were alike elected by the people. The former, presided over by the Governor, *i.e.* the Proprietor or his nominee, was the executive body: it administered the revenue, controlled judges and police, decreed new townships and provided education. The Assembly, elected by ballot, voted taxation and decided upon bills submitted by the executive. The first Assembly, which met in 1684, displayed a thoroughly practical temper. It proceeded to sanction Penn's most cherished conditions: decreeing fair treatment of Indians, humane discipline of prisons, manual education for every child, and the Christian qualification for office. Elective boards were provided for local areas.

The motive of its foundation: political and social ideal.

Constitution.

It was characteristic of Penn's wisdom that he did not

attempt to devise beforehand an elaborate constitution. The actual working out of his principles was left, both as regards large questions and minor details, to be determined by circumstances; and he never used his power as Proprietor to prevent serious alterations in his original scheme. The Assembly, due to the mixture of its elements, soon developed antagonism to the Proprietor, and but for Penn's profound faith in freedom, justice, and the saving virtue of responsibility, the proprietary system would, even in his lifetime, have come to an end.

The population of the colony was formed, in the first place, of the scattered Dutch and Swedish settlers
Population. who had for half a century established themselves, without political organisation, in scattered farmsteads along the valleys of the Delaware and Susquehanna. Penn early organised a large immigration of Quakers, who were followed by Rhenish and French Protestants. These were gradually joined by others from New York and New England, attracted by liberty of opinion and by the open chances of a virgin territory. The colonists suffered neither from rigours of climate nor from attacks of Indians. The French were an unrealised peril. The labour of clearing the forest was the first, and long the chief, task of the pioneers, but the soil

proved fertile, and wheat and maize, pasture,
Productions. fruit and vegetables grew abundantly. Iron, coal, limestone, and useful timber were plentiful enough to stimulate manufacture and ship-building. Small freeholds by degrees supplanted the large estates of the first Quaker owners; German and Swedish farmers, traders and woodsmen penetrated to the interior with perfect security, due, as in Virginia, to the fair native policy of Penn. An export trade in "unenumerated" articles—fur, grain, hides, and timber—sprang up. The middle class, the strong element of the population, rapidly thrived, and Philadelphia became second only to Boston in economic and social importance. Emigration was well organised at home; the mixture of its elements was

characteristic of the colony. Education was elaborately cared for. Negro slavery was rare and was humane.

The Quakers were the first Abolitionists, and their sentiment was shared by the German colonists. Penn was deeply convinced of the religious duty of the settler towards the Indian and the negro; and this, rather than the force of economic motives, kept Pennsylvania free from the slave system. Indentured service was also insignificant and free labour was the rule as in New England. The colony had its manor-houses and country squires, though of Quaker origin: as compared with Virginia its standard of life was thrifty and serious, whilst it was more tolerant in religion and manners, and had more variety of interests, than the Puritan society of Massachusetts or Connecticut.

Character-
istics.

The peace principles of the Quakers, who dominated the Assembly down to the Seven Years' War, prevented Pennsylvania from co-operating with vigour against the common enemy of the English—the Frenchman and his Indian tools. The native tribes of the Alleghanies, the Ohio and the shores of Erie were up to 1752 invariably friendly to the colony, and the terrible experiences of 1755–1759 were due to causes whose root lay in the inevitable struggle of the English and French races for the control of the New World.

By the end of the century there were 20,000 settlers in the colony, three-fourths of whom were of British origin. The influence of its political and religious freedom, the first real success of the kind.

Progress
and influence
of the Colony.

in colonial history, reacted on politics at home. We cannot overlook the important effect of an object lesson in political responsibility and in the widest religious toleration upon the growth of a similar spirit in the mother country. The Navigation Acts were hardly a serious grievance in Pennsylvania. English shipping, especially after Utrecht, was in sufficient supply for the needs of the export trade, and, as this included none of the “enumerated” products, Philadelphia traded

without hindrance to any European port. On the other hand there was much "smuggling," or unauthorised commerce, with Spanish colonies, and this was not interfered with from home. Still we may trace the beginnings of the spirit which ended in the Declaration of 1776. There was no "disloyalty." But the large infusion of foreign population, with its indifference to England, the memories of Quaker persecutions, the lack of realised peril from the French, combined with the steady prosperity and self-sufficiency, economic and political, of the colony, tended to diminish the sense of dependence upon the mother country.

The colony of Georgia, the latest of the British plantations of North America, belongs in its origin to the type of Pennsylvania rather than that of Carolina, out of whose territory it was formed. The motive of its founder, General Oglethorpe, was philanthropy, and not profit. As a social experiment it received—alone amongst the colonies—a direct grant of public money, the sum of £10,000 being voted by Parliament towards its promotion. By its charter (1732) a region south of the river Savannah, and stretching westwards to the Pacific, was erected into the colony of Georgia. The first settlers were sought amongst insolvent debtors discharged from prison. Criminals were refused. Foreign emigrants, Moravians, and other German Protestants arrived in the second year of the colony (1733), introducing the culture of the vine and the silk-worm. Slavery was expressly prohibited, as was, in the interest of Indian sobriety, all importation of spirits.

The original Trustees of the Colony ceded their privileges to the Crown in 1752, when a constitution of the usual kind was set up. The precise aims of the founders had already been abandoned. Liquor traffic crept in; slavery, introduced in a restricted form for terms of years, had developed into a recognised system. Whitefield, the Methodist preacher, who visited Georgia in 1738, defended

it on religious grounds. The Indians were generally friendly, and were found on the side of the English in their attacks against Florida in 1740-2. For the "encroachment" of Georgia upon Spanish territory (as the valley of the Savannah was claimed to be) was a contributory cause of the war with Spain which, beginning in 1739, dragged on until 1748.

RUPERTSLAND.

We pass now to the great northern regions, a mere fringe of which was the field of French enterprise.

In 1670 what we may fairly describe as the Colonial Group at court secured an imposing grant of territory, far to the north of existing European settlements in America, under the title of Prince Rupert's Land, from the name of its chief promoter. The charter of the Company of Hudson's Bay, reciting the hope of discovery of a passage to the South Sea, confers exclusive rights of trade, settlement and government within the enormous, though then undefined, area which is drained by rivers falling into the Bay. At this date the territory was wholly unexplored; it was cut off from Canada by dense forest and a network of unnavigable waters. There were, later on, as was to be expected, disputes not only as to boundaries but as to the right of the English to be there at all. But, in the absence of settlers, these were of little practical moment. The first "voyage" was sent out in 1671; store-houses were built in James' Bay and pioneers sent up the country "to cultivate an understanding with the natives." With much difficulty they opened up a trade in furs, which were brought into the forts where factors were maintained throughout the year in charge of English goods suitable for

The
Hudson's
Bay
Company,
1670.

A trading
Company,

barter. This was the origin of the great English fur-trade for which London has ever since remained the central market of the world.

The royal charter was confirmed by Parliament in the usual way at the Revolution (1690); but grave danger arose to the Company, during Queen Anne's war, from French attacks. The Treaty of Utrecht, however, acknowledged the English title to the Hudson Bay territory; and the attempts of outsiders to secure liberty of trade were successfully resisted. It is interesting to notice that the exclusive rights of the Company were defended on the ground of the danger to the natives caused by the importation of spirits by irregular adventurers. The loss to the nation from possible diversion of the trade to Canadian routes, the reckless slaughter of fur-bearing animals, and the risks arising from intrigue amongst Indian tribes were also urged. The case of Hudson's Bay shews that in an unknown and remote region a regulated monopoly may be a wise expedient in the interests of savage races even though it may retard the general exploitation of the resources of the country. The Company had financially no great success; soil and climate forbade settlement, and in the middle of the 18th century the operations of the Proprietors were still confined to the unimportant trade, carried on from Forts York, Albany or Churchill, with the natives of the north-west.

THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH IN NORTH AMERICA.

The Treaty of St Germain (1632) had formally recognised the French as possessors of the basin of the St Lawrence, and of the vaguely defined district of Acadia, which covered practically the Nova Scotia and New Brunswick of our maps.

The settlements of the French down to 1660 were few and weak, and were too remote to endanger the security of New England.

The growth of New France dates from the administration of Colbert, the minister of the young King, Louis XIV. That great statesman typified at once the commercial spirit and the political concep-
Colbert
and French
expansion.
 tions of his country: and the characteristic features of French colonisation and of trade policy have retained ever since the marks of his genius. The history of the French monarchy and the temper of the French people have always rendered possible a conception of the functions of government in national life intolerable to men of English race. To Louis XIV and his ministers, and not less to his people, the King's government was the natural source of all activity: the individual had but to follow. Hence a system of authority, working through officials or state monopolies, was invoked to initiate and direct the expansion of France across the seas. America and the Indies were the fields chosen by Colbert for his great experiments.

The Company of the West (1664) had a sufficiently ambitious aim. Its area in North America stretched
Canada or
New France.
 from Hudson's Bay to Florida. It was invested with sovereign and territorial rights, monopoly of trade and of settlement. The existence of English colonies in New England and in Virginia was ignored. Political, military and financial administrators were despatched; with them officers, Jesuit Fathers, young nobles and a handful of traders and settlers. The systematic development of Canada was boldly taken in hand. The French in Canada concern us here in three aspects: as (a) explorers, as (b) colonisers, and as (c) competitors with the English settlers for the control of America.

Montreal, when the officers of Colbert's new company reached it in 1665, was the upper station of the French in Canada. Jesuit missions had already been planted on Lake

Ontario; and were feeling their way to Lake Superior. Fur-hunters penetrated to still more distant points, and both to the north and south of the St Lawrence Indian tribes had become familiar with the wares, and the vices, of the white trader.

Now began the era of systematic exploration. In 1668 the great travellers La Salle and the Jesuit Marquette pushed towards the west. Reports from the Iroquois of a great stream flowing away from the St Lawrence fired their imaginations with the hope of reaching the "South Sea" and a short route to China. La Salle began by exploring Lake Erie; he passed on to Huron and Superior. The upper tributaries of the Ohio were reached in 1671. In the same year the sovereignty of Louis XIV was formally proclaimed over the entire region of the Lakes and of the countries adjacent thereto: "both those which have been discovered and those which may be discovered hereafter, in all their length and breadth, bounded on the one side by the seas of the north and west, and on the other by the South Sea," and forbidding intrusion on the part of subjects of any other state whatsoever.

The Mississippi was first reached by Marquette. In 1673, travelling by way of Lake Michigan, he launched his canoe upon the Wisconsin, reached the main stream, passed the junction of the Missouri, and only at the mouth of the Arkansas turned once more northwards. The discovery was hailed with enthusiasm at Quebec. Frontenac, the greatest of French Canadian statesmen, secured by forts both Ontario and Michigan, and by his orders La Salle completed the exploration of the Mississippi to its mouth in the Gulf of Mexico in 1682. The lower Mississippi was however left unoccupied until, at the close of King William's war (1697), to forestall the grant of an English charter, D'Iberville led a small expedition to the delta, built a fort, and started the famous colony of Louisiana.

(a) Explora-
tion of the
West,
1668-1700.

The Mis-
sissippi, 1673.

Louisiana,
1697.

on its eventful career. It was a critical moment: an English vessel (1699) was actually threading its way amongst the channels above New Orleans, and Carolina planters were quoting their charter which gave them the territory, not to the river only, but to the Western Ocean itself. By 1700 the policy conceived thirty years before by Talon was effectively accomplished. A chain of forts from the St Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico created "occupation": the English were hemmed in; and it only remained to claim by aid of arms, diplomacy or intrigue, the tributary waters of the Mississippi eastwards to the Alleghany ridge.

The Jesuits, a tower of strength to the Government not less than to the Church, were the unwearied pioneers in this perilous work of exploration. The Jesuits
and discovery. In these achievements we see the Canadian Jesuit at his best. Politicians not less than missionaries, they won a hold over the Indian tribes which enabled them to penetrate where no soldier or settler could hope to pass. The Christian civilisation which they impressed upon the savage race was never deep or lasting, and they were too readily content with a nominal acceptance of the faith which left the innate barbarism of the convert untouched. Yet we may recognise, in the Jesuit explorer of the 17th century, the type of intrepid traveller—scientific, political and religious emissary in one — which France preeminently continues to produce down to our own day.

It is instructive to consider the methods of administration of this vast colonial empire of France. The (b) Canadian
administra-
tion. supreme political control rested with the King and his ministers at home: the colony received its chief officers, Governor, Commander-in-chief, and Intendant, or Director of finance or trade, by royal appointment. There was not the least approach to self-government, and apparently no desire for it. Public meetings were forbidden; criticism of the ecclesiastical, civil or military powers was rigorously

punished. Emigration was entirely directed by the Crown :
 Population. Huguenots were excluded : no individual could settle, or, having once settled, could leave the colony without licence.

Trade was restricted to privileged corporations or private
 Trade and Agriculture. monopolies. The cultivation of land was regulated by law ; a farmer sowed wheat or reared cattle under direction. In Louisiana, at one time, a man might not sell a cow without an order from Paris. Prices were settled from Quebec. Competition or free enterprise was unknown. Commerce with English colonies or with foreign countries was disallowed ; the King was expected to take all unsaleable produce off the hands of the colony. Hence agriculture became rapidly careless and wasteful. Young men of spirit took to the woods as fur-hunters. Beaver skins, the staple product of the country, were, like tobacco in Virginia, the usual currency ; but they were the object of a monopoly. Taxation was light, and there was no prohibition of colonial manufacture, but the cost of the colony to the French exchequer was enormous. Population, in spite of emigration laboriously encouraged, increased but slowly, and at the Peace of Ryswick hardly exceeded 25,000. The greater part were dependent, sunk in poverty, averse to useful exertion.

The land system, like the administration, was borrowed
 The Land and its Tenure. from the mother country. It was a revived feudalism. Great seignories, or baronial holdings, were granted to settlers of family, or to retired officers. Under them the tenants held their lands ; below them, in a third degree, came the tillers of the soil. Something of the aristocratic feeling of the *ancien régime* took root in the great estates upon the banks of the Chaudière and the Richelieu. The sons of the seigneurs took to the woods or headed Indian forays. Trade and cultivation were beneath their dignity. Not a few returned to join the army under Turenne or Villars.

Such a land system was less progressive than that of the small freeholds of New England or of the plantations and manors of Virginia. For these were in either case the natural adaptation to the circumstances of soil, climate, and production: whilst in Canada an institution, already outworn, was imported from the Old World and applied as it stood. The colony was not left to provide for its own defence. Regiments of the royal army were stationed there to secure internal order and protection from attack. The history of the English colonies shews repeatedly how great an advantage their Canadian enemies gained from their military organisation: unity of purpose and swiftness of execution marked French warfare; whilst indecision, delay, and mutual jealousies perpetually hampered the militia levies of New England or New York.

Behind all the machinery of the administration stood the Church of Rome, the true nurse of New France, and to the end its real controlling power. If through her devoted sons she led the expansion of the colony, none the less she tended to repress its independent activity; never stimulating (as did the—perhaps equally narrow—Puritanism of New England) intelligence and education; always supporting absolutism, and confirming in its flock an already ingrained habit of submission.

The contrast is impressive when we turn to the English plantations a few hundred miles away: neglected, as we have seen, by Kings and ministers; struggling unaided amidst hardship and disaster; but self-reliant, energetic, practical, tenacious of self-government. The difference is due partly to race, partly to historical antecedents. For the men of Massachusetts and Virginia were Englishmen who had carried with them not only the blood, but also the political inheritance, of their nation.

New England never forgot that the English flag had once been planted on Quebec (in 1627 by Kirke), that a Virginian

Military
organisation.

The Church
in Canada.

Contrast of
English Co-
lonial spirit.

crew had swept the Bay of Fundy clear of Frenchmen (1615), that Nova Scotia derived its name from an Edinburgh Company (Alexander's Charter, 1621), and above all that Newfoundland, at the entrance to New France, was English still by virtue of discovery (1497) and repeated occupation. The English settlers thus grudged the French their possession of Acadia ;

(c) Canada and the English Colonies. the more that it was a menace to Boston by sea, and that Port Royal, its chief town, was a very nest of privateers—a new Dunkirk, as it was said, out in the West. New England, with no royal fleet to protect her shores and fishing fleets, was never at ease when troublous times broke out in Europe. An English governor might always be sure of popularity in Providence or Boston if he held out hopes of an expedition against Port Royal or Louisbourg.

Nor was attack by sea the worst calamity that might befall. The province of Canada impinged upon the **and by land.**

English and Dutch colonies on the Atlantic seaboard. The frontier line was undetermined, and, in fact, unexplored. Each party intended to claim just so much of this unknown borderland as it could occupy and defend. The water-parting of the St Lawrence and the rivers flowing south and east is of no great elevation, but the dense forest which covered it was impenetrable except to Indians; to them it served as cover for stealthy forays against the isolated hamlets of the

The Indians of Canada. white man. From the nature of the fighting-ground, the Indian held the key of the position during the Hundred Years' War of Englishman and Frenchman in the West. The Canadian readily made of him a friend and an ally : to the New Englander of the backwoods, embittered by experience, the Indian was little more than a wild animal, crafty and untameable. The water-ways of the Penobscot, the Kennebec, the Connecticut, and the Hudson were the four natural avenues of attack from the St Lawrence.

With the conflict fought out along these streams and upon the shores of Lake Champlain are associated some of the most pathetic episodes of English colonial history. The memory of countless Indian forays, stimulated, planned and led by French officers, fur-hunters, or even missionaries, was burnt deep into the minds of the New England men. Englishmen, indeed, utilised Indians in warfare against Indians. But the charge is reiterated that French commanders permitted the torture, mutilation, murder and enslavement of the hapless victims of these raids, at the hands of the savage hordes whom Canadian rulers hurled against the English frontier. French records themselves prove that there is only too much truth in the terrible accusation, which explains the bitterness with which Massachusetts, especially, waged the war for the West.

The four great wars fought against France in Europe between 1688 and 1763 had each their counterpart in America. King William's war (1690—7), as it was called, raged along the entire frontier

The Frontier Wars: 1690—1713.

from Maine to the Hudson. Indians destroyed townships within 25 miles of Boston. So serious was the danger that a joint conference of the colonies was, for the first time, called at New York to concert measures of defence. Acadia was captured but restored at Ryswick (1697). Five years later Queen Anne's war broke out. New Hampshire and Massachusetts were the objects of fierce and repeated attacks. The sack of Deerfield (1711) by a war party of savages under French command and the ferocious outrages which followed exasperated the colonists. Port Royal in 1710 fell to a strong force of colonial and British troops; and with it Acadia passed finally into English hands. At Utrecht, Newfoundland, though under conditions which are still a source of grievance to the inhabitants, and Hudson's Bay, were definitely declared to be British possessions. Acadia was ceded, and the Iroquois admitted to be under the

The Peace of Utrecht, 1713.

protection of the English Crown. The province of New York thus extended its boundary to Lake Ontario, and vague rights over an enormous area were acquired. But the Treaty of Utrecht did not determine boundaries. The "ancient limits" of Acadia meant wholly different things in Boston and in Montreal. The loss of this territory rankled deeply. Whilst England neglected its new conquest, France bent all her efforts to retain the allegiance of its inhabitants. Louisbourg, in Cape Breton, was built (1716) to replace Port Royal, and became the strongest naval base in North America, whilst its privateers were a constant menace to American shipping.

About 1720 we find French Governors urging imposing claims to dominion upon the ministers at Paris. The conflict still unsettled. 'The English should be treated as interlopers upon the North American continent: at most they should be allowed to retain their existing settlements, but beyond these limits the whole of the lands west of the Alleghanies belong by right of discovery to the French Crown.' Such claims seem to us, in the light of events, merely childish; but down to the year of the capture of Quebec (1759) the issue of the struggle was regarded in America as by no means assured. It was in reality, as we now know, a question of the command of the sea, which after 1713, belonged to England. But English naval policy in the Atlantic was not such as to inspire great confidence, whilst the military force of Canada was far more efficient than that of the colonies. There is no doubt that this uncertainty as to the result of the inevitable conflict was a powerful factor in deferring acute troubles between the American colonies and their mother country.

NEGRO SLAVERY AND THE PLANTATIONS: THE WEST INDIES.

The negro slave trade which, as has been seen, was so important a factor in the progress of American civilisation falls to be considered in the present stage of this history. Difficult as it is to do so, it is necessary to regard slavery and the slave trade in the light of economic expedients which Englishmen found existing in the colonies of other European powers at the time when we entered into competition with them for the ownership of the uncivilised world.

The Slave Trade.

The Portuguese, as the lords of Africa, were the first systematic dealers in negro slaves, as the Spaniards were the first great slave-holders. As a rule, the negroes were caught by other negroes and bartered by their captors to European traders, who had posts or "castles" on the slave coast. John Hawkins was the first, and for nearly a hundred years the only, Englishman to share in the traffic in human beings. During the sixteenth century this traffic was still a Portuguese monopoly, which, after 1600, was with calculating deliberateness invaded by the Dutch, who saw in it merely another profitable branch of over-sea commerce. Dutch traders introduced the first negroes into Virginia in 1620, and through them also Barbados and other islands derived, later, the large supply they needed for the sugar industry. About 1650 English traders, now the keen rivals of the Dutch, got over their reluctance to mix in the business. West Indian planters were in urgent quest of cheap labour that would stand the climate. Neither Caribs nor Indians were available. Brazil and Hispaniola had long utilised the African negro. The prosperity of the Dutch Spice Islands in the same way depended on the slavery of Malays.

Thus, after 1660, Englishmen addressed themselves seriously to wresting from the Dutch the traffic in slaves for American plantations. The African companies of London, dating from 1662, were

The English enter the trade, 1660.

formed under powerful Court influence: the Duke of York (James II) was a prominent shareholder. The charter of 1672 granted, in the usual way, rigidly exclusive rights of

The African
Company on
the West
Coast, 1662.

trading in slaves along the entire west coast, from Sallee in Morocco to the Cape of Good Hope. Fortified factories were erected by the Company at suitable points, mainly along the Gold Coast where the Dutch were already established in some strength. These forts were in no sense territorial possessions of the Crown, but were like the factory at Surat, trading posts for which rent was paid to native potentates, through whom negroes were procured. Not until the Seven Years' War did England aim at dominion on this forbidding coast. From the incursion of the English traders in 1662 into the slave markets of the Dutch sprang the war of 1663, which ended in the Treaty of Breda. To the politicians of the day the organisation of the slave-trading companies was but a natural step in the diversion of the Dutch carrying trade with the colonies of England to English traders and seamen. The Royal African Company quickly made good its footing, and supplied English plantations, chiefly in the West Indies, with slave labour direct. The number of slaves thus imported rapidly increased, displacing the indentured servants, henceforth represented mainly by political and other prisoners, or by kidnapped children. In 1680 four to five thousand negroes were imported yearly into English plantations; in 1700 the yearly number was perhaps 25,000. The monopoly of the African Company was, in the interest of planters and ship-owners alike, abrogated in 1689, and the trade thrown open by Parliament to all British subjects.

The Peace of Utrecht gave a new status to the English slave trade. England now acquired, as part of the general settlement of affairs, the "Assiento" (or "agreement") which secured to this country the exclusive right of supplying negroes to the Spanish Indies. The bargain

The 'Assien-
to,' 1713.

came to an end in 1750. As part of the profits of the slave traffic now accrued to the Crown England committed herself as a nation to the maintenance of a trade, which we now know to have been shameful in itself, politically hurtful, and economically, in spite of appearances, unsound. The transport of slaves continued to increase during the century. Jamaica was the chief English customer, then came Carolina. The industrial future of the tropical and sub-tropical regions of America was in large part determined soon after 1700 by the energy of the English purveyors of slaves. The height of the traffic, however, was not reached until the century was drawing to a close, when the yearly export of slaves from Africa to America reached 100,000.

Without considering the general political consequences of African slavery we may note its economic effects upon the development of the English colonies which admitted it. In the first place it must be allowed that without negro slavery the tropical regions of America would not, and probably could not, have been developed by Europeans at all. Neither the heavy work of clearing the forest—the first labour of the settler—nor the daily toil in the plantations, was possible to the white man in latitudes between Virginia and the River Plate. The civilised world depends upon that region for three articles of necessity: cotton, sugar, and coffee. But for the slave-trader each of these may well have been the luxuries of the rich. They are produced to-day by free labour, but that would not be there but for the slavery of which it is the descendant. Nor, in a broader view of political well-being, can it be denied that a slave system has proved consistent with the highest achievements of civilisation. Ancient Athens was in its noblest days a community in which the ruder manual work was habitually performed by a servile class. So, too, in the great crisis in 1776 Virginia, then a colony of slave-holders, produced as fine a type of patriot,

The economic effects of negro slavery.

(a) Some reasons in its support.

legislator and soldier as the free colonies of New England.

(b) The weight of experience against it.

Admitting, however, that under all the circumstances a slave system was inevitable in tropical America in the 17th and 18th centuries we may still recognise its inherent drawbacks.

Negroes being cheap, in regular supply, docile and physically strong, superseded white labour, not only in colonies like Jamaica, but in the comparatively temperate climates of Maryland and Virginia. In this way true immigration was obstructed, if not altogether stopped. The white population of Barbados, for instance, steadily declined after 1675. Again, negro labour, being mechanical and unintelligent, could only be devoted to uniform cultivation of one crop, such as sugar, cotton, or tobacco. Hence variety and experiment in production were rarely attempted; in Jamaica cocoa and indigo were early abandoned for sugar mainly for this reason. This dependence upon one staple crop was of doubtful advantage to a colony. Further, the presence of the negro, by degrading all manual work in the eyes of the European, put a stigma also upon skilled labour, thus discouraging manufacture and mechanical invention. Hence a slave colony made no progress in the industrial arts. If we add to this the constant dread of negro risings, we see that the slave system conspired with the influences of the climate to produce in the slave-holding communities a lack of that elasticity, self-confidence and dogged vitality, that strong bond of common rights and interests, which marked New England then and have marked Australasia and Canada since. It may, indeed, be fairly contended that, bad as slavery was for the enslaved race, it was after all only less bad for its masters.

The West Indies and Slavery, 1660—1740.

As regards the history of the West Indies we have touched upon the main source of its interest in treating of negro slavery. By the middle of the 18th century the principal islands, Barbados and Jamaica, had become typical slave-holding

communities. The Barbados whites, in 1673, numbered 22,000, the negroes 45,000: the island was then, next to Virginia, the richest possession of the Crown. Eighty years later the whites had fallen to 17,000, whilst the negroes were four times that number. Estates had increased in size and production was practically limited to sugar. In Jamaica the negroes outnumbered the Europeans nearly tenfold: it was perhaps the best single customer of the African slave-trader. Yet both Barbados and Jamaica were vigorous supporters of English influence in the islands, taking an effective share both in colonisation and in war. In the Dutch and French wars of the time islands were taken and retaken, with the general result that English power was extended at the expense of all European rivals. Islands, like St Vincent or Dominica, hitherto neglected, came under partial occupation. The Buccaneers, the sea-rovers of mixed race, who waged irregular war against Spain in Western waters down to 1700, had their head-quarters in the ports of Jamaica and the neighbouring islands. Ruffianly in their methods, owning no political allegiance, they were yet powerful agents in throwing open the Spanish seas to trade and settlement. They forced an entry and settlers followed. Their captains were on good terms with English and French governors in the islands. The Council of Jamaica gave Morgan, their most notable captain, a roving commission: he sacked Panama, winning, as it was officially declared, "very high and honourable applause for his noble service." Charles II made him a knight: and with governors and councils shared the proceeds of his ventures after the fashion of Elizabeth or Leicester in the days of Drake. It was easier to indulge the lawless spirit than to get rid of it, and piracy, that made no distinction between Spaniards and other victims, infested the Bahamas channel well into the 18th century.

Jamaica
becomes the
prominent
colony.

The Buc-
caneers,
1625—1700.

Mention may be made here of the Darien scheme, which

was a wild project for securing to a Scottish company the monopoly of the trade with the far East by way of the Isthmus of Panama. Its importance belongs to the domestic politics of William III's reign rather than to the story of British expansion. The Government and the mercantile interests of London strongly opposed the scheme, as certain to involve conflict with Spain and to end in disaster. The event justified the harshest criticism. The Scottish Act of Incorporation was passed in 1695. By 1698 the remnant of the 3000 settlers were seeking refuge from the climate, and the Spaniard, in New York. It was easy to attribute failure to the Dutch sympathies of the King, grudging the success of a new competitor in the far eastern trade. In truth, it was a vast, ill-considered venture, based on no knowledge of actual conditions of the region; its promoters were oddly lacking in that caution and practical wisdom, which have since rendered Scotsmen so important and so successful a factor in British expansion.

The Darien
Scheme,
1695—1698.

THE ENGLISH IN INDIA, 1660—1740.

The history of the English in India down to the period of the conflict with the French is comparatively uneventful. It will be sufficient to dwell upon such incidents only, first, in India, second, at home, as indicate the lines on which the British power was to be subsequently established.

By his marriage Charles II acquired from Portugal (1661) the sovereignty of the island of Bombay, which in 1668 was handed over to the East India Company as a fortified possession of the Crown. Bombay was the first portion of the soil of

Bombay
acquired by
the Crown,
1661.

India to own the dominion of the King of England. Its position was thus superior to that of Madras which was held on lease at a rent from a native prince. Being an island it was to some extent independent of the hostility of the Moghul or of his enemies, whilst its area (30 miles by 8) was sufficient to admit of large development. The factory at Surat, now at the height of its importance, was attacked more than once by Sivaji, the great chieftain who created the Mahratta power; and although the English there did not directly suffer, it was decided, for the sake of peace and security, to remove the Presidency to Bombay. The new factory speedily grew in importance owing to the convenience of the situation and the nature of the population of the island. In spite of its unhealthiness, Bombay has ever since been the chief seat of trade and shipping in India.

The policy of the Company was generally one of abstention from interference with native affairs. Little was known of India beyond the limits of the Factories, and no desire existed for territory or for alliances. The wisdom of this course was proved by the attempt made by Sir Josiah Child, the ambitious Governor of the Company in London, to depart from it. About 1684 he initiated a policy of compelling native powers to grant trading privileges by force. Thus he detained ships of the Moghul engaged in carrying pilgrims to Mecca. He directed the seizure of the town of Hoogly in Bengal. In consequence, Aurungzebe, the fighting Emperor, ordered the expulsion of the English from the entire peninsula. Bengal was abandoned, Masulipatam lost, and Madras endangered. Child was promptly disowned. The President of Bombay made humble submission, and a timely indemnity in cash was sent to the Nawab of Bengal. The rulers of the imperial provinces were not anxious to carry out their master's orders, which would have caused the loss of the profits, regular and irregular, which accrued to them from the English trade. Henceforth the Company reverted to the old policy of non-intervention in political affairs. Bombay

Policy of
non-inter-
ference in
India.

grew apace ; the factors returned to Bengal. A new Factory was established nearer to the mouth of the river Hoogly than the old one had been. Chuttanutti, Govendpore and Kalicotta, neighbouring villages, were purchased in 1696 and, attacked by a native rising, were fortified by the English, with the consent of the Nawab, by the erection of Fort William.

Calcutta
founded
1696.

This group of events is of critical importance. Fort William with the adjacent land and villages which it protected extended for six miles along the river. They formed a territorial possession, with rights of justice and police over the native inhabitants. Fortifications and garrison secured the settlement against surprise, and gave a new status to the Company. Later on, from one of these straggling, unhealthy villages, now sheltered by British arms and British justice, sprang the City of Palaces, the modern Calcutta. At the end of the 17th century the Crown possessed, as yet, no right of sovereignty in Bengal ; an English company owned land on perpetual lease, with special immunities and privileges of self-defence and administration. Other Factories, at Patna, Dacca and Balasore were simply warehouses, with resident agencies, like the original house at Surat, without any political rights. Calcutta now rapidly increased in importance. Neither the troubles which disturbed the Moghul empire after the death of Aurungzebe (1707), nor the standing liability to Mahratta invasion, affected the prosperity of the Presidency in Bengal. Exemption from transit duties was secured in 1717. The trading was mainly in native cotton, cloth, muslins, silk, opium and saltpetre. There was some competition from other European factories, Danes, French and Dutch all having agencies on the delta. But the dense population of lower Bengal and its peaceful character were favourable to a profitable commerce ; the private trade of the Company's officials in that region was the most lucrative to be had in India.

Status of
the English
in Bengal,
1696—1740.

The status of Madras remained generally unchanged during this period. It was disturbed by threats of Sivaji and his Mahrattas; and by war between Dutch and French Companies on the coast. But the main event affecting the fortunes of Fort St George was the final conquest of the Deccan by Aurungzebe and the establishment of his Nizam (or Viceroy) at Hyderabad. The English were now as in Bengal subject to the paramount power of the emperors at Delhi. Hitherto they had declined to regard the sovereign rights of local sultans of Golconda claiming to be subjects only of the King of England. But it was undesirable to press any such claim as against so strong a ruler as Aurungzebe. When later on the politics of the Carnatic became complicated by French interference, it was felt to be of advantage to be able to pose as sovereign or as dependent as circumstances might require. Meantime Fort St David (1690) had been built some 100 miles south of Madras; and the factory at Masulipatam had gained the protection of an imperial grant.

It is seen that the Directors at home regarded the functions of the Company as strictly limited to commerce. They desired nothing more than opportunities of trade and these, in the main, with populations directly accessible by sea or river. But two sets of circumstances threatened to render this traditional policy difficult if not impossible. In the first place the Moghul empire was hastening to decay. Aurungzebe (1658—1707) had proved that it was still capable of conquest on a large scale. The Deccan was reduced to submission: the Nizam, the Mohammedan viceroy, was, under the Emperor, lord of the local nawabs of the Carnatic, the Circars and Tanjore. On the death of the great emperor, the Nizam became rapidly independent of his sovereign; gradually the smaller nawabs shook off the control of the Nizam. In Bengal the same dissolution was in progress: so long as a satisfactory tribute reached Delhi the provincial nawabs were left uncontrolled. Then came

Madras,
1660—1740.

New policy
foreshadowed
by (a) decay of
Moghul
empire.

once more the disaster of invasion from beyond the Indus. Nadir Shah captured and sacked Delhi in 1739, and though he did not destroy the dynasty, but returned to his own Persian kingdom with enormous plunder, the shock to the political fabric of India was felt throughout the peninsula. In the Empire, thus helpless and disorganised, the Mahrattas were now (1740) the dominant power. Their raids, led by chiefs of great military ability, such as Bajee Rao and Holkar, reduced not only Delhi, but the fertile provinces of Oudh, Bengal, Orissa, and the Carnatic to tribute. Since 1730 they had been the undisputed masters of the western province from Mysore to Guzerat, and were gradually spreading their power, resting solely on force of arms, over the districts of Central India. The way for ambitious and far-sighted intrigue lay wide open in India about 1740.

In 1741 Monsieur Dupleix arrived at Pondicherry as Governor of the French Company of the Indies. From this event dates the appearance in the field of Indian politics of a new force which rapidly brought about a crisis which perhaps in any event was inevitable. It was the activity and aims of the brilliant French Governor which specifically compelled the English Company to abandon its attitude of non-interference in native rivalries and intrigue.

The exclusive trading privileges of the Company, ignored as we saw by Charles I, and restored by Cromwell, were further confirmed by a charter of Charles II (1661). The policy of confining the Eastern trade to one privileged corporation was from time to time strenuously opposed in the interests of the traders of the kingdom. The Charter, it must be remembered, was granted by the royal prerogative and did not come under control of Parliament. The charter of Charles II empowered the E.I.C. to resist private traders ("interlopers") by force, to protect its Factories by fortifications, and to exercise judicial

The fortunes
of the Com-
pany at home,
1660—1740.

(b) Arrival of
Dupleix 1741.

powers, thus materially raising the status of the Company in India. After the Revolution the attacks of merchants outside the Company became more persistent. Parliament, henceforward the controlling power in all that concerned trade and plantations, was now appealed to, and without waiting for sanction traders in Liverpool and Bristol opened up trade with such eastern ports as lay outside the operations of the Company. New England, even, joined in a traffic which now and then degenerated into piracy.

The arguments for the Company as reiterated in the years 1688—1695 were mainly these. The security of Englishmen in the east was to a large extent due to the skill with which the E.I.C. had established permanent posts in India, to the honesty and good faith of their Factors, to their abstention from political intrigue, to their orderliness, and their respect for native sentiment. Now the irresponsible trader, concerned only for his own immediate profits, shared none of the scruples of an organised Company, whose prosperity depended on native good-will, and which was directly amenable to the Crown. To the Company were due the conditions under which a peaceful and organised trade with India was rendered possible; to the Company, therefore, should belong the profit.

Arguments
for monopoly.

In 1698, however, a rival corporation of traders was authorised by Act, but after ten years' experience its members were glad to merge their dwindling resources into the original Company, which as the "United Company" acquired for the first time a parliamentary charter. Under this the E.I.C. was administered until the exploits of Clive rendered an entire reconstruction necessary in 1773. In 1740 it had a capital of about three millions sterling upon which a dividend of seven per cent. had been paid for some years. The Company, as the chief financial power in the City, commanded easy credit and was in the habit of making advances of money, not always voluntary, to the Exchequer.

CHAPTER V.

EXPANSION BY CONQUEST: INDIA AND CANADA.

1740—1763.

WE have now reached a critical period in the expansion of the Empire, a succession of wars arising directly out of the determination to extend or to preserve British trade and sovereignty beyond the seas. These wars merged in each case into continental struggles whereby their true meaning in English history has become partly obscured. The first (1739—1748) was a war with Spain for a share in the Spanish-American trade, out of which grew a war with France in America and in India. But, because England was led to take a subordinate part in the struggle between Maria Theresa and Frederic II, the war is named from its European but, for England, unimportant, aspect the War of the Austrian Succession. The next conflict is known as the Seven Years' War; and here, too, the title is derived from the continental struggle, England's share in which was secondary to her real effort, which was to secure America for the English race, and India for English trade, and, in the process, to obtain supreme control of the sea-power. In reality, the war waged by England in Germany in alliance with the King of Prussia was undertaken as a grand diversion of French resources from the true seat of operations in Canada, in the Carnatic, and on the Sea. This Pitt expressed by saying that he would conquer French America in Germany.

Four wars :
1739—1783.

Wars to
conquer
or to retain
colonies.

The third war, that with America (1775—1782), though strikingly different both in character and in results, had still for its object colonial commerce and dominion. Pieced on to it, as it were, by the Franco-American alliance of 1778, was a fourth war (1778—1783), in which France and Spain were the aggressors, their motives being the overthrow of British trade and ocean power, and, generally, the undoing of the work of the Seven Years' War in America and the East.

During this period, therefore, empire was won—and lost—by arms. The foundation of new plantations, which in the previous era (1660—1740) went on side by side with acquisition by conquest, had, for the moment, reached its limit. The thirteen colonies, for example, the future United States of 1776, were now complete. Yet the characteristic feature of British expansion—the silent, inevitable, pressure of the race into the wilderness—was perpetually at work, in time of war as in time of peace. From Maine to Georgia there was always the steady pushing back of borders, and in the West Indies new islets and unreclaimed lands were being brought under cultivation.

Expansion
by war not by
settlement.

The present chapter treats of two of the wars just alluded to: the wars which preceded and followed the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. From the point of view of the history of the Empire it is better to regard them as one; for the peace of 1748 settled nothing in colonial affairs, and was, in India and America, hardly more than an armistice. This period of 24 years (1739—1763) opens with a conflict with Spain in American waters. The intervention of France (1744) throws the original cause of the war into the background; the struggle centres in the rivalry of England and France in India and America. After a short breathing time (1748), the struggle is renewed, both in west and east, and shortly merges into the Seven Years' War. The controlling genius of the time is William Pitt, whose sagacity perceives the true character

The period
1739—1763 one
war.

William Pitt.

of the war. To him it was due that the war became a question of colonial empire and not a mere fight for Hanover. He gave subsidies, indeed, to Frederic II; but to the Americans he sent Howe, Forbes and Wolfe, with armies and fleets. He rendered to his country a service greater still. He lifted the idea of British empire to a new level. We have seen how the colonists resented the view of colonial policy which since 1688 commercial interests at home had impressed upon Parliament and ministries. To Walpole the colonists were so many producers and consumers. To Pitt they were fellow-citizens, whose

His attitude
to the colonies.

progress and victories, rights and aspirations, were the natural concern of the mother-country, whilst her history and power were, in turn, the pride of the daughter communities. Whatever Pitt's defects as a statesman, in the history of British expansion he must stand always amongst its inspiring figures.

The year 1739 marks the close of a great peace era.

The conflict
with Spain,
1739.

Walpole had carried through a consistent policy with tenacity and with success. In his eyes, peace was not only an end in itself, but an essential condition of material prosperity and of dynastic security. In foreign as in home affairs everything gave way to this master-aim. But the struggle with Spain had been threatening for some years past. As early as 1733 France and Spain had, unknown to the Minister, drawn together in a

Its origin.

Family Compact to resist the commercial and colonial encroachments of England. The loss of Gibraltar and of Minorca rankled at Madrid. Georgia, the latest British colony, pressed closely upon Florida, a large, undefined area, still part of Spanish dominion. But there was a more serious difference still. By the 'Assiento' (p. 172) England had the right to send one ship yearly for general trade into Spanish-Indian seas. But side by side with this legal commerce an enormous unauthorised trade had arisen in Spanish America, mainly with the English colonies: and, being of great convenience

to Spanish planters, was connived at by officials on the spot. The seamen engaged in the traffic found the profits good, and, being largely New Englanders, had no scruple about Spanish rights, and were keen enough to run the needful risks. Spain now determined to stop this irregular trading by stringent means. Legally, she was justified in her policy of exclusion, which rested on the same law of nations as that on which the English Navigation Acts were founded. But the right of search which belonged to her in her own waters was extended by her officers to the high seas. For some years before 1739, complaints from West Indian and Boston merchants poured in to the Board of Trade: unoffending ships had been searched, seized and carried into Havannah or Cartagena; their officers and crews ill-used and imprisoned; cargoes condemned and plundered. In spite of much exaggeration—‘Captain Jenkins’ ear’ was probably a sample of it—cleverly turned to party purposes, it is certainly true that Spain defended her legal right by illegal and violent means.

The right
of search.

The English temper rapidly became warlike. The people had, perhaps, grown weary of too long peace; they were irritated with Spain whose power they despised, and whose action now offended their interests and roused their passions. Two things may fairly be alleged in defence of British opinion. One, that a State excluding the rest of the world from a vast and rich inheritance, which she is herself incapable of developing, does so at her own risks: the other, that a State unable to uphold her regulations without violently offending the rights of strangers will find those regulations ignored by all who are strong enough. In the autumn of 1739 England demanded the renunciation of the right of search, and the admission of British claims in the matter of Georgia. As was expected, war followed. Walpole, lacking moral courage to resign, remained in office.

The feeling
in England.

His fears were justified. It was evident that behind Spain stood France, hoping to recover Acadia. The Jacobites became active. Meanwhile armaments both on land and at sea were in a deplorable condition. At the outset the war was confined to American waters. Vernon began well, by taking Porto Bello (1740), Anson, purposing to co-operate with him at the Isthmus, rounded Cape Horn and took some prizes; but, Vernon having disastrously failed off Cartagena and later at Santiago de Cuba, Anson sailed home across the Pacific (1740—1742). France joined Spain in 1744; the naval war was carried into the Mediterranean; but in 1747 the French fleets were destroyed by Hawke, and, on the sea, England, though with no great credit, triumphed over the two Powers. La Bourdonnais was busy in the East, as we shall see, and took Madras (1747), whilst in America an English squadron enabled the New England men to capture Louisbourg (1746). On the continent England fared badly; and the Jacobite rising of 1745 proved an important diversion in favour of France. Commerce on both sides had suffered greatly from the war and peace was desired both in London and Paris. Each party surrendered its gains; and the Spanish right of search was not even mentioned in the Treaty. In India and in America momentous issues remained undecided. It is now necessary to follow events first in the West and, secondly, in India.

Inconclusive results.

The struggle for N. America. 1740—1760.

The struggle between England and France in America, between 1740 and 1760, can only be regarded as one and continuous, more acute at certain stages, but never laid aside. If a dividing moment must be chosen, it should be fixed, not in 1748, but in 1755, when the mother country once for all took the cause of the Plantations into her own hands and carried the conflict through to its close.

At the outset of the period we find the exploration of the West still an object of keen interest to the French

administrators. From Louisiana, in 1739, travellers, in vain search for the Pacific, penetrated to the mountains of Colorado; the region of Dakota and the easternmost range of the Rocky Mountains were reached from the Missouri in 1743; further north, in 1752, the Saskatchewan was ascended to a point some hundred miles west of the great lakes of Manitoba. This activity in discovery had a definite motive. In the uncertainty of boundaries actual occupation alone secured possession of new territory: and it was, perhaps, of equal importance to attach Indian tribes of the far West to French alliance, in the hope of thwarting English expansion by a barrier of hostile savagery.

French expansion in the West.

But the French had outlined another and more trustworthy line of defence. Since the Peace of Utrecht it had been a cardinal aim of Canadian policy to unite by a chain of fortified posts the two colonies of Canada and Louisiana. Already, by 1740, important links in this chain had been created. On the extreme northeastern wing Louisbourg guarded the mouth of the St Lawrence against naval attack, and menaced especially the new English possession of Acadia. Passing westwards, a fort at Crown Point upon Lake Champlain (built 1731) barred the one practicable route from New York to the St Lawrence, by which the English might cut off Montreal and the Lakes from access to the sea. Frontenac, on the north shore of Ontario, guarded the outlet of the Lake; Fort Niagara secured the communications from Erie to Ontario and shut out the English from their Iroquois connections across the Lakes. Posts on the Miamis and the Wabash led on to Louisiana, where at the entrance of the southern colony, Fort Chartres blocked the waterway of the Mississippi to New Orleans. It remained to secure by occupation the basin of the Ohio, whose upper valleys lay open to the hungry traders and prospectors of Virginia and Pennsylvania. Let us remember that in spite of the lordly claim

The chain of forts in the French West.

The Ohio country.

to dominion over this vast region nothing in the way of settlement or systematic trading had been effected by the French. The white population of their two colonies, perhaps 60,000 in all (1750), left no margin for overflow to an area whose diameter from Frontenac to New Orleans measured 1500 miles. Explorers had paddled along the Lakes, and down the great river to the Gulf of Mexico, scarcely turning to the right hand or the left, and forthwith the entire basin was claimed by right of 'occupation.'

Turning to the defensive front of the English colonies, we find Acadia, on the extreme right, ill-governed, disaffected, and feebly garrisoned: a source of weakness rather than of protection. Maine and New England were fenced in by the dense forest which covered the water-shed of the St Lawrence, and which was pierced by the Penobscot, Kennebec and Connecticut—all avenues of Indian attack. On the edge of the wilderness the isolated hamlets were defended by a stockade of logs to serve as a rallying place in an Indian surprise. New York was fortunate in the alliance of the Iroquois, or Five Nations, who held the forests of the Upper Hudson, and whose influence in native counsels was, though declining, a sore hindrance to French intrigue. Fort Oswego, on Lake Erie, built (1727) under pressure of Governor Burnett, and now falling to decay, was the extreme outpost of the colony, and, as giving access to the Lakes, was jealously regarded by the French. To the south, Pennsylvania and Virginia were hitherto far removed from the French sphere, and, although their limit of occupation was steadily spreading to the Alleghanies, in neither colony did opinion take account of what might pass beyond the watershed.

Down to 1750 the conflict needs but brief relation. There is first, and always, the Indian trouble on the New England border and along the upper Hudson. This was the standing peril of the frontier hamlet and lonely farmstead. It was a

The struggle
to 1750: the
Indian war-
fare.

scourge terrible from its surprises, its fierce cruelty, perhaps even more from its ever present suspense. "There was no warning, no time for concert, perhaps none for flight. Sudden as the leaping panther a pack of human wolves burst out from the forest, did their work and vanished." We must picture to ourselves forays of this kind, planned, and often led, by Canadian officers, as the unchanging background of these years of war.

It had been a definite object of the French, since 1713, to recover Acadia, which, in truth, the Walpole ministry had made no attempt to reconcile to English rule. A persistent course of intrigue carried on through the Church by Jesuit emissaries marked this interval. In 1744, formal hostilities were begun by an attack from Canada in force. One small post fell to the French, but Annapolis (Port Royal) was relieved and Acadia remained British. Now followed the striking exploit of the capture of Louisbourg. Both as the key to the St Lawrence, and as the shelter of French privateers, this strong naval station was a most desirable capture. If the traders of Boston or Salem hung back when the sagacious Shirley, the Governor of Massachusetts, proposed the bold stroke, it was because it seemed too mad a scheme for a provincial militia alone to attempt. But by sheer persistence Shirley had his way, and Louisbourg fell after a siege of three months (1746), a British squadron preventing relief by sea. The importance of this success lay, not only in its strategic consequences, but in the self confidence engendered in the New Englanders. It was therefore a keen disappointment to the Colonies when at the Peace (1748) Louisbourg was handed back to the enemy in exchange for Madras. But events were already preparing which showed that the conflict had hardly been interrupted by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

As early as 1740 English traders had begun to find their way across the Alleghanies into the basin of the Ohio. By

1748 they had made good their footing in the Indian villages known as Logstown and Pickawillany; others even reached the Mississippi. In Canada these yearly excursions were, rightly enough, regarded as foreshadowing territorial claims. In 1749 the Governor despatched a small expedition to confirm French ownership of the Ohio country by formal possession. For the Ohio river-basin lay, in French contention, wholly within the limits of the colony of Louisiana. But Celoron, who commanded, found to his dismay, that the Indians bluntly refused to expel the English traders, or to admit his authority.

In 1751 the newly formed Ohio Company was invested by George II with rights over half a million acres of land to be located by prospectors in this same region. To secure this advanced position, the Assembly of Virginia was urged to build a fort at the fork of the Ohio, where Pittsburg now stands. But in vain. It was far off: there was even doubt whether the site would not be proved to be within the Pennsylvanian grant. Precious time was lost. The French were on the alert. Governor Dinwiddie pressed his Assembly to move. George Washington, a smart young major of militia, was sent (1753) to meet the advancing French detachment with formal protest; early in 1754 a weak Virginian force took possession

Duquesne
on the Ohio
Forks, 1754.

of the spot. General Duquesne, a few weeks after, expelled the English, and in April 1754 the Canadians were strongly entrenched in their place. However diplomacy might treat it at home, in America the expulsion of the Virginian outpost on the Ohio was held an overt act of war. The final struggle between France and England on the continent had begun.

The conduct of the colonial Assemblies, in this critical autumn of 1754, is most instructive in view of Grenville's policy ten years afterwards. The Governors of Virginia, Pennsylvania and New York urge in vain the danger of the situation. Virginia has a

The Colonial
Assemblies
and the crisis.

dispute with Dinwiddie on the question of a small fee upon grants of title to land. The Governor, under precise instruction from home, is not free to concede the point. The Assembly, more keen to humiliate Dinwiddie than to guard the future of its own race, refuses all military aid. The Quakers and stolid Germans of Pennsylvania openly avow, through their Assembly, that they will accept French rule rather than yield their privileges, which meant at the moment the right to tax unoccupied lands. New York, in spite of the peril which threatened its border, was indifferent. New England alone, knowing what a French war meant, armed and vigilantly watched its Indian frontier. We are so accustomed to regard the American Colonies as 'united states' that we do not realise that outside New England, they recognised, at this period, no common tie but that of British sovereignty. Diverse in origin and history, separated by broad tracts of difficult country, communicating with each other mainly by sea, each colony had developed a special character, and no crisis had yet arisen, south of New England, to call forth a higher sense of political duty. The Assemblies, interested exclusively in their local affairs, were rarely led by men of much capacity. To save public money, to uphold the rights of the colony against a neighbour, even more than against the mother-country, and to bait the Governor, were at the time the most attractive functions of the Burgesses of the middle and southern provinces. To Governors Dinwiddie and Shirley, clear-sighted and sagacious men, sorely-trying in their thankless posts, American 'patriotic' historians are now beginning to render something of their true meed of gratitude.

A first step towards union was, however, taken in 1754. Under much pressure from England seven colonies sent delegates to Albany to secure by joint policy the good-will of the border Indian tribes in whose lands lay so terrible a power. Benjamin Franklin, from Philadelphia, the strongest man at the Con-

A colonial
Congress at
Albany, 1754.

gress, then urged—for the first time in American history—a still more decisive measure of federation: a standing council of defence for the thirteen colonies. But the colonies would have none of it, as fettering their independence, nor was the Crown favourable to a project which created a central power which might prove even more stubborn than the separate Assemblies. But the Congress accomplished two things. The Indians of the New York border, at least, had been secured, and the delegates had been convinced of the urgency of the danger that threatened from French intrigue.

Meantime the ministry at home listened to Dinwiddie's reports, and in February 1755 Braddock arrived in Virginia with two British regiments, under instruction to expel the French

**The Home
Government
intervenes,
1755: plan of
operations.**

from the Ohio. At the same time a general plan of operations was laid down which governed the course of the war till its close. From the side of Virginia, the French were to be driven from Fort Duquesne, and thrown back upon the

Lakes. From New York, Niagara was to be attacked, and the French line of communications broken at a vital point. Oswego was to be made the headquarters of a flotilla to command Lake Ontario and the outlet of the St Lawrence, thus rendering possible a descent upon Montreal. By the co-operation of New England and the Jerseys, the approach by Lake Champlain was to be strongly held, and a passage forced by the Richelieu into the heart of Canada. The extreme right of the English line, Acadia, was to be secured at all costs, and Louisbourg once more taken, as a preliminary to a naval attack upon Quebec. A reference to the Map (No. IV) will show that this scheme of offensive strategy aimed at a converging attack upon Montreal and Quebec from the west, the south, and the east. In 1760 this was finally accomplished in the fall of Montreal.

The course of the war can now be readily understood. The attack on Fort Duquesne led by Braddock himself ended

(in July, 1755) in an overwhelming disaster. The nature of the warfare was now made clear. For it, English troops and generals, trained in European tactics, were likely to be of slight avail. Braddock was described by one who saw him at work as 'a general chosen for being disqualified for the service he is employed in in almost every respect.' But we must not forget the wretched support which he received from the Assembly, and the parsimony and indifference which refused him supplies and transport. The consequences of his defeat were quickly seen. The Indians of the Ohio came over to the winning side. They swarmed across the mountain ridge, pushing their forays along the streams of Virginia and Pennsylvania. This border war of 1755-6 was one of the most terrible experiences of American history; and yet the Assemblies of these two colonies remained supine. The Quakers of Philadelphia used all the arts of obstruction to hinder measures of self-defence. They urged conciliation and peace, and, had they offered to proceed in person to the tormented frontier, there to face the hideous massacre to which they abandoned helpless women and children, they might have won some respect for their convictions. Not until the Indians touched, at a point some 60 miles from the capital, the Quaker settlements, did the Friends assent to the cry of their fellow colonists for arms and men to rid the province of the awful scourge.

Braddock's
defeat, July,
1755.

Its effect:
Indian raids:
1755-7.

In the next year (1756) the French easily repelled the attack on Niagara. Montcalm took Oswego, and enabled to concentrate his strength upon the centre pressed southwards along Lake Champlain and built an impregnable post at Ticonderoga. In this way the French threatened the colonies with the fate suggested for them a century before: they could now hope, by the capture of the valley of the Hudson, to thrust in a wedge between New England and the middle provinces and reduce each in turn.

Campaign of
1756.

In 1757 English prospects sank even lower. Louisbourg was unsuccessfully attacked. At the opposite end of the line, on the Lakes and the Ohio, the French steadily strengthened their position, as the Indians hastened to the winning side. On the centre, the critical point of the operations, they took the advanced post of the British army at Fort William Henry. But at this extreme limit of their success the French victory was disgraced by the massacre of English prisoners by the Canadian Indians, and still more by the horrible barbarities, which, under the eyes of French officials and population, were inflicted upon the English women and children who had been carried off to Montreal. It was clear that the triumph of the French meant the opening of the floodgates of barbarism upon the English settlements from north to south.

But in June, 1757, Pitt had taken charge at home: straight-way the American conflict became a national war, the really vital element of the great world-struggle into which the colonial quarrel had now merged. New men were chosen, strong in the confidence that they would be supported. Fleets, troops, supplies, money were promptly forthcoming. The original offensive plan was once more taken in hand, but in a fresh spirit.

The year 1758 saw the tide of French successes stayed. Forbes, next to Wolfe the strongest of Pitt's men, with masterly ability, forced his way across the Alleghanies in July to find Fort Duquesne already evacuated. The harassed Virginia border, with Washington in command, now had rest. At the other extremity of the line Louisbourg fell to Amherst and Wolfe. In the centre, however, the brilliant and beloved Lord Howe met his death in an assault on Ticonderoga (July), directed by his chief, the incompetent Abercomby. But in September Fort Frontenac was captured, and Oswego recovered; with Ontario in British hands, Fort Niagara and the whole of Louisiana were cut off

1757: the
French
victorious.

June, 1757.
Pitt in power.

1758: the
English
victories.

from the St Lawrence, and a way opened for rear attack on Canada itself. The year closed with dismay and dissension in Quebec, with returning hope and fierce determination in New England.

The end, indeed, was now near. British dockyards were busy all winter (1758-9) in fitting out a squadron for attack upon the heart of Canada itself, the fortress of Quebec, now laid open by the capture of Louisbourg and the helplessness of the French navies. With expedition unheard of for a century, the fleet, with 9000 troops on board under General Wolfe, was ready for sea by the middle of February. The attack on Quebec from the river by this force was to be the main operation of the campaign of 1759. It was intended that Wolfe should be supported at the point of attack by Amherst, from the south, driving the French before him down Lake Champlain, and by the flotilla from Lake Ontario, bringing Prideaux's corps from the far west. As it fell out, Wolfe was left to win his victory alone. Niagara was taken in July; the troops were not ready to descend the St Lawrence until the need for them had passed. In August, Amherst found Ticonderoga and Lake Champlain evacuated, but he was still only preparing to force a passage down the Richelieu when Quebec fell.

1758-9: Pitt's preparations.

Wolfe at Quebec, 1759.

Wolfe, after vain attempts to reduce the city by bombardment, and by flank attack from the east, moved his force up-stream across the fire of the fortress. His position was becoming difficult: he was incapacitated by sickness, and winter was fast approaching. Word had reached him of a steep and narrow path leading directly up the face of the range of cliff crowned by the Plains of Abraham, the narrow plateau which stretches westwards from the city. Soon after midnight on the 14th of September boats laden with troops dropped down with the tide from the transports, others crossed from the southern shore; the path

Quebec taken, Sept. 1759.

—as being impracticable—was found unguarded. When the day broke, Wolfe had under him on the north bank 4,500 troops in all, of whom 3,250, forming the front line, were actually engaged with an equal force of the enemy under General Montcalm. The fighting speedily ended in the repulse and

Death of
Wolfe and of
Montcalm.

flight of the French. Wolfe and Montcalm were mortally wounded on the field. The French first evacuated the city and then their defensive

lines to the east of it. On the 18th the citadel, on threat of assault capitulated, and Canada, in effect, was won. A thrill of profound relief passed over the colonies; to the New England men it was as the day of Barak or of Gideon. But the main French army still kept the field. The English in

1760: Mont-
real falls: Ca-
nada British.

turn were, in the spring of 1760, besieged in Quebec, but the power of the sea once more decided operations. A relieving fleet appeared

in the river; Montreal was thereupon attacked by an overwhelming British and colonial force, converging from three sides, and surrendered unconditionally to Amherst (Sept. 8). It was urged that his terms were unduly hard: 'I am fully resolved,' answered the General, 'for the infamous part the troops of France have acted in exciting the savages to perpetrate the most horrid and unheard-of barbarities in the whole progress of this war, to manifest by this capitulation my detestation of such practices.' Under the articles of surrender all French officers, troops, sailors and civil officials were sent to France in English vessels, and Canada passed at once under English rule.

THE ENGLISH IN INDIA.

The French East India Company, whose real activity dates from Colbert (1662), was, like its English rival,

The French
in India: 1662
—1740.

purely a trading corporation. Its chief centre was Pondicherry, built in 1675, and, like Madras,

owned and governed as a French dependency. It lay about

100 miles south of Fort St George. In Bengal the French held Chandernagore, in the same manner as the English held Calcutta, and, on the West coast, Mahè, a port of much less importance. The Company possessed also the Ile de France and the Ile de Bourbon (Mauritius and Réunion), and claimed vague rights, derived from settlement, in Madagascar. The period of peace which followed the death of Louis XIV. (1715) had aided the growth of the eastern trade, in which a strong mercantile marine was employed. The Factors of the French settlements were rigidly enjoined to follow the example of the English and Dutch in abstaining from interference in the native politics of the peninsula.

In 1741 the control of French interests in the East was entrusted to a man of singular genius and patriotic ambition. Dupleix had already spent twenty years in the service of the Company;

Dupleix at
Pondicherry,
1741.

since 1730 he had been Governor of Chandernagore, which had attained a marked degree of prosperity under his command. He was made Governor-General at Pondicherry, with supreme charge of the commercial, military and political administration of French affairs in India. The political condition of India had attracted his keen attention.

His aims.

In the dissolution of the Moghul empire now in progress he saw the unique opportunity of France. No one had grasped so clearly as Dupleix the defenceless position of the native states and the influence which European intervention, skilfully guided, might win amid the shifting sands of Indian intrigue. He believed that France, by securing a firm foothold in native politics, would easily monopolise the European commerce of India, and if need be expel her British competitors altogether. Dupleix's ambition, however, soared above mercantile ideas. He had conceived of a vast European empire in India, maintained by native aid, a source of wealth and prestige to the power that owned it. And it was his determination that France should be first in the field.

His policy was steadily shaped to this end. The administration and finances of the Company in India were reformed; Pondicherry was fortified against land and sea attack: a native army, drilled by French officers, was raised. Dupleix took pains to conciliate native opinion, as the French have always known how to do; he acquired from Delhi an imperial title which placed him in a unique position,—a foreigner, yet a part of the great political system of India. But in 1743, the Directors in Paris, alarmed at his expenditure and at the coming war, ordered their Governor to retrench. When fighting began in Europe, Dupleix was almost ready.

But he had overlooked one vital link in his chain. Events

**The weak
point in his
conceptions.**

proved that he was right in believing that a European power, pitting one native ruler against another, could become dominant in India. But

he did not perceive that such a power must possess control of the sea. Reinforcements, for example, must be drawn from home, and military bases on the coast rendered secure from naval attack. But what Dupleix did not realise, Admiral La Bourdonnais, the other great Frenchman who appeared in the East at that time, fully understood. The two men had the same ultimate end in view—to restrict, if not to destroy, British interests in the peninsula. But, whilst the mind of Dupleix was fixed on a policy of native alliances—a

**La Bourdon-
nais.**

land policy—La Bourdonnais knew that mastery at sea was the prime necessity. England gained India because she was able to apply

the methods of both.

War in Europe was formally declared between Great

**The struggle
of France and
England in
India, 1744—
1761.**

Britain and France in 1744. It will be (as in the case of the American War) more true to the actual facts to disregard the apparent

break in continuity implied by the Peace of

1748. The events of the period will then group themselves under the two heads of the conflict in the Carnatic and that

in Bengal. From 1756 onwards these overlap in point of time, but they remain generally distinct from each other. In the Carnatic the French occupy the foreground of the scene; in Bengal they fill a subordinate part, and the actors in the drama are its native rulers and the British E. I. Company.

In 1745 an English fleet appeared off Pondicherry. Dupleix, in alarm, appealed to the Nawab of the Carnatic, the native sovereign of that region, to forbid hostilities between European settlements in his dominion. The English squadron then drew off. Next year La Bourdonnais reached Pondicherry: after compelling the weaker English fleet to retire from the coast, he attacked and took Madras (Sept. 1746). A ransom (£400,000) was agreed upon, but Dupleix, angry at not being consulted, refused to acknowledge the terms. The Governor of Fort St George and his Council were paraded in triumph at Pondicherry. The French Admiral, in indignation, withdrew his fleet and sailed for France, where the brave and sagacious servant of his country was sent to the Bastille. Meantime the Nawab, resenting the armed intervention of the French, demanded of Dupleix the surrender of Madras; attempted to seize it, and was defeated, to his astonishment, by a small French force (1747). Madras, however, was next year restored in exchange for Louisbourg by the Peace of 1748.

1. The Carnatic, 1745—1748.

The opportunity of establishing his influence in native politics, for which Dupleix had been carefully watching, now arrived. The Nizam of Hyderabad, the ruler of the Deccan as viceroy, or Soubahdar, of the Moghul, and therefore over-lord of the Carnatic, died in 1748, leaving a disputed succession. Dupleix at once made agreement with one of the several claimants, the Governor of Madras taking the part of another. At the same time Dupleix was actively intriguing for the ejection of the reigning Nawab of the Carnatic, Anwur-

2. The Carnatic, 1748—1754.

ood-Deen, who had shown English sympathies, in favour of his own protégé, Chunda Sahib. He succeeded in both projects. Mozuffer Jung and Chunda Sahib were proclaimed Soubahdar and Nawab respectively, and their rivals slain

(1748-9). Dupleix seemed on the eve of realising his most sanguine hopes. He had organised an effective native force to support his French troops; he had defended Pondicherry against a serious British attack both by land and sea; native rulers respected his power and sought his alliance. The Nizam and the Nawab owed their thrones to him. The former appointed him governor of the possessions of the Moghul south of the river Krishna, the latter became a mere dependant of Pondicherry. It was even more significant that, for the security of the new Nizam against pretenders, a mixed French and Sepoy force was stationed at his capitals under the command of the most capable officer the French ever sent to India, the Marquis de Bussy (1751). Thus, in the Deccan and the Carnatic plain, sovereign authority was controlled by the French Governor-General. The methods by which Great Britain built up her power in India were first put into operation by Dupleix.

The English at Madras were gradually awakening to the fact that the old order of things was passing away. They perceived that Europeans in India were no longer mere traders; that, however unwillingly, the Company must be prepared to meet the French with their own weapons. Formally, England and France were at peace, but, as allies of rival native princes, they were drifting into hostilities. Dreading the effects of the unchecked influence of Dupleix in the Carnatic, the Governor of Madras lent direct aid to Mahomed Ally, son of the late Nawab. It was in the course of the struggle between the two European powers on behalf of their respective claimants, that Clive appears in the field, taking

**The English
abandon non-
intervention,
1750.**

**Clive at
Arcot, 1751.**

and defending with great skill and courage the fortress of Arcot, the capital of Chunda Sahib (autumn of 1751). Eventually Chunda Sahib was slain (1753). Dupleix, relying on Bussy, was planning new combinations, when he was suddenly recalled to France in Oct. 1754.

Dupleix's aims were boldly conceived, and, however fantastic in the eyes of western observers, they were proved, within very few years, to be thoroughly practicable. But, given the genius of the man, three things were needed to make his success possible: able assistance on the spot, whole-hearted support from home, and command of sea-communications. Of the first he had little or none; the second was persistently denied to him; the latter was always precarious. Dupleix was recalled because the Directors at home were weary of a policy which caused much anxiety and brought no tangible profits; because the ministry disregarded political successes which did not tell in the European struggle. Complaints passed from London to Paris: Dupleix was made a scapegoat, and became another victim of French indifference to great opportunity. On his return he was disgraced and ruined; and, ten years later, the greatest figure in the history of French expansion died forgotten.

Failure of
Dupleix.

His death,
1764.

The departure of Dupleix led to a temporary agreement between Madras and Pondicherry. Mahomed Ally was accepted as Nawab, a definite success for England; but Bussy, who had received the Northern Circars with a revenue of half-a-million sterling, for the support of the French auxiliaries, still remained at Haidarabad. His position was rightly felt, both in London and in India, to be a serious menace to British security. The overthrow of French military power in the East now became a ruling object of English policy; the Seven Years' War provided the occasion. Lally was sent out from France, arriving in

3. The Carnatic, 1754—1761: Lally.

1758, with a fleet and the large force of 1,000 troops. Tactless, haughty, and guilty of wanton cruelties, this impulsive Irishman was a marked contrast to Dupleix. He imperilled the unique advantage of the dependence of the Nizam by recalling Bussy. The Circars, the province under French control, were thereupon promptly invaded by a force despatched by Clive from Bengal (Oct. 1758). Conflans, Lally's officer, was routed, and Masulipatam fell before assault in April, 1759. The Nizam, seeing the trend of events, transferred his alliance to the English, ceded to them Masulipatam, and dismissed the French corps. The power which the sagacity of Dupleix and Bussy had established in the Deccan thus fell to pieces. From the treaty of 1759 dates that friendly relation between England and the Nizam which has with little interruption subsisted ever since.

Lally failed equally to hold his own in the Carnatic. Fort St David, weak and ill-defended, had fallen to his attack soon after his arrival (June, 1758); Madras then stood a siege (1758—9), which however was raised on the appearance of an English fleet. Coote's victory at Wandewash (1760) drove Lally to seek the shelter of Pondicherry, which was then invested. Superiority at sea had gradually veered to the British side. The French garrison, cut off from reinforcements and supplies, was compelled to surrender at discretion (Jan., 1761). Mahé was captured a month later: Chandernagore had already fallen to Clive. The military power of France in India now ceased to exist. Once more the French Government sacrificed a servant whose failure was mainly due to its own supineness. On his return Lally was executed.

**Destruction
of French
power in India,
1761.**

Events had taken place in Bengal which had strengthened the determination of the Company and of Pitt to expel the French from India.

**4. The events
in Bengal.**

In 1756 the succession to the sovereignty of Bengal passed to the Nawab Surajah-ood-Dowlah. He was a young man—hardly nineteen years of age—whose ungovernable

temper brought him speedily into conflict with the English to his own destruction. Calcutta was now a prosperous town administered on English methods and defended by an English garrison. It was further secured by the fact that it was accessible to ocean-going ships. The French owned in the same way the town of Chandernagore, twenty-four miles above Calcutta, and the Dutch had a similar settlement at Chinsurah, immediately adjoining the French boundary.

Within a few weeks of his accession the Nawab made demand for the surrender of a relative who had claimed English protection at Fort William. The Council demurred. But the fortifications of Calcutta were weak, and the garrison small. The Nawab had no difficulty in occupying the town (June, 1756). Such English subjects as had not fled were, by orders of an officer of the Nawab, thrust into the military jail-room, and, amid unspeakable horrors, out of 146 prisoners 123 died before morning.

The Nawab
takes Calcutta.

'The Black
Hole.'

Clive had just reached Madras from England. He was already recognized as the man of energy and resource who could be relied on in grave emergency. With ships and troops he sailed for Bengal. The young Nawab was promptly brought to understand the nature of the race with whom he had to reckon. Calcutta was easily re-captured. Ample amends were then made in money, and the privileges of the English in Bengal were confirmed in detail. This took place early in 1757: about the same time news arrived of the declaration of war between England and France in Europe. Clive, now on terms of treaty with the Nawab, proceeded to attack the French in Chandernagore. But Surajah-ood-Dowlah, resenting this independent action and miscalculating the relative strength of the two powers, took the French side. Chandernagore, vigorously attacked, fell in March. The Council of Calcutta, borrowing Dupleix's policy, determined to

Clive in
Bengal, 1757.

He takes
Chanderna-
gore, March,
1757.

displace the hostile Nawab by a prince upon whom they could rely. Mir Jaffier, an officer of position, was fixed upon: and around him gathered a veritable network of intrigue. But the army of Surajah-ood-Dowlah was in the field, and in June was encamped at Plassey, 70 miles north of Calcutta. Clive, by a memorable night march, on the 22nd of that month, led his force of 1,000 European and 2,000 native troops with eight small field-pieces, within striking distance of the enemy, fifty

Plassey,
June, 1757.

thousand strong, with fifty guns. Next day Plassey was won, with little slaughter on either side, but with complete demoralisation of the native force and of its ruler. Mir Jaffier was now proclaimed

Mir Jaffier
made Nawab.

Nawab of Bengal, Orissa and Behar at Moorshedabad, the capital of the province. Immense treasure poured in upon the Company, its army and officials, the price paid by the successful usurper. The Company became the landowners of a large territory surrounding Calcutta. But the deposition and death of Surajah-ood-Dowlah led the imperial Prince at Delhi, afterwards the Moghul, to claim Bengal in his own right. Clive scattered the ill-organised force by which the demand was supported (1758), thereby confirming the prestige of British arms in Northern India. The success of his operations against the Circars, as part of the struggle against Lally, has been mentioned. Clive

Clive, Govern-
nor of Bengal,
1758.

meanwhile had been appointed Governor of all English settlements and factories in Bengal in 1758. In 1760 he sailed for England.

The position
of the Com-
pany in Bengal.

Great Britain had now gained in Bengal a footing similar to that possessed by her in the Carnatic. These great and wealthy provinces were ruled by native princes who were the nominees of the English, to be removed without scruple if they entered upon embarrassing courses. But no attempt was yet made to interfere with their methods of internal government. The administration of the Company's settlements, since its origin in Surat, was still

that of a business establishment. A dazzling vista of power and wealth was suddenly revealed to a body which had no organisation or trained intelligence fit to cope with the responsibilities involved. Hence two results: the confusion between commercial, civil and military authority, giving rise to disputes and scandals which long hampered the administration of affairs in India and at home; and the gross demoralisation which overtook the Company's service in Bengal. Clive was himself guilty of a gross act of forgery in the discreditable intrigues that resulted in the accession of Mir Jaffier in 1757; and he lent the sanction of his own example to the personal rapacity of the Councillors at Calcutta. No doubt, as Clive said, the temptations put in the way of Europeans of influence in India at that time 'were such as flesh and blood could not be expected to withstand.' The beginnings of British rule in Bengal are an unpleasant study for those who take a well-founded pride in the integrity of modern Anglo-Indian administration.

Its difficulties.

Corruption of officials.

The second great achievement of the period we have been considering was thus accomplished. The foundations of the territorial power of England in India were laid in the victories of Clive at Plassey and of Eyre Coote in the Carnatic. Beginning as a struggle for existence against the ambitions of Dupleix the conflict had ended within ten years in the conversion of a London trading Company into an anomalous but effective paramount power in two of the richest and most densely peopled regions of India. Military skill, the vigorous support of Pitt, and the decisive control of the sea, were the three chief causes of English success. Great as were the results so far secured, they were more significant still as indicating the lines upon which far greater things were yet to be won.

India and
England at the
Peace, 1763.

The victories in America and in India were due, in their rapidity and their completeness, to the command of the sea, which was secured once for all by the destruction of the French fleets in 1759. The triumphs of Boscawen in the Straits of Gibraltar (Aug.) and of Hawke off Quiberon (Nov.) set free the English navy for operations against the outlying colonies of France, and effectually stopped the relief of her struggling army in the Carnatic. The capture of every maritime possession of the enemy, and, what was of no less importance, the annihilation of her sea-borne trade, was now only a question of time. Within little more than two years every French island in the West Indies, except San Domingo, had fallen. No support could reach Quebec or Montreal. In India she had not a square yard of territory left. Goree and the Senegal had been captured, and with them France had lost all share in the West African slave-trade.

Spain, with incredible folly, chose this moment for taking the losing side. Too late to help France, she was in time to bear the brunt of her misfortunes. Pitt had foreseen this alliance in the summer of 1761. In September he resigned because his proposals for an offensive policy were rejected by the Cabinet. But, Pitt once out of office, Spain, by open preparations and by avowal of the French treaty, promptly proved his sagacity. She reaped nothing but humiliation from her belated interference. Her weak and ill-equipped fleets—50 sail in all—were helpless before the English navy of 120 vessels with their crews of 70,000 hardened and confident seamen. Havannah was captured in 1762, and with it the communications of Spain with her western empire were destroyed. Manila and the Philippines were attacked from India, and when they fell the East Indies also were closed to Spain. Immense treasure was, as an inevitable consequence, taken on the high seas. Though Pitt was no longer in power,

The Naval
War, 1759-61.

Spain joins
France, 1761.

Pitt's resig-
nation, 1761.

his spirit still animated the Services, and the victories were rightly put to his credit by public opinion. It was difficult to fix a limit to the possible successes of the English fleets.

But George II. had now been succeeded by a young monarch who purposed to govern as well as reign. Pitt was too strong, too popular, too independent of royal favour, to suit George III.

George III.
and peace.

The intrigue and corruption by which the new King secured personal control of affairs are told in the general history of this period. It is enough to say of them here that by their means Pitt was overthrown, his plans discarded, and the full fruit of his conquests lost to his country. As in 1713, peace was sought as a move in a great party game, and to discredit a prominent leader. An agreement between England and the allied Powers was reached at the end of 1762.

By the provisions of the Treaty of Paris (Feb. 1763)—i. *France* yielded to England all territory

The Treaty
of Paris, 1763.

held or claimed by her on the continent of N. America, lying east of the Mississippi, except the city of New Orleans. She retained certain privileges of fishery on the Newfoundland coasts. In the W. Indies, England restored her three finest conquests, S. Lucia, Martinique and Guadeloupe, retaining only the less important islands of Tobago, St Vincent and Dominica. In India, France recovered her territorial possessions, but merely as trading-posts. Her political career in the East was, for the time, formally renounced. In W. Africa, by ill-advised compromise, Goree was handed back by England who kept the Senegal river and its forts.—ii. *Spain* surrendered Florida, which included all her territory east of the Mississippi: but she regained Cuba and the Philippines, and France ceded to her, in compensation for her losses, all her claims to America west of the Mississippi. The whole of the settled and more accessible area of the great Continent thus fell to England; whilst the great unknown West lay dormant in the hands of Spain until the time should come when

men of English race should be ready to appropriate that also.

The gain to England in territory, in treasure and prizes at sea, and in prestige, were greater than in any previous war. India and America were now destined to be English and not French. The sea power and the maritime trade of the world were avowedly in English hands. To Great Britain continental politics and interests ceased to be of primary concern. Pitt had definitely established the insular and the extra-European character of British power. Henceforth the face of England was to the ocean ; but her back was turned to the Continent of Europe.

General
results of the
War.

CHAPTER VI.

THE LOSS OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES.

1764—1783.

THE conduct and issue of the late war had imbued the nation with a proud sense of power and, insensibly, with a stronger view of sovereignty over the colonies. Yet it had been foretold that the expulsion of the French from Canada would prove a doubtful boon to Great Britain. Foreign observers, noting the large measure of independence enjoyed by the colonies and their increasing population and wealth, argued that, once the Canadian danger removed, the Americans would awaken to the fact that England was no longer necessary to their security. It was even discussed in England in 1763 whether it might not be politic to restore Quebec to France in exchange for Guadeloupe. It seemed, however, wholly needless to scheme for the preservation of American loyalty in the years that saw the victories of Louisbourg and Quebec. The endeared memories of Lord Howe and Wolfe, Pitt's outspoken pride in the Empire, the accession of the 'true Briton,' George III., the sense of final relief from the conflict of a century, the boundless possibilities of the future, all contributed in the colonies to a generous sense of gratitude and content.

England and
the American
Colonies in
1763.

American
loyalty.

Moreover, the colonies were well aware that, as regards political privileges, they held a unique position. Not the mother country, not any European state, enjoyed so full a measure of self-government,

The political
privileges of
the Colonists.

institutions so elastic, freedom of enterprise, of thought, and of religion, so unfettered. That 'equality of opportunity' which is the most sincere mark of democracy was, in the middle of the 18th century, to be found nowhere outside the limits of an English colony. In New England pre-eminently, but in only less degree in the other colonies, the affairs of the township and parish, of churches, and of the colony itself were managed 'by the people for the people.' The royal Governor exercised, outside matters of trade and defence, little or no control on policy. Internal revenue was wholly in the hands of the Assembly, in which sat no place-men or royal pensioners, who, in the British Parliament, often nullified public opinion. The franchise was broad, the Press free, education cheap or actually costless. Much that Englishmen at home had to wait for until the 19th century was well advanced had been the privilege of the colonists for a hundred years.

The population of the thirteen colonies, in 1763, was estimated at more than a million and a half: this
Population. reached nearly 2,000,000 by 1776. Of this total New England claimed one-third; the fact that Boston, its one important town, contained barely 19,000 people, shows the broad distribution of its inhabitants over the soil. In the middle colonies, New York City had a mixed population of only 10,000; Philadelphia, the thriving capital of the most promising of all the colonies, twice as many. Virginia, out of 200,000 inhabitants, counted only 70,000 whites. Speaking generally, destitution was unknown, there was work for all; and if few great fortunes existed, the small farmer and artisan, intelligent and self-respecting, enjoyed a degree of comfort unknown in Europe until our own times. The prosperity of the American colonies was a matter of envy to all European observers.

The Peace of Paris left England saddled with a debt of 140 millions, a large proportion of which had been incurred in relieving America of its enemies and in assuring her future

progress. National debts were less familiar then than now, and were more alarming in proportion. George Grenville, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, proceeded faithfully to review the position. First of all, debt had to be met, and taxation was, and threatened for some years to continue, abnormally high. Now the national wealth, in the days before the sudden growth of manufacture, could only be seriously increased by extending foreign and colonial trade. Grenville then reflected on the laxity of the application of the Navigation Laws, particularly in those colonies which had just been so signally benefited by the war. Next, he took account of the certainty that France would attempt to recover the ground lost in America. In that event British arms would be called upon again to undertake the defence which provincial jealousies prevented the colonies from providing for themselves. Now Pitt had aroused a new feeling for the Empire, and Empire, with Grenville, meant joint responsibilities. If armaments were necessary for colonial defence, America might fairly be charged with some part of the cost. Grenville, therefore, aimed at three things: (1) to stiffen the operation of the Navigation Acts in the colonies, and to suppress smuggling: (2) to raise a standing army for America: (3) to impose taxation on the colonies towards its cost. The Americans were undoubtedly prosperous, and apparently loyal. It occurred to no one in this country that Grenville's policy would meet with serious opposition.

Financial burdens of the War: views of Grenville.

The three aims of his policy, 1764.

The conflict with the colonies now preparing, which was to end in separation, may be divided into three stages: the first, ending in 1766, the second, in 1774, the third, with the Declaration of Independence in 1776.

Grenville began (1764) with measures for enforcing the Acts of Trade. Orders were issued to Governors to repress illicit trading and customs officials were supported by ships of war. It was found that,

The American dispute: first stage, 1764-1766.

though by law no tea other than that drawn from England could be used in the colonies, yet, of $1\frac{1}{2}$ million lbs. yearly consumed, not more than one-tenth was shipped from home. The profitable, but illegal, import of sugar and other West Indian produce from French and Spanish islands was now (1764) expressly forbidden by statute. On the same occasion Grenville introduced a resolution that, 'for the further

Strict administration of the Navigation Acts.

defraying the expense of protecting the colonies, it may be proper to charge certain stamp duties in the said colonies.' The purpose of the impost was duly laid before the agents of the colonies in London, who were instructed to take the opinion of their Assemblies. These, without exception, protested against the proposal, though they offered no alternative plan of raising the money. In March 1765 the Stamp Act was passed, with little interest and less discussion. But in America the measure was greeted with an outburst of disorder, and the Act became at once a dead letter.

The Stamp Act, 1765.

A change of ministry now followed. Rockingham, the new premier, at the urgent request of the mercantile interests, already suffering from a disturbance of American credit and trade, repealed the Act (1766); but, to induce Parliament and the King to yield so far, the Minister carried, along with the repeal, a Declaratory Act, which asserted the undoubted right of Parliament to make laws binding the colonies 'in all cases whatsoever.' This, however, passed unnoticed in America in the enthusiasm with which the withdrawal of the Stamp Duties was received. It seemed that in spite of the deep irritation caused in all classes in England by the news of the abuse, menaces and violence, with which the Act had been met, that the good feeling of 1763 had been restored. It was noticed, however, with concern, that the colonists had begun to quote English precedents, to talk of Ship-money, and to

Its repeal, 1766.

adopt the anti-excise cry of 1733 in the watchword 'Liberty, Property, and No Stamps.'

The fall of the Rockingham cabinet made way for the last Ministry of William Pitt (1766). It was a strange irony that made Chatham—the idol of the colonists, the statesman who had publicly 'rejoiced that America had resisted'—the head of the

The second stage: Townshend and the Colonies, 1767.

Government destined to revive, past hope of remedy, the conflict which he had so bitterly denounced. It was his lieutenant, Charles Townshend, who, when his chief lay incapacitated by illness, introduced in May 1767 measures for raising Crown revenue in America, by duties on 'tea, glass, lead, paper, and painters' colours.' The proceeds, estimated at £40,000, were destined to pay the salaries of Governors and Judges. Other Bills suspended the New York Assembly, for resisting instructions concerning the quartering of troops, and still further strengthened the Customs staff. It is difficult for us, as it was for the colonists, to understand how a cabinet containing several strong opponents of the Stamp Act could assent to such a policy. The dismay of the more sober colonists was quickly followed in New England by renewed agitation, by non-importation agreements, by resolutions calling afresh for a repealing Act, by violent usage of Crown officials. The Massachusetts Assembly, dissolved by the Governor, promptly met as a 'Convention.' Troops to support royal authority were despatched in 1768 to Boston, and an ugly temper was rising on both sides of the Atlantic.

Discontent renewed.

Meantime Townshend had died (Sept. 1767) without seeing the effects of his measures. He was succeeded by Lord North. Chatham and those who thought with him left the cabinet one by one; by the end of 1768 the King was virtually the chief of his Ministry. To George III. belongs the responsibility of the disastrous policy which ensued.

The King directs affairs, 1768.

Once more the mercantile community at home intervened.

The colonial trade, which, according to Chatham, brought to English men of business a profit of at least two millions a year, was utterly disorganised. The enemies of England were watching events: France was quietly preparing.

**Compromise
proposed, 1770.**

In 1770 Lord North attempted a compromise. Townshend's duties were withdrawn, with the exception of that on tea; a step which showed how ill the Ministry understood the state of opinion in America. The Government wished to maintain the principle; and it was exactly the principle that the colonists vehemently rejected. Conflict, with loss of life, had already occurred between the soldiery and a Boston mob. A disposition on

**Violence in
New England,
1770—1773.**

the part of the more responsible colonists in New England (to which disorder had mainly been confined) to discourage agitation, was thwarted by the efforts of a disputatious class of lawyers, ministers, and ruined traders. A vessel of the navy engaged in watching the harbours of Rhode Island was boarded by the inveterate smugglers of that colony and burnt (1772). Cargoes of tea were thrown into Boston harbour. No one was punished for either offence. Parliament was not unreasonably stirred by such marks of anarchy. Public opinion was more deeply moved by the exposure of Franklin, the capable Agent of several of the colonies in London. He had, in a discreditable way, become possessed of, and had caused to be made known, certain private letters of Hutchinson, the Governor of Massachusetts.

The third stage in the conflict was now reached. The King and the Ministry, with, it must be said, the general support of the country, determined to abandon conciliation for repression. In 1774 Lord North proposed three measures of coercion.

**The third
stage: coercive
measures,
1774—1775.**

By the Boston Port Act the harbour of Boston was closed to trade inwards and outwards. The Charter of Massachusetts was in part revoked. Crown officials of the same colony were in

specified cases removed from the jurisdiction of colonial courts of law. These Bills, strenuously opposed by Burke and Chatham, were promptly agreed to, in the conviction that Massachusetts—the head and front of the offending colonies—would be ‘brought to its senses.’ The actual result was that on the appeal of Virginia and Massachusetts a general Congress of delegates from all the colonies (excepting Georgia) met at Philadelphia on Sept. 5,

The First
Congress of
the Colonies,
1774.

1774. Among its members was George Washington, but the lead was taken by men of a different stamp, the demagogue Samuel Adams of Boston, and the charlatan Patrick Henry of Virginia. Congress, whilst claiming exclusive rights of Assemblies over taxation, still admitted the power of Parliament to regulate trade. After condemning the legislation of the past ten years, it supported Massachusetts in resistance to recent coercive measures, but finished by a loyal address to the Crown. Washington could still write from Congress, with full conviction, ‘I am well satisfied that no such thing as independence is desired by any thinking man in all North America.’ Yet Massachusetts had now suspended all legal forms of executive government and was acting as an independent State: and before Congress separated she had (Oct. 1774) called out her militia. In response to the declarations of Congress, Parliament extended the Boston Port Act to nine colonies. Before Congress met again in 1775 war had begun in the skirmish of Lexington (February). Still Congress despatched the ‘Olive Branch’ petition to the King, asking for a return to the mutual relation as it stood in 1763. It was rejected; the temper of the King and of the country admitted of nothing short of submission on the part of the colonies. On the other hand, Congress voted a ‘continental,’ or united colonial, army, with Washington in command, and privateers were commissioned. In April 1776 a final blow at the English connection was struck, when Congress, repudiating for the first time on behalf of America

The Second
Congress, 1775.

the whole fabric of the Navigation Acts, declared the trade of the colonies open to all the world, 'not subject to the King of Great Britain.' But the two countries had been already for twelve months in a state of war. The colonies, now secretly encouraged by France, followed Massachusetts in throwing off the last ties of British allegiance. The proprietary governments, as in Pennsylvania, were abolished. Planter influence in the South, mainly loyalist, went down before the wave of patriot feeling. Still, Congress worked by very small majorities. In New York, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, British sympathies were exceedingly strong to the last. But on July 4, 1776, was signed and published (New York alone abstaining), the Declaration of Independence by which the Empire lost its chief colonial inheritance.

Let us shortly review the causes which had led to so decisive and so rapid a change in the relation of the mother country to her colonies during the thirteen years that had elapsed since the Peace of 1763. First, we may bring together the *broader underlying conditions* which made the revolution possible, and which will have been suggested by the story of the colonies already told.

English
authority re-
pudiated, 1776.

Inde-
pendence
declared,
July 4, 1776.

Motives to
disruption :
a. General
causes.

1. The chief of these lay in the origin and history of the colonies themselves. The colonists were, as we have seen, above all things Englishmen, with the political tenacity and individual reliance of their race. In fighting George III., New England at least felt itself once more resisting the tyranny of the Stuarts. Moreover, thanks to their long training in self-government in Church and State, and to their steady prosperity, the colonial communities were, politically, far more intelligent and advanced than the mother country, and their leaders were conscious of it.

2. Though the colonists had been left to themselves in

matters of government, their industries had been closely controlled by the Navigation Acts. Even if at certain periods English statesmen had winked at the evasion of the regulations as to trade, colonial manufacture had always been strictly repressed.

3. The Navigation Laws, however, the colonists regarded as the price they paid for protection against foreign enemies: and the French in Canada had been a standing reminder that they could not dispense with the strong arm of the mother country. When Canada had finally passed into English hands this powerful motive to loyalty no longer operated.

4. A fourth deep-seated source of misunderstanding lay in the gross ignorance of Englishmen of all classes—from the King, his Ministers and civil servants downwards—concerning colonial life and thought. With lack of knowledge went, in governing circles, the absence of any reasoned policy, such as, however defective it might be in itself, marked the relation of France and Spain to their dependencies. Whilst the colonies were acquiring and tenaciously maintaining rights amounting to practical independence, the English Government was, in colonial affairs, living as it were from hand to mouth, without accepted principles, expert advice, or properly organised administration. The powerful trading interest, no doubt, concerned itself with America, but only as traders: and of other instructed public opinion on the colonies there was little or none.

Estimating, next, the *immediate causes* which led to the rupture, we see that in the three essentials of a colonial policy—sympathy, equity, and most clear-sighted purpose—the English method of handling the problem of American relations was conspicuously lacking.

b. *Immediate causes.*

1. *The right of taxation*, claimed by Grenville, disputed by Chatham, and rejected by the colonies, may have been legal; but it was clearly contrary to the ingrained political conviction of Englishmen. So soon as the colonists made it manifest that

they viewed it from their own standpoint as Englishmen, it was necessary to abandon the claim. In the undetermined relations of Parliament to the colonies it may have been perfectly natural to propose taxation, but the true question for statesmen was whether, in the common interest of the Empire, such a policy was expedient. The question thus stated was answered unmistakeably, not only by the tenacity of American resistance, but by the paltry product of the taxes—a yearly sum of £40,000 in all, reduced by Lord North to £15,000.

2. By American lawyers the more subtle question was gradually raised: Had Parliament the *right to legislate*, on any subject, for Englishmen who were not represented in it? Though warmly disputed in New England, this inherent right of Parliament was defended by no one more energetically than Chatham, and was deliberately admitted by Congress as late as 1775. At the same time, during the dispute, this power of legislation was always rejected in practice whenever it conflicted with colonial opinion. In England it was undoubtedly felt that America had no honest intention of accepting the supremacy of Parliament.

3. The third cause is found in the renewed enforcement of the Navigation Laws and the prohibition of smuggling. This change was due, not only to Grenville and Townshend, but to the pressure of mercantile opinion, which urged the loss to British industry if the Acts became a dead letter. The injury to Boston and Rhode Island caused by interference with the West Indian trade, and the friction involved in the searching of vessels and seamen, brought home the grievance to a wide and important class of colonists. The destruction of the 'Gaspee' in 1772 by the men of Rhode Island, the frequent and unpunished outrages on Customs officials, well illustrate the feeling which was directed as much against the methods of carrying out the Acts as against the restrictions themselves.

4. The proposal to establish a standing army in America

and the actual landing of troops at Boston (1778) were keenly resented. To Puritan and Quaker the phrase 'standing army' had an evil sound; to all classes of colonists it was distasteful, if America were expected to pay the cost. In the late war, British officers, from Braddock downwards, had, with a few marked exceptions, made themselves unpopular by their conduct and pretensions. Royal garrisons, it was felt, would prove harmful to colonial simplicity and, in case of conflict with Governors, possibly dangerous. The despatch of troops to Boston under Gage produced bad feeling; and the right of Ministers to land armed forces, and of Parliament to pass quartering Acts, was disputed.

5. The mischief was effectually completed by the coercive legislation of Lord North in 1774. Such Acts, as Burke and Chatham contended, rendered conciliation impossible, and were only intelligible as an intentional prelude to war.

6. This suggests the supreme cause of rupture: the utter lack of consistent policy from 1767 onwards. There might be arguments for a system of colonial taxation as an effective part of a scheme of Imperial defence, but to imperil the Empire for £40,000 a year was not statesmanship. To confess Townshend's finance to be mistaken, and yet to retain its most irritating feature—the tea-duty, worth at most £20,000 a year—was preposterous. Nor was it kingly in George III. to treat a rebuff in policy as a personal affront; whilst it was the silliest bravado to threaten coercion without either the intention, or the power, of exerting force enough to carry it through. America might have been retained to the Empire on the basis of frank cooperation: it might have been kept in subjection by overwhelming strength coupled with skilful diplomacy. It was irretrievably lost, before the war broke out, by a policy, if it can be called a policy, which was at once aimless, weak and stupid.

Meantime the dispute had become a war. Two stages in the military struggle must be noted. During the first period

England and the colonies stand face to face alone: in the second France and Spain have joined America, intending 'to avenge their respective injuries and to put an end to that tyrannical empire which England has usurped and claims to maintain upon the ocean.' The American revolt, it must be clearly understood, was to these two Powers nothing more than an opportunity for undoing the results of the Seven Years' War. Into this conflict, chiefly fought out by the European parties to it upon the sea, Holland allowed herself to be forced in 1780. The war therefore had a double character. On one side it was a civil war, a war of repression, in which little could be won even by the most conspicuous success, and which could inspire neither ministers, nor people, nor commanders in the field with true patriotic enthusiasm. On the other side it was one more act in the European struggle for sea-dominion. The colonial and the foreign wars merged together, and the actual event (Yorktown, 1781) by which Independence was won was due, not to American valour, but to French arms on land and sea.

But, France apart, England could hardly have triumphed in any event. British troops, supported by adequate fleets, could no doubt have held all important points along the coast; in the extreme south two colonies might have been rallied to the English side. But the war proved, at an early stage and conclusively, that the interior could not be recovered, that New England was lost, that the submission of America, if yielded at all, could be maintained only by an intolerable drain upon the resources of the mother country.

The causes of British failure lay partly in the nature of the problem itself: a hostile population, large in numbers, sturdy, self-reliant, used to hardships and to irregular warfare; a country unfamiliar to the invader, marked by great

The American War: two main divisions.

Its double character.

England bound to fail.

Reasons for the military failure:

a. The inhabitants and the country;

distances, without military roads, with precarious transport and supplies; a field of operations far from the only effective base, viz. England, and, above all, dependent upon naval communications, always uncertain, and, after 1777, threatened by an enemy of nearly equal power at sea. The conquest of America, difficult in any case, became impossible when once British control of the Atlantic was imperilled.

Further, political causes affected military efficiency. Since Pitt's dismissal in 1761, neglect and corruption had marked the administration of the Services, which in 1776 were the prey of unblushing jobbery. The War Department and the Admiralty were under the control of Lords Germaine and Sandwich, men without principle or intelligence, and, as creatures of the King, proof against national discontent. Hence supplies and reinforcements were deficient, subordinate officers were ill-chosen, and the generals lacked confidence in their chiefs at home. Rodney and Howe were supplied with fleets inferior in numbers, armament and speed to those of the French, to face the heaviest task that has perhaps ever befallen the British navy.

The Loyalists, often heroic and devoted, were alienated by wanton plundering by the troops, or by the indifference of their officers. The goodwill of New Jersey, Pennsylvania and South Carolina could not survive the actual experience of English military occupation, which was further rendered odious by the presence of German mercenaries and the enlistment of Indians.

The British were opposed by Washington, the centre of colonial resistance, as George III. was the centre of British repression. The one truly noble figure in the whole war is the great American leader, fighting on behalf of his country against heart-breaking difficulties in Congress, in the Assemblies, and in the army itself.

A state of war, although unacknowledged as yet on either

b. inefficient
organisation;

c. alienation
of loyal American
feeling;

d. the genius
of Washing-
ton.

side, existed in America from the day when the Assembly of Massachusetts voted the enrolment of her militia (Oct. 1774). Actual hostilities began in April 1775 with the skirmish at Lexington; the credit of the day rested with the colonial troops, who had shown that they could cope with British regulars in the field. The success of Howe on Breed's Hill (Bunker's Hill, June, 1775) still left him shut up in Boston, in front of which Washington was now in command. The British, who could barely find supplies, destroyed in the winter two unprotected harbours to the general indignation. Howe was, in March 1776, forced by Washington to evacuate Boston; and with his withdrawal the attack on New England ended.

The other operation of the first winter of the war was an attempt by Congress to bring Canada into line with the revolted colonies. It was, however, a complete failure, notwithstanding a temporary occupation of Montreal by the American general, Montgomery. Quebec resisted; the Catholic Church, the traders, the peasantry and the Indians preferring English rule. The American force fell back upon the Hudson amid general disaster.

Boston being now secure, New York became the American headquarters. In July 1776 a large British fleet, conveying in all some 24,000 troops, arrived off the Hudson. Washington was now compelled by superior force to abandon New York, and to retreat across New Jersey upon Philadelphia. New York city now became, and remained for the rest of the war, the headquarters of the British, under Sir Henry Clinton. The 'middle' colonies, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, which always contained a strong loyalist element, formed the seat of war. Early in 1777 Washington made his way back towards the Hudson with a small, ill-equipped force; gaining support as he advanced as a result of the senseless depredations

First stage
of the war:

a. To the
Evacuation of
Boston, 1776;

b. the war
in the Middle
Colonies,
1776—1778.

committed by the British upon friend and enemy alike. But now the sea-power began to tell. Clinton, with as yet no hostile squadron to fear, occupied the fine harbours of Rhode Island; he then detached (Sept. 1777) a fleet, with General Howe and 18,000 troops on board, to occupy Philadelphia. Washington, falling back again to oppose the movement, was defeated at Brandywine. He complained bitterly of the ill-will to the patriot cause of the Quaker population. The British position, strong as it seemed, thus rested so far upon the sea; an attempt to sever New England from the less hostile colonies to the west and south, by occupying the Hudson in force from the Canadian border, was meanwhile being made (July, 1777). In that month General Burgoyne descended from Lake Champlain; he was attacked on the flank from New Hampshire, at Bennington, and finding his advance cut off at Saratoga, capitulated with only 3500 effective troops (Oct. 1777) to a force of 14,000 provincial soldiery born to forest warfare. It was evident that English occupation of territory at a distance from the sea-base was likely to prove a very serious problem.

Saratoga,
Oct. 1777.

The strictly colonial war, as distinguished from the wider conflict which developed from it, closes in the winter of 1777—1778, with the British in possession of the three isolated positions of Rhode Island, New York, and Philadelphia, dependent in each case upon the control of the sea, which is now about to be gravely challenged. France declared war early in 1778. The fleet left Toulon in April. Before its arrival off New York in June Philadelphia had been evacuated hastily, but in excellent order, and the English army concentrated once more in New York. But it was quickly seen that the French admiral was primarily concerned to attack the British West Indies. Clinton then felt free to open a campaign in the southern colonies, where loyalist opinions were known to be

End of the
first division
of the war.

Second divi-
sion of the
war. France
intervenes,
Feb. 1778.
1778—1783.

strong. By the end of the year 1778 Georgia was recovered ; South Carolina was entered (Jan. 1779) with little resistance. Henceforward the southern colonies are the main seat of operations. Charleston was taken by a force brought from New York ; and Cornwallis placed in command of a strong force, as the nucleus of a southern army with which to sweep the Carolinas and Virginia itself. The easy victory at Camden (Aug. 1780) encouraged the hope that the resistance of New England would not be repeated in the slave colonies. But the intervention of the French, which had led to the abandonment of Philadelphia, now caused the evacuation of Rhode Island waters by the English fleet and the diversion of ships and troops from New York to the West Indies. The French land force, however, was in turn blockaded in the harbour of Newport at a time when Washington's position, as he watched New York, became steadily more gloomy. Cornwallis in the south was preparing a venturesome attempt to reach the Hudson by land march from Carolina. In the spring of 1781 he was in Virginia, much disappointed at the absence of effective support from Loyalists. Washington concerted a joint operation with the French to intercept Cornwallis, who had taken up a defensive position at Yorktown, in order to await supports. The English general, confidently expecting Clinton and his fleet, saw the French admiral De Grasse, with 28 ships of the line, sail in to blockade the Chesapeake. Washington, with Rochambeau, his French colleague, occupied the base of the peninsula and forced an attack. Cornwallis, now closely invested, surrendered at discretion on the very day that Clinton set sail to relieve him (Oct. 19, 1781). With the surrender of Cornwallis the war on the continent had practically ceased. The effect of the news upon the King and the Ministry was overwhelming.

The colonial
war transferred
to the South.
1778-1781.

Surrender of
Cornwallis,
Oct. 1781.

The maritime war of 1778-1782 was at once part of, and distinct from, the colonial war. It was part of it in so far as

the French land force, supported by the French fleet, brought about the surrender of Cornwallis. But this was practically the one important service rendered by the allies to the colonial cause in the field. Congress, however, relied for money and supplies upon French liberality: and, further, by compelling diversion of armaments to Gibraltar, and to the West and East Indies, perhaps even more by reducing the American struggle to a second place in English minds, the action of France had indirectly much influence on events in America.

The naval
war, 1778-1782.

Apart from the crucial success of De Grasse at Yorktown, French admirals did little in the North Atlantic: they were generally out-manceuvred. They took Tobago and most of the smaller Antilles, but lost St Lucia: they were defeated by Rodney off Martinique, though in much superior force (April, 1782). St Eustace, a rich prize, was taken from the Dutch. Plans for combined operations of French and Spanish fleets in the Channel came to nothing: nor did the strenuous efforts of Spain to reduce Gibraltar. On the other hand, Rodney destroyed their squadron off St Vincent. Minorca was lost, and some coast settlements in Florida. The activity of Suffren, the ablest French seaman of the time, in the East will be noticed later. But the war showed that England, unprepared as she was, could, though with heavy risks, hold her own against the entire naval strength of Europe. Thus she was enabled to conclude a peace on terms comparatively favourable.

Incidents of
the war.

General po-
sition of
England on
the sea.

The Treaty of Versailles, Jan. 1783, was of necessity a humiliation for England. Although Rodney's victory in the West Indies was followed by the recovery of most of the losses that had been incurred in those seas, the general feeling in England was one of disgust at the whole war, and a desire for peace on any terms. The main articles agreed upon with America and her

Territorial
results of the
war.

allies were these. (1) The American colonies acquired complete independence. Their western boundary was the Mississippi, their southern limit the northern border of the Spanish Floridas. The Loyalists were practically refused amnesty by the different states and forced to emigrate, thus peopling Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Upper Canada with a body of admirable colonists, fiercely hostile to the republic which had ejected them. To these exiles the British Government paid compensation to the amount of £4,000,000 sterling. The mistaken policy of the victorious party in America, in wreaking vengeance upon the defeated party, has worked, in the judgment of American historians, no little injury to the well-being of the American state. (2) France gained the right to fish off Newfoundland, and the islands of St Pierre and Michelon passed wholly into her possession. She received, also, from England Tobago, but retained no other of her conquests in the West Indies. Goree in West Africa was surrendered, and in India Pondicherry, Chandanagore, Mahé and other small trading posts reverted to her. (3) Spain retained Minorca, which she had captured, but was disappointed in her hopes of Gibraltar. East Florida, which she had lost in 1763, she now recovered. (4) The result of the war to Holland was confined mainly to the enormous losses incurred by her shipping on the high seas and in the West Indian ports.

But the indirect results of the war, less easy to enumerate in definite shape, were of more importance than these transfers of territory would imply.

General consequences of American Independence.

It is not possible, even yet, to estimate the effects in history of the creation of a new state of British origin, energy, and ideals. But to American Independence we may ascribe without hesitation these results: the fall of the English mercantile system, the beginning of a new idea of colonial relations, the break up of the Spanish Empire in the west, and the French Revolution.

The United States now pass out of the history of the British

Empire. The creation of an English dominion from Hudson's Bay to the Gulf of Mexico, achieved by the genius of Chatham, had no sooner been accomplished than it was undone. The gain of Canada was but a trifling set-off against the severance of the settled and fertile provinces just surrendered. The story of their origin, their prosperity, their alienation and loss, may still suggest certain lessons concerning the principles and conduct of Colonial policy.

Lessons of
American
Revolt.

For nearly a century the one lesson derived from England's failure in America, a lesson accepted sometimes with regret, sometimes with complacency, was this: a colony is like a fruit which, when ripe, falls naturally from the tree. In other words, the loss of America prefigured the inevitable loss, in due course, of other colonies of the Empire. Down to a date well past the middle of the nineteenth century, this may be called the recognised doctrine of the relation of colonies to the mother country: a doctrine which had for its results popular indifference to the colonies and a despair of the possibility of Imperial unity.

The untrue
deduction,

But if we examine it, we find that this broad conclusion has been drawn from one group of colonies alone, and that their example has not, as a matter of fact, been followed by other groups.

which rests on
this solitary
instance.

We are then led to ask whether the circumstances of the American colonies and of their alienation are marked by characteristics peculiar to this particular instance.

On reflexion, we remember that America had its origin in an age of religious and political aggressiveness, which was fostered by a selfish mercantile policy on the part of the mother country, inevitable in an age ignorant of political economy, and careful of colonies merely as sources of trade-profit. We have seen Colonial affairs treated as the fair field of jobbery and incompetence; whilst but one statesman

The American
case a special
one.

in a century viewed the interests of the colonists, as distinguished from the mere acquisition of territory, in a spirit of serious concern. Finally, we have the whole delicate fabric of Colonial relations tumbled into chaos by the self-will of one of the most arbitrary and ignorant monarchs in our history.

The loss of America, then, reads to us rather this lesson. Where colonies are advanced, prosperous, and populous ; where they have no need of the strength of the Empire for protection ; where they have been treated as mere customers for goods and not as partners in the Commonwealth ; where their sentiments and their interests alike are ignored by Parliament, Ministers and King ; where, in a word, colonies have the meanest place in the imagination and in the functions of their nominal rulers, —then colonies are apt to quit the Empire. More than that the American revolt does not prove. It may be true that America was bound, sooner or later, to become an independent nation. But, in the actual order of events, her independence was due to British ignorance, to the mercantile system, and to George III.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CREATION OF BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY IN INDIA.

1763—1805.

THE attempt to govern India by Englishmen acting as agents of a native sovereign of their own creation was obviously full of risks. There was the certainty that methods of administration would be hard to reconcile, and the probability that the titular lord might forget his actual dependence. The latter difficulty happened first. Mir Jaffier, now a leper and an imbecile, was in 1761 superseded by his son-in-law, Mir Cossim. The new Nawab proved to have a will of his own and had the courage to defend his authority against the Company by arms. Enraged by his prompt defeat in the field, he ordered all the English residents in the Factory at Patna, who were for the moment at his mercy, to be murdered (1763). The Nawab Vizir of Oudh gave him shelter; and so became involved in the war: and as he controlled both the person and the remaining authority of the Moghul, the latter also, perforce, joined in the struggle. The battle of Buxar (1764) was a decisive defeat for the allies. The Moghul was in English hands, a prisoner and a suppliant: a triumph more important in native eyes than that of Plassey. Oudh submitted in the following year.

Bengal after
1763.Battle of
Buxar, 1764.

Fortunately Clive at this moment (June, 1765) appeared once more in Bengal, as Governor for a second term. He dealt promptly with the situation created by the recent victories. The Moghul granted to the Company the *Diwanni*, or right of collecting and administering the Imperial revenue, of the three provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. In return, a yearly allowance of £300,000 was guaranteed to the Emperor, and two districts were ceded by Oudh as an Imperial estate. Oudh was not further curtailed. The Nawab of Bengal was henceforth a person of no political significance. It is important to note the effect of Clive's settlement of 1765.

The Moghul, the source of all legitimate authority in Northern India and the Deccan, was now a puppet in English hands. Clive hardly seems to have realised what this implied. In the next place, the Company, besides the military control of Bengal, had now the administration of its public revenue. For the present, however, the collection of the land-tax, or State ground-rents, which constituted the greater part of this income, was, perhaps inevitably, left in the hands of native officials as hitherto; and the Nawab, after defraying the cost of the Company's forces, and of internal government, remitted the balance to the Governor of Bengal instead of to the Moghul. It is clear that such an arrangement was bound to produce friction.

The Calcutta government was, to all intents, sovereign in Bengal: revenue collection—in the East the touchstone of honest rule—justice, and police, were left to a titular Nawab, acting through officials over whom he had no effective control, yet for whose action the Company declined responsibility. Oppression and embezzlement ensued on a scale unprecedented even in Bengal.

Clive returns
to India, 1765.

The English
and the
Moghul, 1765.

The settle-
ment of 1765.

First effort
at British ad-
ministration
in Bengal.

Its tentative
character.

The settlement proved to be of a temporary nature, a transition between native and English administration.

Clive now turned his attention to the work which had been the immediate purpose of his appointment. He had himself taken part in the shameless scramble for wealth which followed the victory of Plassey.

Reform at
Calcutta,
1766—7.

Perhaps his frequent intercourse with Pitt in 1761—2 had given him a higher idea of English responsibilities. During his absence at home corruption had eaten deeply into every part of the Company's service. Exactions from native rulers and officials, unjust immunities from regular taxation, plunder of helpless native traders and cultivators,—almost every form of fiscal oppression known to the East had been enforced with the energy and precision of the West. The province was already sensibly poorer, and revenue fell off; the Company approached bankruptcy, whilst its servants divided millions of money amongst themselves. Clive cut at the roots of corruption with ruthless severity, undeterred by resistance and mutiny. The lucrative 'private' trade was cut down: secret presents from natives were forbidden; irregular allowances were commuted for increase of pay. The Governor returned to England in 1767 having proved himself as strong in civil administration as in the field.

For some years the main interest of Indian history lies in the problem of government. Three stages are to be noted: first, that of Clive just described; second, that marked by the Regulating Act, 1773, and the civil reform of Warren Hastings based upon it; third, the India Bill of the younger Pitt (1784).

Stages in
Indian ad-
ministration.

The Governor of Bengal controlled 26,000,000 of people, a revenue of £4,000,000 and 30,000 troops. He was, in all but name, a sovereign. It was maintained—notably by Chatham—that territorial sovereignty can only be exercised by the Crown, and that the Company, as a political authority, was an anomaly. The great

The Regulat-
ing Act, 1773.

famine in Bengal of 1770, the most terrible of all such visitations of which we have record, forced the responsibilities of England to India upon public opinion, already made sensitive by the aggressive wealth of the retired officials of the Company, and the scandalous stories of its origin. Parliamentary enquiry revealed a state of things which shocked a not too scrupulous age; and the Company became an object of general distrust. Under these circumstances the Regulating Act of Lord North, on the whole a statesmanlike attempt to provide a government for British India, passed by large majorities. Burke, with his ingrained respect for vested rights, resisted the proposed reform, not perceiving that the true point at issue was the profound distinction between the privileges of a Company chartered for trade and the functions of sovereignty afterwards

forced upon it. Clive supported the Bill. By this measure the Governor of Bengal acquired a general control over the action of the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras in respect of negotiations or war. The old Council at Calcutta was replaced by a body of four, nominated in the first instance by Parliament. A new Supreme Court was established for protection of natives against exaction. All political and military despatches of the Company were to be submitted to the Secretary of State. The Crown thus took within its cognisance all the functions of the Company outside its mercantile activity. The degree of State control was left undefined. But first steps were taken towards two ends of great importance, in introducing the rudiments of (*a*) a central administration in India, and of (*b*) a supreme State department at home.

This year saw the death, by his own hand, of Robert, Lord Clive. His latter years had been clouded by the angry controversy which raged around all who had been engaged in recent Indian affairs. Beginning life as a clerk in the Factory at Madras, the Carnatic

The Famine
of 1770.

The govern-
ment of India,
1773-1784.

Death of
Clive, 1774.

war gave him the opportunity of proving that tenacity, resource and military instinct which distinguished him. Energy, endurance, strength of will—qualities which have in each generation gone to the making of the British power in India—were the leading features of Clive's nature. But whilst he had both military and administrative gifts of a high order, he lacked that personal integrity upon which British influence has been most securely founded. Yet Burke (and he could have no stricter censor) declared that he atoned, by the great services to Indian probity of his second administration, for the errors and evil example of his first.

Warren Hastings, who had been appointed Governor of Bengal in 1772, became the first Governor-General under the Act. His famous trial, which has rendered his name more familiar than that of any other of the rulers of India, has tended to obscure the true place which he occupies in the history of the Empire. Let it be said at once that Hastings stands in the very first rank of British-Indian statesmen. No criticism of isolated acts can nullify the truth that his genius alone secured the safety of British rule in a supreme crisis.

Warren
Hastings in
Bengal,
1772--1786.

The services which he rendered to India fall under two heads: his administrative reforms and his defensive policy. If we look back upon Clive as the founder of British sovereignty in Bengal, the basis of the British administrative system was due to Hastings. Research proves ever more conclusively the zeal and unwearied industry with which Hastings attacked the work of organising the rural government of Bengal. Starting from the instructions which he had brought from home, that the Company should take the actual fiscal administration of the province into its own hands, he first removed the exchequer from Moorshedabad, the native capital, to Calcutta. He cut

His work in
India.

(a) Adminis-
trative organi-
sation,

Revenue,

down the allowance paid to the infant Nawab; the native revenue controllers were removed in merited disgrace. English officials were appointed as Collectors, with limited judicial powers, and a native police was tentatively organised. In every Eastern state an honest and intelligible revenue system lies at the root of all order and prosperity; Hastings spared no pains in examining, on repeated journeys, the actual working of the land-tax in different parts of Bengal.

In respect of trade he put an end, so far as his powers enabled him, to the tyrannical dealings of the
Trade, Company's servants with the helpless class of weavers and traders. He simplified transit and customs duties, and strove in various ways to repair the ravages of the great famine. Burke's rhetorical fervour never led him into grosser untruth than in his declaration that under the government of Hastings "the country itself, all its beauty and glory, ended in a jungle for wild beasts." In matters of Justice,

Justice. the native Supreme Court was brought from Moorshedabad to Calcutta, and proved a far more effective safeguard than the Court established under the Act of 1773, with its English judges and its basis of English Common Law. In this continuous work of civil organisation Hastings found only moderate sympathy from the Directors at home, whilst he met with persistent obstruction from the malignity of Philip Francis, the most active member of the new Council at Calcutta.

In his relations with Native Powers, the uniform aim of Hastings was to safeguard the territory of the
(b) Native policy. Company, and not to enlarge it. Danger threatened from three sources: from the Maharrattas, from Hyder Ali of Mysore, and from the French. The critical period of his administration fell within the years 1777—1783, a period when England was sorely pressed in Europe and in America. Hastings was fully aware that for the defence of India he must rely only upon himself.

The Mahratta chief, Sindia, had, in 1771, acquired the control of the person, revenues, and territory of the phantom Emperor. It was evident that in the near future the great marauding power would come into conflict with the British, upon whom demands for *chauth* or forced tribute were already being made. The buffer state guarding the north-west frontier of Bengal from Mahratta attack was Oudh. Clive had, in 1765, taken from Oudh two provinces and handed them over to the Moghul, who had, under duress, surrendered them to Sindia. Hastings resumed the ceded territory and discontinued the tribute on the ground that, the Moghul being no longer a free agent, the Company was in effect subsidising Sindia. The provinces were sold to the Nawab of Oudh as part of an arrangement by which his state was defended by an English force.

Hastings and
the Moghul.

Oudh.

The affairs of the Mahrattas in the west occupied Hastings' attention from 1775. The Bombay Council, contrary to the terms of the Regulating Act, had interfered in the disputed succession to the office of Peshwa, the hereditary premiership of the Confederacy. The seat of the Peshwa's government was at Poona; and at this period his power, itself an usurpation of the authority of the ancient Mahratta dynasty, who survived as mere puppets, was in course of supersession by the more vigorous chiefs, Sindia, Holkar, and the Rajah of Nagpur. It seemed, perhaps, a good opening for Bombay to follow the example of Madras and Bengal in gaining sovereignty by interference in native politics. Hastings strongly condemned such rash action and ordered a reversal of the steps so far taken.

Mahrattas:
the Peshwa
and the Bom-
bay Govern-
ment, 1775.

An emissary of the French Ministry now arrived on the West coast, with orders to proffer European aid to the Mahrattas with the view of checking the power of England and re-establishing a French

The French
involved.

policy in the Peninsula. Hastings, with his usual promptness, saw that such intervention demanded a re-consideration of his general policy. French sympathy with America was maturing into active alliance, and in the summer of 1778 news of the declaration of war reached India. Hastings threw the whole weight of the Bengal power, in troops, treasure, and credit into the struggle.

Mahratta
War, 1778.

French
attacked.

Chandernagore was taken in July, Pondicherry in October, 1778, Mahé in May, 1779. The Mahrattas were astonished by the activity of the English. General Goddard marched from the Ganges to the Taptee in the winter of 1778-9 and occupied the Mahratta state of Guzerat, whilst Popham stormed Gwalior, the strong outpost fortress of Sindia towards the northern plain.

The chief interest of the war, which led to no great territorial changes, lay in the evidence it afforded of the power of small British and Sepoy detachments to resist greatly superior forces of the Mahrattas. As many as 60,000 troops harassed Goddard's retreat in 1779, without preventing his object. But Hastings was wise enough to perceive that the Mahratta power was too strong for him to cope with it effectually under the distractions which rendered support from home impossible.

In Sept. 1780 the news came that Hyder Ali had descended in force upon the Carnatic, and that a French fleet had sailed for India with 7,000 troops. There were at this moment 30,000 Mahrattas threatening the borders of south-western Bengal; and the Nizam was wavering. In Hastings' words: "the crisis demanded the most instant, powerful, and even hazardous, exertion of the government."

Hyder Ali
invades the
Carnatic, 1780.

Hastings and
the crisis of
1780.

Peace was negotiated with the Mahrattas on terms which restored the "status quo ante bellum." Sindia was satisfied by a large sum; Rugonath Rao was pensioned and his claim

withdrawn. Meantime the treasury was empty, the army small, and Eyre Coote, the only experienced general on the spot, was past his prime. Yet Hyder was ravaging the Carnatic up to a few miles of Madras, the Nawab was a fugitive, the French were momentarily expected. The urgency of the crisis led Hastings to adopt harsh measures to recover monies due to the Company from the Rajah of Benares, and to support the Nawab of Oudh in extracting from the Begums, or Princesses, a part of the accumulations of State revenue inherited—legally or not—from the late Nawab. The Vizier of Oudh was thus enabled to pay up the arrears of subsidy due to the Company. Hastings, with these resources, by pledging credit, and stopping remittances to London, was in a position to come to the aid of Madras.

He raises
money: the
Begums.

The crisis was, perhaps, the most serious that has ever threatened the British in India. For the success of Hyder Ali would undoubtedly have brought all native India into the field against the European intruders. Within a month (Nov. 1780) the invading army had the Carnatic at its mercy. Coote made a brave resistance; by aid of the fleet operations were undertaken on the western coast of Mysore, thus distracting the attention of Hyder from Madras. But the arrival of Suffren, the most distinguished French admiral of the century, and the subsequent landing of De Bussy with a strong corps of French infantry, placed Hyder in a commanding position. But the Mahrattas and the Nizam had been now (1782) won over to a friendly neutrality, and shortly after Hyder died suddenly. Before the war closed, in the following year, Suffren had proved how

The danger.

Suffren off
the coast, 1782.

Death of
Hyder Ali,
Nov. 1782.

essential to British security in India was the command of the sea. For his squadron, being slightly superior in strength to that of Admiral Hughes, not only hampered British operations and encouraged native resistance, but was able to throw a hostile European force into the seat of war.

Hyder's death and the subsequent news of the French peace at home led to negotiations. England was then in the mood to wind up hostilities wherever possible. The Peace, 1784. Tippoo Sultan, the son of Hyder, threatened by the Mahrattas, consented to withdraw into Mysore, but with every intention of renewing the war when better opportunity offered. The French, on their part, gained nothing by their intervention.

Hastings was recalled in 1786, and his impeachment followed. The eloquence of Burke and Sheridan The Trial of Hastings. was devoted to an exaggerated presentment of subordinate events of Hastings' career, "the scandals of a hundred years ago, dead and buried like the individuals implicated." Two of the charges may be mentioned in this place, the lending of a British force for the reduction of Rohilkhand by the Nawab of Oudh, and the death of Nuncomar. On both these points the results of enquiry now tend to show that Hastings' conduct, though not wholly free from blame, admits of reasonable defence. But, whilst Burke's charges were not substantiated—for Hastings was finally acquitted upon them all—the great impeachment profoundly affected English standards of Indian administration. It served as an eloquent protest on behalf of lofty ideals of government which have never since been lacking to British administrators of our great Eastern dependency. Moral effect of the Trial.

The Regulating Act of 1773 was the first step in the transfer of the government of British India from The India Act, 1784. the Company to the Crown. Under the India Bill of Pitt, 1784, Indian Administration was conducted until 1858. By this Act the direction of all political affairs in India passed to a new department of State, the Board of Control, whose chief was a Cabinet Minister. The Governor-General and all higher officials were henceforth nominated by the Ministry of the day. The remaining patronage remained

with the Directors, as did also the control of the trading interests of the Company. Certain declaratory clauses against further annexations, and treaties likely to lead thereto, formed part of the Act, but circumstances rendered them nugatory in effect.

The new policy demanded that a statesman of position should in future represent Great Britain in India.

Lord Cornwallis, in whose capacity and integrity the highest confidence was reposed by Ministers

Lord Cornwallis, 1786.

and by the country at large, was sent out in 1786. His appointment marks a new era: "Never before," wrote Dundas, "had Great Britain a government in India and in England acting in complete harmony on principles of perfect purity and independence." His higher status and authority enabled him to extend the policy of Hastings in purifying the Company's administration. By careful finance he was in a position to defray all Indian charges and to remit large sums to London. But his most important service was the establishment of the revenue of Bengal upon a secure basis by what is

known as the Permanent Settlement. Indian rulers have immemorially derived their taxation

The Permanent Settlement.

from the land. In the time of the great Emperor Akbar an assessment of the revenue due from the soil had been made. The collectors of this revenue had acquired hereditary rights which the E.I.C., when they took over the administration of Bengal (page 230) as *Diwan*, had recognised. Hastings had made a beginning of a new Settlement, but it was left to Lord Cornwallis to establish the Land Tax of Bengal on a definite footing. Surveys and valuations of the cultivated area of the province were carried out during a period of three years. The rights of the collectors, or Zemindars, were then converted into ownership, limited on the one hand by the prior charges due to the State and by the traditional tenant-right of the cultivator or Ryot on the other. The Land Revenue due to the State in respect of each field was now declared perma-

ment, that is, it could not rise with the increased value of the soil. Now, such has been the prosperity of Bengal under British rule, that whereas, in the time of the Moghuls (say 1600), between 40 and 50 per cent. of the produce of the soil was claimed as royal dues, the average proportion claimed by the Indian exchequer to-day does not exceed 6 per cent.

Cornwallis had been appointed to secure India against what had been described as a policy of ambition, but he found himself compelled to follow in the steps of his great predecessor. The second Mysore War of 1790 was forced upon England by the restlessness of Tippoo Sultan, who regarded the English—and with justice—as the main obstacle to his supremacy in the Deccan. Hyder Ali, his father, had created the most powerful army in India. Tippoo had further organised Mysore as a military state, the strategic position of which rendered it a constant menace to the Carnatic, to the Nizam, and even to the Mahratta states of Poona and Berar. In 1790, Tippoo attacked the Protected state of Travancore. Cornwallis, thus compelled to intervene, concluded alliances with the Nizam and the Peshwa of Poona, whilst Tippoo invited the intervention of the French. The native allies of the Company proved half-hearted; they were, in fact, intriguing with Tippoo himself. The Mahrattas appeared just a year after they were due. The Nizam's troops waited to enter Mysore until all risk of meeting the enemy had passed away. They formed a motley array: "clothed in armour of every conceivable variety, including the Parthian bow and arrow, the iron club of Scythia, sabres of every age and nation, lances of every length and description, matchlocks of every form. But there was neither order nor discipline nor valour among them; they were unable to protect their own foragers and soon ceased to move beyond the English pickets." The fighting naturally fell to the English. When Cornwallis in person attacked Seringapatam (Feb. 1792), Tippoo, without

The second
Mysore War,
1790--2.

A native
army de-
scribed.

awaiting assault, surrendered. The result of the war was to enlarge English territory by the cession of the western sea-board of Mysore, which formed the first acquisition of the Bombay Presidency on the mainland. Madras received certain areas on the southern and eastern slopes of the Ghauts, and a large indemnity was paid. The event increased the prestige of England as a military power. At the same time the helplessness of the state of Haidarabad and the untrustworthy nature of the army of the Peshwa were significantly proved. Protests were made in Parliament against the "policy of annexation," but it was easy to establish that statutory provisions drawn up in ignorance of facts and without reference to emergencies, must, in a time of crisis, be set aside. The defence of Cornwallis was complete, and careful observers noted that the progress of English dominion in India was unlikely ever to be seriously checked by parliamentary opinion.

Result of the
war: 1792.

The next important step in the advance of British power in India is marked by the arrival of Lord Wellesley as Governor-General in 1798. An intimate friend of Pitt, he had been, like him, carried away by the strong current of hostility to France aroused by the events of 1793. It is impossible to understand the policy of Wellesley in India apart from that intense dread of French ambition which actuated English feeling at that time.

Lord
Wellesley,
1798.

The French
peril in India.

The treaty of Campo Formio (1797) enabled Bonaparte to design a grand attack upon England. The naval strength of Great Britain forbade the prospect of successful invasion. The Directory was easily persuaded that the arch-enemy was most vulnerable in the East, where already Tippoo was burning to avenge the defeat of 1792. The French owned in Mauritius an admirable naval base; French officers were in command of powerful corps in the service of the Nizam and of Sindia. The occupation of Egypt was undertaken (1798) as the first

step towards a vigorous attempt to supplant the English power in India. It is only necessary to add here, that once more the absence of the sea-power frustrated French ambitions. Nelson's victory of the Nile, three weeks after Bonaparte had landed in Alexandria, scattered for the present French dreams of Asiatic dominion. But to the rulers of British India Bonaparte's projects were by no means as visionary as they are to us. We must remember that Trafalgar had not yet been fought, that the English power was in no sense paramount in the Peninsula, and that Napoleon already overawed European statesmen by the uniformity of his good fortune in the field.

Lord Wellesley brought with him to India a determination to secure British power in the East against European interference. In carrying out his policy he applied the principles of Dupleix in their completeness, and with such success that, when the French peril was finally banished as a consequence of the crucial victory of Trafalgar, Great Britain had become the paramount Power in India from Delhi to Cape Comorin.

He had scarcely reached India when he heard the news of Tippoo's advances to the French Government and of vast preparations at Toulon for an Eastern campaign. Wellesley proposed to Madras a prompt invasion of Mysore. The difficulties of the position, serious as they were, did not dismay him. The Nizam and the Peshwa, our allies in the last war, were now either helpless or hostile; the Madras army was weak; the treasure and the credit of the Company at a low ebb. The Governor-General dealt first with the Nizam. His French corps, 15,000 strong, was disbanded and, by a subsidiary treaty, a force officered by Englishmen was substituted for it; the Nizam further binding himself not to take Europeans into his service without British consent. Tippoo was now invited to enter into the British alliance and to abandon his relations with France, which he defiantly proclaimed by assuming the title of "Citizen Tippoo." On his refusal war was declared (Feb. 1799). Three

The
Conquest of
Mysore, 1799.

months later Seringapatam was assaulted and taken, Tippoo falling in the breach. The capture of the Mysore capital was the most notable military achievement the British had yet won in India.

The settlement of Mysore deserves attention in that it is typical of one important aspect of British dealings with native states. Wellesley decided to maintain Mysore as a separate power under the old Hindoo dynasty, expelled by the Mohammedan usurper Hyder Ali 30 years before. The true heir, a boy of five, was brought from confinement—it is to the credit of Tippoo that his life had been spared—and under an English Resident elevated to the throne. Native officials administered the State and the old Hindoo life and faith were restored amidst popular rejoicing. Mysore is governed to-day by its native Rajah under the provisions of the peace of 1799. The defence of the State was taken over by the English, and to defray its cost the belt of country below the Ghauts, stretching from the west coast to the east, was allotted to the Company. The Nizam and the Peshwa also received additions to their territories. What was left was the old kingdom of Mysore as Hyder Ali had found it.

The settle-
ment of
Mysore.

The Nizam, whose weak government was always a source of danger to his own security and to that of his neighbours, and rendered him an easy prey to Mahratta raids from the north and the west, was glad to surrender his share of Mysore in return for the systematic protection of the English power. Accordingly he entered in 1800 into a subsidiary alliance with Lord Wellesley, by which he disbanded his own army—the nature of which we have seen—and received eight battalions of British sepoy. The cost of his English corps was met by the cession of the newly-acquired territory. By this arrangement no burden was levied upon the population, friction arising from arrears of subsidy was avoided, and the Nizam was secured against external attack.

Subsidiary
treaty with
the Nizam,
1800.

As part of the general establishment of British authority in Central India, the Carnatic and Tanjore were at this time (1800—1) brought directly under British dominion. The dependent Nawab of the Carnatic had long been the centre of scandalous intrigue, and his government a source of misery to his subjects and a danger to the British, who were responsible for his defence. Disputed succession and confessed traitorous relations of Tippoo provided the opportunity. To the intense relief of the inhabitants, the Madras presidency took over in full sovereignty the territory of the old Arcot state. A similar arrangement was voluntarily proposed by the Rajah of the small state of Tanjore.

The position of England in Southern India had thus undergone striking developments during the few years of Wellesley's rule. In place of a rancorous and powerful enemy we had in Mysore a dependent ally, whose territory formed a second line of defence. With the removal of the tyranny of Tippoo, industry had revived, and the Hindoos were gratified by the restoration of their native House and religion. The French had lost once for all their chief *point d'appui* in India. The Carnatic and Tanjore under British order grew rapidly in wealth and population. The interests of the Nizam were henceforward closely identified with British rule. In the Deccan, therefore, and the country to the south of it, Great Britain was recognised as the paramount Power.

Lord Wellesley now turned his attention to the north-west frontier of Bengal. The outer line of defence was formed by the state of Oudh, the internal condition of which was a constant source of anxiety to the Government at Calcutta. The Nawab was a mere voluptuary, his army an undisciplined rabble. Civil order was maintained only by the interference of the subsidiary corps which since 1765 had protected the capital. All signs portended speedy

The Carnatic
and Tanjore,
1800—1.

British
sovereignty
in Southern
India, 1801.

Oudh, 1801.

disaster. Wellesley now urged upon the Nawab to disband his native troops, to increase his English force and to allot territory for its support. Under the treaty of 1801 the Doab and Rohilkhand were ceded to the British, and the Nawab undertook to effect a thorough reform of his administration under English supervision. In return, the integrity of his dominion was guaranteed against foreign attack. The population, the Nawab, and the English alike benefited by a settlement which, by establishing security, encouraged industry and stimulated the cultivation of the soil.

We now come to Lord Wellesley's dealings with the Mahratta states. A reference to the map shews that the four great Mahratta chiefs, the Peshwa, Holkar, Sindia, and the Rajah of Berar, dominated western and central India. The nominal head of the confederacy, if we may so describe the uncertain bond which united these Hindoo chiefs, was the Peshwa, now the weakest of the group. His capital was Poona, and his attitude was always a matter of concern both to the Nizam and to the Presidency of Bombay. Sindia, the most ambitious, was also the strongest, of the four, partly on account of his youth and ability, partly by his position as controlling the person of the Moghul and most of all by reason of the force of 50,000 sepoy, drilled by French officers and supported by a formidable artillery, which protected his State. Holkar had most affinity with the old marauding type of Mahratta; his strength lay in his irregular horse. The limits of the territorial power of these chieftains were never defined. Not one of them possessed a lawful title. In each case their rule was the result of plundering incursions into territories of weaker rulers. The original home of their race lay in the western Ghauts, which at this time formed part of the Peshwa's state. Thence they had secured the control of the Moghul, threatened Rajputana, and possessed themselves of Central India from Orissa to Baroda. They levied blackmail from the Nizam and

Position of
the Mahrattas,
1802.

demanded it from Bengal. They had, like the Turk, the destructive instinct of the savage, and though like him they could take on a veneer of civilization, their power was incompatible with progress, order and the arts of settled life. The annihilation of the Mahratta dominion must ever be reckoned amongst the greater services rendered by the power of Britain to human happiness.

The defensive treaty with the Nizam made it a matter of urgency with Lord Wellesley to bring the Peshwa within the British alliance. Sindia and Holkar were quarrelling for the control of the Court of Poona. In Oct. 1802, the Peshwa to save his life took refuge on board a vessel of the East India Company. On the last day of the year he signed the treaty of Bassein, by which he entered the system of defensive alliances whose purport was to erect England into the arbiter of peace and war and the guarantor of orderly rule throughout the Peninsula.

The Peshwa was restored to his throne under the protection of a British force, for the support of which territories upon the Tapti and Nerbudda were ceded. Wellesley now found himself forced into war, first with Sindia and the Rajah of Berar, and later on with Holkar. The campaign of Sir Arthur Wellesley in the Deccan distinguished by the battles of Assaye (Sept. 1803) and Argaum (Nov.) was victoriously

concluded within six months. General Lake in Hindustan defeated the French sepoy force, entered Delhi, where he took the blind Moghul under British protection, captured Agra, Sindia's capital, and by the decisive victory of Laswarri (Nov. 1803) compelled Sindia to accept a subsidiary alliance. Sindia abandoned Delhi and all territory north of the Jumna, and his French corps was finally broken up. The Rajah of Berar ceded Orissa and accepted the British alliance.

The results secured after four short months of warfare were

profoundly significant. The Mogul represented the only legitimate power recognised throughout the Peninsula.

Lord Wellesley had now secured that his authority should not be utilised in hostility to English rule. In the next place, the last hope of French ambition in the Peninsula vanished with the overthrow of Sindia's European corps. Thirdly, the Mahratta power had been proved incapable of withstanding attack of an organized European army. Finally, in northern and central India, Great Britain was for the first time recognized as the supreme Power.

Results of
the war.

Meanwhile Holkar, who had hitherto stood aside, now took the field on his own account. He was a skilful warrior of the true Mahratta type, distrusting infantry and artillery and relying entirely upon that irregular horse by which the marauding race had spread their power over central India. The campaign of 1804—5 was marked by serious British reverses due to British inexperience of traditional Mahratta warfare. The siege of Bhurtpore failed conspicuously. Delhi, however, was successfully defended by its British garrison, but Holkar was still defying British arms when in 1805 Lord Wellesley was recalled, in a new fit of reaction against the policy of extension of British dominion. Holkar submitted a year later, and the Mahratta settlement effected by Lord Wellesley in 1802—3 remained intact.

War with
Holkar,
1804—6.

The Marquis Wellesley ranks with Lord Dalhousie (1848—56) as the greatest of British-Indian rulers. Not only were the additions which he made to the Empire important in themselves, but the political methods by which he built up the British power have survived to our own day. To understand the significance of his measures, certain primary truths of native Indian polity must be carefully borne in mind. In the first place there was in India, at the end of the 18th century, no such thing as a truly independent native power.

The place of
Wellesley in
Indian history.

Conditions
of Indian
politics.

Almost every state was nominally dependent on the Moghul: in reality each was at the mercy either of the Mahrattas or of foreign adventurers. Nor could the principal reigning princes claim a lawful title to their states; and they were often so weak and corrupt that without external aid they could not subsist at all. The idea of the good of their subjects, as a political principle, we may say with confidence, did not occur to any native Prince. The multifarious origin and creed of the races of British India is seldom adequately realised. The one uniting tie had been the Moghul empire, and Lord Wellesley consciously aimed at substituting for that now decrepit headship the rule of Great Britain. But, this policy once embarked upon, no limit to its extension could be reached, short of the great mountain chain which encloses the Peninsula. * It is probable that Lord Wellesley himself foresaw some such goal as ultimately inevitable.

CHAPTER VIII.

CANADA UNDER BRITISH RULE.

1760—1867.

THE administration of Canada passed into British hands from the moment of the capitulation of Montreal (Sept. 1760); General Amherst acting as military governor until the Peace. So conciliatory were his methods, that when the treaty was formally concluded, it was possible to say that the Canadians dreaded nothing so much as a return to French dominion. There was no emigration of the inhabitants, who, to their surprise, found themselves undisturbed in their civil and religious rights. In 1763 the population, amounting to about 65,000, was, with the exception of 200 settlers from New England, exclusively Catholic and of French origin, and was settled chiefly within a short distance of the St Lawrence. Westward of the river Ottawa the territory was abandoned to the Indians. The proclamation of 1763 established the colony of Quebec as a new and separate government; a popular Assembly was already contemplated; pending its creation a Governor with an Advisory Council administered the country.

Canada
under military
rule, 1760—
1774.

Nova Scotia—the old French province of Acadia—was a distinct colony, backward and thinly peopled. Halifax had been founded in 1749 by definite act of the Home Government and became the capital and a naval station of great importance. In 1755, owing to the

Nova Scotia.

refusal of the French settlers to take the oath of allegiance to the British Government, it was found necessary, in view of the critical condition of British rule in America, to deport a number of recusants to Canada and the English colonies. It cannot be disputed that the political activity of the Catholic clergy, stimulated from Quebec, rendered this harsh step unavoidable. Longfellow's well-known poem *Evangeline* entirely ignores the motives of an event unique in English colonial history. Newfoundland was still merely a summer fishing station, with neither settled population nor permanent government.

The problem of the government of Canada, which remained under semi-military rule until 1774, was new to British experience. Neither Jamaica nor New Amsterdam—both colonies won by conquest—afforded any true parallel. For in both cases the old population was speedily equalled or outnumbered by settlers of British race. In the colony of Quebec there was but the slightest intermingling of strangers with the old French stock. The Ministry desired to treat Canada as a colony on lines familiar elsewhere on the American continent. Yet it was necessary to take security for allegiance to the British Crown from a people rendered hostile by circumstances, and alien in language, religion, law, and mode of life. The difficulties confronting the able men who fortunately piloted the colony through the first period of British connexion, Murray and Carleton, are easily described.

a. The Roman Catholic Church.

b. Lack of training in self-government.

The Catholic Church had, as we have seen, proved itself not merely a religious but a political power in Canada. During the long struggle it had been intensely anti-English, and it was inevitable that suspicion should rest upon the direction of its future influence. In the next place, the Canadians had had no experience of, and apparently no desire for, self-government, local or colonial, and the experiment of autonomous institutions seemed hazardous.

The use of the French language was universal and French law, both civil and criminal, was alone intelligible.

The land system, resting on feudal tenure, differed both from the small freehold of New England and the manor of Virginia. The New England immigrants, with their ingrained aversion to Roman Catholics, proposed institutions which should exclude all but Protestants from political power, whereby

c. Law:
tenures.

d. Puritan
immigrants.

400 Protestant new-comers would dictate laws to 80,000 disfranchised settlers. The problem, already complex enough, was aggravated by the inveterate jobbery of the Home Government, which Murray denounced in scathing terms. Judges were appointed knowing neither the French language nor French law, and executive offices were given to ministerial supporters who promptly sold the posts for hard cash to deputies who were destitute of all qualification for the work they professed to do. A system of protected rapacity was thus let loose upon the colony. Fortunately in Murray and Carleton Canada had administrators, not only honest and capable, but with a veritable passion for good government.

e. Jobbery
of Home
Government.

The second period of Canadian history begins with the Quebec Act of 1774. By this Act Roman Catholicism was recognised as the religion of the colony, and the parochial clergy were allowed to "hold, receive and enjoy their accustomed dues and rights, with respect to such persons

Second
period of
Anglo-Can-
adian rule: the
Quebec Act,
1774.

only as shall profess the said religion." In civil matters the existing French law was continued in force; criminal charges were to be decided by an English code. Colonial government was, as before, to be administered by a nominated Council. English opinion could not then rise to the idea of a legislative Assembly which must be, under the circumstances, exclusively Catholic. England, as we know, admitted toleration in the colonies long in advance of its recognition at home; but the

time was not yet ripe for so great a concession, which, indeed, no Minister would have dared propose.

That the Quebec Act satisfied Canadian feeling is proved by the attitude of the colony to the revolted provinces in the War of Independence. In spite of the assiduous court paid to prominent colonists by Congress, and of the active alliance of Louis XVI, Canada held firmly aloof. If it refrained from active participation across the border, at least it helped to defend the colony against American attack in 1776—7 and offered asylum to Loyalist refugees. The Puritan and Republican sentiments which inspired the American states found no sympathy in monarchical and Catholic Canada. Noblesse, clergy, peasantry and Indians agreed in abiding by the sovereignty of England.

The bitterness of the colonial struggle led to a large emigration of Loyalists, especially from the Middle and Southern states. In 1778 a large body of these immigrants settled in Nova Scotia. During the next ten years a succession of settlers, impoverished in means, yet admirable material for the making of a new country, took up areas of land in Upper Canada and so became the founders of the British province of Ontario. By 1806 Canada and Nova Scotia had received not less than 80,000 of such immigrants. Those who had abandoned their homes from loyalty to Great Britain during the course of the American war were allotted special grants of land and were to be distinguished by the letters U. E. ('United Empire' loyalists), a badge of honour, then and afterwards highly prized by its recipients. Connected with the arrival of this influx of British population the district of New Brunswick was in 1784 constituted a separate colony.

The third stage in Canadian development was now reached.

The third
period: 1791—
1836. The
Canada Act.

The colony had ceased to be the home of a homogeneous nationality. The English element required not less consideration than the French,

and the geographical limits of settlement marked out the policy to be pursued. By the Canada Act of 1791 Upper Canada, with its special British characteristics, was separated from Quebec or Lower Canada. Self-government by means of elective assemblies was introduced in each province. The colonial type of constitution was adhered to. The Legislative Council, appointed by the Crown, stood for the English House of Peers; and the Assembly for the Commons. But, as in the old American colonies, the constitution was that of England before the rise of Cabinet government and ministerial responsibility, and the executive was thus independent in a large degree of the Legislative body, and could remain in power at the will of the Governor until the refusal of supplies brought about a deadlock. In other words the two Canadian colonies had legislative powers but not responsible government: a distinction of the greatest importance in colonial history.

**Separation
of Ontario and
Quebec.**

**Modified
self-govern-
ment.**

The constitution of 1791 was, however, the first step towards colonial autonomy. It preserved the rights previously conceded to the French population and placed the English settlers in an equal position with them. Upper Canada could thus protect its Protestant worship, support its clergy, and adopt a system of freehold land-tenure; and this it proceeded to do. Lower Canada retained, with its French language, its own civil and religious institutions. England in this way recognized that Canada contained two nations, which could not as yet amalgamate; and devised a constitution to meet their distinctive needs.

For twenty years Canadian progress was not interrupted by political troubles. Ontario attracted settlers both from the United States and from Great Britain. But Quebec was, until 1850, the more populous of the two provinces. The attack upon Canada by the United States in 1812 was a war of aggression of which

**Growth of
Ontario.**

the English Orders in Council (1807) were the nominal pretext, but a desire to humiliate England the real motive. The New England States, and instructed opinion throughout the Republic generally, were, indeed, opposed to this diversion on behalf of Napoleon, which present day historians in the United States find it hard to palliate. It cannot be denied that the immediate impulse to the war lay in the exigencies of the Presidential election of 1812. Its undisguised object was the conquest of Canada: its result, the strengthening of the tie which bound the colony to Great Britain. For the French-Canadians had no sympathy either with the Revolution of 1789 or with the republican principles of their neighbours. They joined, therefore, with energy in the defence of the colony. The brunt of the invasion, however, fell upon Upper Canada, where the old Loyalists offered a vigorous and triumphant resistance. The war ended in 1814, leaving behind it a heritage of embittered feeling which has lasted till our own day.

Notwithstanding, Canada grew apace. After the great war emigration was encouraged, and in the social and economic distress that followed the Peace of 1815 Canada was the chief colonial outlet for the overflow of British population. The West was gradually opened up by aid of steam communications on the great waterways. This was the period of important advances in engineering and other public works, such as the Ottawa canal, of the founding of new industrial centres in the upper Province, of the first settlements in Manitoba, and of significant economic and educational reforms.

During this period Canada entered upon another era of agitation which reached a climax in 1837. The causes were partly racial, partly constitutional. With the rapid increase of the English element in the population, Lower Canada became proportionately tenacious of its racial privileges. Discontent, therefore, in Quebec,

The American War of 1812.

Expansion of Canada, 1810-1840.

Renewed discontent, 1820-1840.

which remained overwhelmingly French, turned upon the question of nationality, which engendered friction between the English official element and the popular Assembly. In Upper Canada, the Clergy Reserves—extensive lands allotted to the support of the Anglican Church—were the prominent grievance. But in both Provinces the measure of self-government accorded by the Constitution of 1791 had been for some years felt to be inadequate. As we saw, the nominees of the Governor constituted the Ministry and the Upper Chamber, and thus precluded direct popular control over the administration. The Assembly could vote money but could not control its expenditure, whilst a group of Loyalist families contrived to monopolise official posts. The influence of the Reform agitation in England and the remarkable growth of the United States under republican institutions stimulated discontent in Upper Canada. In 1837 a movement in favour of independence was raised by a Scotchman named Mackenzie, whilst in Lower Canada a revolt was openly led by Papineau, by whose name the rising is generally known. However, in the absence of a powerful rallying cry the rebellion was half-hearted, and, though suggestive of the American revolt of 1776, it gained very different support. The Home Government despatched Lord Durham, a prominent Liberal statesman, with full powers as High Commissioner to examine into the affairs of the Colony. His celebrated Report, a most significant document in English colonial history, pointed to racial feeling and constitutional grievances as the twin sources of discontent. The remedies suggested were a full measure of responsible government, elective bodies for local affairs, an intercolonial railway, and, pending a broad Federation of the whole group of territories, the immediate union of the two Provinces under one Legislature. Based upon this Report the Reunion Act was passed in 1840,

Racial.

Constitutional.

Rebellion,
1837.Lord Durham,
High Commissioner,
1837.

and under it Canada won, though not at once, that full measure of 'responsible government' which is the characteristic feature of the greater English colonies of to-day. It is possibly the most important service which Canada has rendered to the Empire that from her constitutional struggles arose that form of complete self-government under which the unity of the Empire is reconciled with the practical independence of its daughter communities.

**The Reunion
Act, 1840.**

**Responsible
Government.**

From this time Canada was left to work out for itself its political balance of power. Under Lord Elgin (1847—1854) the question of the Church lands was solved by their surrender to local authorities for educational and social uses. Henceforward the Church of England held the status of a voluntary Church, and the question of State-endowment of one Communion was by the precedent of Canada settled in the negative for all the self-governing colonies. The operation of the Reunion Act proved an admirable and necessary training in mutual toleration and in united effort for the well-being of the colony. At the same time the growth of the neighbouring colonies on the East and the West pointed to federation on a broad scale as the ultimate solution of divergences due to race, history, interests and geographical position. The outcome of

**The working
of the New
Constitution,
1840—1867.**

**The B. N.
America Act,
1867.**

this conviction was the British North America Act of 1867, by which Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia were formed into one Dominion. To this Federation were subsequently admitted Rupert's Land and Manitoba in 1870, British Columbia in 1871, and all other territories of British North America, excepting Newfoundland, in 1880.

**The
Canadian
Dominion.**

The constitution of the 'Dominion of Canada' provides for a Federal Parliament, consisting of the *Queen*, through her representative, the Governor-General, the *Senate*, whose members are appointed by

the Governor-General for life, and the *House of Commons* elected by the provinces. The Federal government is exercised by a Cabinet, chosen by the Governor-General, just as the British Ministry is selected by the Sovereign. Under the cognisance of the Parliament and its Administration come the questions common to all the Provinces—Public Debt, Taxation, Trade, Defence, Currency, Postal Service, Native (Indian) Affairs, which fall under the control of permanent Departments of State as in England. Each Province retains the administration of affairs not specifically assigned to the Dominion Parliament, and thus has its own Parliament, Ministry and permanent officials. The adjustment of the relations of the separate provincial administrations, which are not uniform, with the Federal government involved at the outset careful handling, as was proved by the rebellion of Louis Riel (1870) on the incorporation of Manitoba. Just as Canada led the way in formulating the principle of responsible governments, so too the Australian and South African groups may, from the example of the Dominion, apply the federal idea to the solution of their own special problems.

The Federal
Parliament.

The Provin-
cial Parlia-
ments.

The territorial growth of the British American colonies subsequent to 1783 requires notice here. Canada was presumed to extend to the region of the great lakes and the longitude of the Mississippi. What lay to the west of such an imaginary line was out of colonial ken. The southern boundary of Canada was, except where it impinged upon the state of Maine, determined without difficulty at the peace of 1783. The frontier of Maine was settled in 1842, and by the treaties of 1818 and 1846, the 49th parallel of latitude was accepted as the boundary from Lake Superior to the Pacific. On the north-west of Canada lay the vaguely defined territory of the Hudson Bay charter,

The growth
of Canadian
Settlement.

The boun-
dary to the
South.

Hudson's
Bay Territory.

destitute of settlement, but growing in importance as a fur-hunting reserve.

The work of exploration, checked by the English conquest of Canada, was resumed by the Scotch settler Mackenzie, who, in 1798, started from Lake Athabasca and pursued the course of the great river which bears his name to its outlet in the Polar Sea. The same intrepid pioneer three years later ascended the Peace River to its source in the Rocky Mountains, crossed the range, and descended to the Pacific. That hitherto unknown coast-region had been observed in 1790 by Lieutenant Vancouver, in an endeavour to find the North-West Passage from the side of Behring's Straits. The early decades of the 19th century were marked by much activity in the exploration of the Polar Sea and the coast-line west of Hudson's Bay. But, heroic as were the exertions of Parry, Franklin, and their fellow-discoverers, they had little influence upon Canadian settlement.

The origin of the Hudson's Bay Company has been already related (p. 161). Like other exclusive trading bodies it had aroused the opposition of adventurers who found themselves shut out from the area of its operations. The North-West Company of Montreal, its most powerful rival, carried on a like industry in the region stretching westwards to the Rocky Mountains. Within the whole of this area no settlement existed until, in 1812, a Highland colony was led by Earl Selkirk to the Red River, the germ of the later province of Manitoba. This early attempt, however, proved a failure. In 1838 a monopoly of all the lands lying north of the United States and west of Lake Winnipeg was acquired by the Hudson's Bay Company, which now absorbed its Montreal competitor. But the

Exploration:
the North-
West, 1789.

The Pacific
Coast, 1790—2.

The Polar Sea.

The
Hudson's Bay
Co. and
Canada.

Manitoba
opened up,
1812.

Hudson's
Bay Co.
absorbs the
whole of the
West, 1838.

gold discoveries of 1858 led to the incorporation of British Columbia as a separate colony, to which Vancouver Island was added in 1866. The resumption of the entire territorial rights of the Hudson's Bay Company was now only a question of time. The directors still opposed colonization, desiring to keep their possession as a vast fur-trading preserve. But the energy of the Canadians, backed by a steady stream of new settlers, was not to be repressed by a barrier erected by a London trading company.

British
Columbia
incorporated,
1858.

In 1869 the landed privileges of the Proprietors were purchased by Canada, and the outlines of provincial organisation were sketched out. The N.-W. Territories now form an integral part of the Canadian Dominion. The Canadian-Pacific Railway, completed in 1886, has been an essential factor in the development of this vast group of British colonies.

The
Dominion
acquires the
West, 1869.

CHAPTER IX.

AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND.

1788—1870.

THE legend of a great southern continent, *Terra Australis*, such as we see it marked on Frobisher's map, recurs frequently in the geographical records of the 16th century. But China, the Indies, and the North-West Passage were too attractive to European navigators to leave room for attempts at systematic exploration of that mysterious region. In the first years of the 17th century Luis De Torres, a Spanish pilot, discovered the Strait called after his name, and sighted, if he did not touch, its southern shore at the point of Cape York. The Dutch now took up the work of discovery. Possibly in 1606, certainly in 1616, the North-western coast of Australia was made by vessels sailing east from Bantam; and not a few Dutch names on that side of the island seem to date from the first 40 years of the 17th century.

In 1642 a Dutch commander, Abel Tasman, explored the coast-line of the south-eastern region, which he called, after the governor of the Indies, Van Dieman's Land, though its island character was not known for another 150 years. He then discovered New Zealand, the Friendly Islands, and other Pacific groups. By right of discovery the Dutch called the great island New Holland, but they made no attempt at occupation. The first

Early
voyages to
Australian
Seas.

Tasman,
1642.

English adventurer who devoted himself to Southern discovery was William Dampier, a reckless, semi-piratical sailor, who visited New Holland in 1689, and again, in the employ of the Admiralty, 10 years later. But the first organised exploration of the South Pacific was the work of Captain Cook, who, between 1768—1779, made three voyages into Australian waters. In 1769 he determined the general outline of New Zealand; passing thence to the eastern coast of New Holland, he surveyed it from the neighbourhood of Sydney harbour northwards to Torres Strait. There in 1770 he proclaimed the British ownership of the Eastern sea-board under the title of New South Wales. His later voyages added materially to English knowledge of the region so far as it was immediately accessible to navigators.

Dampier,
1689.

Cook, 1768
—79.

The Aborigines of Australia were found to be a barbarous race with no apparent capacity for civilisation. They seem to have been thinly scattered over the continent at the time of its first exploration.

The
Aborigines.

Estimated now at less than 100,000 in number, they are steadily disappearing before the white man. Unlike the natives of North America or South Africa, they have not counted as a factor in the development of the colony. The Maoris of New Zealand, on the other hand, are a vigorous race, of fine physique and warlike instinct. The first European visitors found them organised in communities, and possessed of a knowledge of agriculture and navigation. They inhabit mainly the North Island, and in the history of New Zealand have been a factor of decisive importance.

The close of the American war in 1783 had left behind it a feeling of despair upon the subject of the colonial Empire. It was almost forgotten that England had other possessions besides those just lost, and there was certainly no popular interest in adding to them. Captain Cook's discoveries might probably have been

Transporta-
tion.

ignored by English statesmen, and New Holland might have passed through a stage—a short one—of French ownership, but for one pressing necessity. The American colonies down to 1776 had, as part of their labour system, absorbed an annual supply of convicts. By 1783 the closing of this convenient resource began to be seriously felt by the English Government. In that year a project to despatch an expedition of settlement to New South Wales, in order to make good Cook's proclamation by actual occupation, was met by the Secretary of State with the proposal to unite with it the scheme of a convict station. It was not until May, 1787, that the first expedition for the colonisation of Australia set sail, Captain Phillip, R.N., was in command, as Governor, of 750 convicts, under the guard of a detachment of marines, which latter with their wives constituted the nucleus of free settlers. In January, 1788, Botany Bay was reached and the colonisation of Australia begun. Governor Phillip, however, promptly abandoned his first landing-place for one more suitable in the magnificent harbour a few miles to the north, which Cook had called Port Jackson. The site chosen for the settlement took its name from the Secretary of State, Lord Sydney. Six days after Captain Phillip's arrival, two vessels of the French navy appeared off the coast in course of a voyage of discovery in the South Seas. England, perhaps, acquired Australia by one week's priority.

Convicts at
Sydney Cove,
1788.

Governor Phillip was instructed to administer the territory of New South Wales, defined as including the Eastern coast of Australia from Cape York, in the north, to the extreme point of Tasmania in the south; its western boundary being constituted by the 135th degree of east longitude. The Pacific Islands lying within the extreme latitudes of the colony were to be included. Meantime effective settlement was limited to a few acres on the shore of Sydney Cove, and Norfolk and Lord Howe Islands occupied by Phillip in 1788.

New South
Wales in 1790.

The convict settlement in Sydney Cove was extended by the occupation of rich agricultural lands 15 and 20 miles distant from Port Jackson. In this way the colony, within two or three years, was able to supply its own means of subsistence. Prisoners on expiry of their sentence were released from forced labour and received grants of land. Free settlers, mainly discharged soldiers already in the colony, formed a more stable population. Sheep and cattle were successfully acclimatised; and excesses of the ex-convicts and occasional affrays with the blacks, were, under the firm and sagacious rule of Phillip, the only drawbacks to the orderly progress of the new colony.

For the first 30 years of its existence New South Wales was administered by military rule. The chief function of the Governor, during this period, was the control of the convict population. The Government held itself responsible for the entire maintenance of the colony, in which the free settlers continued for some years to be a subordinate element. The first administrator who took a wider view of the destiny of New South Wales was Governor Macquarrie (1815—1821). During his term of office emigration was liberally assisted from the proceeds of land-sales. Large areas of land on the west side of the Blue Mountains, "Bathurst Plains," were opened up to pastoral settlement, carrying a quarter of a million of sheep. The population at his departure was upwards of 30,000, and all the elements of a vigorous progressive colony were secured. The free emigrants had now become strong enough to determine the character and development of the enterprise. The industrial crisis in England stimulated emigration, though Australia naturally benefited less by the movement than did the more accessible colony of Canada. The criminal taint, too, proved no doubt a deterrent. It was evidence of the reviving faith in the colonial function of England that the mother country was willing to expend a sum

Period of
military rule,
1788—1823.

Increase of
free settlers.

amounting from first to last to not less than £10,000,000 sterling, in bringing the colony to the self-supporting stage, which was not reached during this period. Coal had been discovered at Newcastle in workable quantity. Convicts in Tasmania, 1804. Tasmania had been settled, at Hobart and Launceston; Moreton Bay, the nucleus of Queensland, explored; and the natural advantages of Port Phillip, the harbour of the later city of Melbourne, had been discovered. A supreme Court, determining civil cases, began to sit in 1817, under the presidency of a judge of distinction, appointed by the Crown.

The second period in the development of New South Wales extends from the departure of Governor Macquarrie to the year 1842. The 20 years comprised within these limits are marked by those remarkable journeys of discovery which revealed the main characteristics of the eastern half of the Australian continent. They include, also, the beginnings of self-government in the colony, the agitation of the question of the colonial lands, and the cessation of the convict system. The progress of settlement in New South Wales was not caused, as in New England or Ontario, by steady pressure of population upon the wilderness. The ranges of hills which, from the western border of Victoria to northern Queensland, skirt the coast of Australia, served as a barrier to the earlier settlers, which could

Pastoral districts opened out, 1813—1827.

only be surmounted at certain points. The discovery of these gaps in the ridge led at once to the opening up of vast areas of open down on the western slope of the water-shed where were the gathering-grounds of the upper tributaries of the Murray. Such downs were the Bathurst Plains, to which a track was made through the Blue Mountains in 1815, the Liverpool Plains, some 200 miles to the north, the Darling Downs at the back of Brisbane, whilst farther south, on the upper waters of the Murrumbidgee, are the Monaroo Downs.

The discovery of these pastoral districts falls between the years 1813 and 1827. It was followed, very shortly after, by the more venturesome explorations of Sturt, who, between the years 1826—31, followed the course of the Murray and its great tributaries the Darling and the Murrumbidgee. By this time (1831) the great river system of Southern Australia had been fairly grasped. The mountain-ridge itself was mapped by Sir Thomas Mitchell, who was the first to realise the natural features and marvellous promise of the district soon to be incorporated as Victoria. In 1840 Gipps Land, the south-eastern plain-land of the continent, was traversed, and, the most remarkable venture hitherto accomplished, a cross-country route from Sydney to St Vincent Gulf was effected by that intrepid pioneer of Australian discovery, Edward John Eyre.

Explorations
of river system
of the Murray,
1826—31.

Victoria
traversed.

The contrasts presented by the pioneer work of Australian settlement and that of New England or South Africa in their early days are obvious. The Australian explorer had not to reckon with either European rivals or vigorous native tribes. The natural features—once the comparatively narrow forest-belt was passed—offered no obstacle. The slow, laborious work of clearing the primitive wood-land, characteristic of Virginia or Massachusetts, was unknown. The one great hindrance to discovery and to settlement alike has been the recurrent drought.

Character-
istics of Aus-
tralian expan-
sion.

It was inevitable that with the increase of population and under the prospect of indefinite expansion of the colony its purely military administration would not long suffice. The Governor, by enactment of 1823, was instructed to associate with himself a consultative Council. At first this body consisted only of executive officials who were appointed by the Secretary of State in London. Non-official members were

N. S. W.
under Gover-
nor and
Advisory
Council, 1823—
1842.

added by degrees, and after 1830 the Legislative Council began to exercise an important influence upon colonial affairs. In matters of executive administration the Governor retained much of his autocratic authority down to the abolition of transportation (1840). There was thus no elective element in the Administration during this period, but colonial opinion was consulted through the non-official members of the Council. New South Wales, in fact, was, up to 1842, a Crown colony in a strict sense. The same type of administration was adopted in Tasmania, in Western Australia, and in South Australia.

These three colonies entered upon their existence during this period. Tasmania had been occupied in a separate Colony, 1812. the first instance by detachments of convicts, who were a source for some years of great anxiety. Free settlers began to arrive about 1810. Ten years later the island had an English population of 6,000. Sheep had been successfully acclimatised and wool was already exported. But relapsed convicts took to bush-ranging, provoked fierce native outbreaks and hindered settlement. Under the strong rule of Governor Arthur order was rigorously maintained, aborigines were deported, and large areas of land taken up by English companies. The convict system first provoked opposition in Tasmania, where its evil effects were most grievously felt. But the desired end was not obtained until 1853, by which time Tasmania was ready to receive its full status of a self-governing colony.

If we disregard two abortive attempts to establish a convict settlement, Victoria dates from the years 1834-5. In these years independent settlements were made, one in Port Phillip Bay, on the site of Melbourne, another 200 miles farther west. The Government of New South Wales administered them by officials sent from Sydney in 1836; in the following year Melbourne was laid out as the chief port of the colony, and in 1842 received its

municipal charter. The colony of Port Phillip, as it was still called, attracted settlers, from Sydney and from home, by virtue of its fine pastoral areas, Gipps Land being at once recognised as the richest agricultural region yet discovered in Australia. Already by 1842 the colonists of Port Phillip were agitating for incorporation as a separate colony.

Western Australia was the goal of a direct expedition from London in 1829. Settlements were made upon the Swan River at Perth and Freemantle. The original enthusiasm, stimulated by the advocates of systematic colonisation at home, gave way, in the usual course, to a period of depression, but there was much good material in the settlement; wheat-growing and sheep-farming were the two staple occupations, for as yet the special wealth of the colony—its hard timber and its gold deposits—were unavailable to enterprise. By 1840 the population, entirely of free settlers, amounted to 2,300, and the progress of the settlement, though slow, was sound and promising. The administration was that of Governor and Council as developed in New South Wales.

The settlement of South Australia was another instance of a colony directly initiated from England under the impulse of the emigration movement of Gibbon Wakefield. The intention of the promoters was to establish a self-contained community administered by the Crown, from the outset dissociated from the convict system. Organised in terms of a statute of 1834, the first expedition reached St Vincent Gulf in 1836. Adelaide was chosen as the place of settlement. Captain Grey was Governor. Cattle were found to thrive; settlers swarmed to the new colony, and surveys disclosed large tracts of good agricultural soil. By 1842 the colony was already assured of success, the cultivated land reaching 20,000 acres, and the population 17,000 souls. The famous copper deposits had just been discovered. The Legislative Council, of eight members, which

W. Australia,
1829.

S. Australia,
1834.

advised the Governor, was avowedly a temporary device pending the grant of an elective constitution.

Queensland had a dual origin. In 1826 Brisbane, on Moreton Bay, was built as a convict station. Free settlement was forbidden, and Moreton Bay was thus closed to colonisation. But the true history of Queensland dates from the gradual advance of the great sheep-farmers or 'squatters' along the western slope of the mountain range. When the penal settlement at Brisbane was abandoned in 1840, the squatters of Darling Downs found their natural access to the sea at Moreton Bay, and from this time we may date the beginnings of the squatter community which ultimately became the colony of Queensland.

The example of Canada, which substantially acquired a self-governing constitution in 1841, could not be without its effect upon Australian politics. England was now committed to a policy of colonial self-government. As regards Australia, it was evident that free political life was not consistent with the use of the colonies as convict settlements. The abolition of transportation to New South Wales (1840), to Queensland (1849), and to Tasmania (1853), was a necessary preliminary to the grant of responsible government. In 1842 the elective element was first introduced into New South Wales by the creation of an enlarged Legislative Council, two-thirds of which was to be directly elected by the colonists. Although a very modest instalment, it gave the politicians of the colony a schooling in a modified form of representative government, without throwing upon them the full responsibilities of a Cabinet system. For the present, customs revenue and the proceeds of the sale of lands were reserved from local control. The full grant of responsible government was due, not to internal agitation, as in the case of Canada, but to the deliberate conviction shared by English, not less than by colonial, politicians of all parties, that only thus could the

Queensland,
1826.

Australian
Self-govern-
ment, 1842—
1855.

needs of the prosperous English communities of Australia be adequately met. It must, then, be borne in mind that the peculiarly British method of reconciling colonial loyalty with colonial elasticity was the product of the experiences of years 1837—53 in the Canadian and Australian communities. It is of not less importance to note that this concession of full autonomy was not made into a party question by statesmen at home.

The immediate impulse to the next stage of Australian development was afforded by the gold discoveries of 1849—1851. The population of Victoria in 1850 was just 70,000, five years later it had passed 300,000. In New South Wales Bathurst was the mining-centre. Such was the excitement that public officials threw up their posts, crews deserted, and the colonies of Tasmania and South Australia were abandoned by their male population, who swarmed to "El Dorado" of their more fortunate neighbours. Victoria had entered upon her separate existence as a colony in 1851, and the administration was unable to cope with the problem so suddenly presented to it. Mining licences and land tenures led to disputes, riots, and bloodshed. The necessity for new administrative institutions was urgent. Parliament at home had given authority to the colonies to submit for approval of the Crown drafts of such Constitutions as they might desire to establish. Before the end of 1854 the four organised colonies, New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania, were empowered to put the new institutions into force. The constitutions thus prepared varied somewhat in detail, but were alike in creating an Upper and a Lower Chamber, in establishing a broad franchise, and in adopting a method of executive government intended to be identical with that of the English Cabinet. Entire control of customs duties, land revenue, and of mining rights, was vested in the Legislature. The free trade

The Gold
discoveries,
1849—51.

Victoria, a
separate
colony, 1851.

Responsible
Government
established,
1854.

measures of 1846 had rendered interference of the mother country with colonial commerce out of the question; it was enough to secure by statute that no exceptional or 'differential' duties should be levied in colonial ports upon imports from home.

Since the period of constitutional reforms the most important events in the history of Australia have been the separation of Queensland from New South Wales in 1859, with the coincident gift of responsible rule, and the much later attainment of colonial manhood by West Australia. The latter colony, cut off from its sister communities by a broad belt of desert, pursued a line of development of its own. In 1849, when other colonies were shaking themselves free from the convict system, the Swan River squatters invited the Home Government to supply their estates with criminal labour. But there, too, transportation was entirely abolished in 1865; a Representative Council was granted in 1870, but responsible government of the full type was not attained until 1890.

Under self-governing institutions Australia continued her career of rapid and somewhat uneventful progress. The type of her civilisation was practically fixed 40 years ago. Her three industries, pastoral, agricultural, and mining, were already firmly established. Her population remains more purely British than that of any other English possession. Her freedom from external dangers and the vastness of her undeveloped territories have encouraged an optimism and self-confidence which have more than once brought her perilously near to disaster.

NEW ZEALAND.

The history of New Zealand is throughout independent of that of Australia. The beginnings of an English connexion in the islands may be said to date from the year 1817, when the Governor of New South Wales was authorised to exercise

police jurisdiction over the casual and disorderly settlers—Pacific sailors and traders—who frequented the bays of the North Island. Sovereignty, however, was expressly disclaimed. During the years 1825—35, schemes of colonisation were much debated in England, and New Zealand seemed to offer favourable prospects of settlement. Reluctance to extend Imperial responsibilities had weakened with the success of Australia, and in 1839 New Zealand was annexed by proclamation of the Governor of New South Wales. Captain Hobson, appointed to take charge of the new colony, with great ability won over the Maoris of the North Island to acknowledge British sovereignty and protection in the Treaty of Waitangi (1840). This treaty between Great Britain and the Maori people gives the clue to the history of New Zealand to the close of the period included in this chapter. Like those of South Africa, but unlike those of Canada or Australia, the aborigines of New Zealand have played a conspicuous part in determining the fortunes of the colony; and, as in the case of the Kaffir tribes, so with the Maoris of North Island, the problem of their future cannot be regarded as finally solved. The relations of settler to native in New Zealand throw an instructive light upon the difficulty which has beset in the past, as it continues still to do, the advance of civilisation upon savage or undeveloped peoples.

New Zealand
proclaimed
a colony, 1839.

Treaty of
Waitangi,
1840.

The treaty of Waitangi contained two essential stipulations: the first, the acceptance by the Maoris of the sovereignty and protection of the Queen; the second, the guarantee by the Governor of the rights of ownership of the natives in their lands. This guarantee was further secured by the agreement that no individual chief had the right to convey the lands of his tribe, and that no individual settler or land-company should be permitted to acquire native lands. The tribe, therefore, alone could sell, the Governor, as representing the Queen, alone could buy,

Its import-
ance.

territory occupied by the Maoris. This last provision was of crucial importance. Promiscuous land grabbing had been a fertile source of Indian enmity in the American colonies, and the English Government in Canada had claimed the right of pre-emption to avoid similar disasters. The treaty of Waitangi, moreover, in admitting the title of the Maoris to the soil, gave them a recognised place within the subject populations of the Empire.

Settlement was first begun upon North Island, where Auckland was built in 1840, and remained the capital of administration until it was superseded by Wellington in 1865. In the same year, New Zealand was formally separated from New South Wales and erected into a colony with the simple machinery of government in force in Australia at the time. The Governor, advised by a Council nominated by himself, was the supreme authority. Systematic emigration was promoted from home by the New Zealand Company, a joint stock corporation, with large capital and influential support, and, unfortunately, powerful enough to modify the policy laid down by the Imperial governors on the spot. Large areas of land in North Island, where the Maoris were mainly concentrated, were acquired by the Company's agents from various local chiefs in 1841, in defiance of the treaty of Waitangi. The first settlement in Middle Island (often called South Island on the maps), Nelson, was founded in 1841 by agents of the Company, who proceeded to survey lands on the Wairau River farther south, in spite of native protests that the soil had been illegally alienated. Blood was shed, and but for the firmness of the acting Governor, who upheld the native contention, the English settlers in the island would have been driven into the sea. But the colonists, now increasing in numbers and keen to acquire large pastoral areas for wool-growing, forced the Executive to infringe treaty

Settlers on
North Island,
1840.

Early ad-
ministration.

The New
Zealand Com-
pany.

Troubles in
Middle Island,
1841—4.

rights and so encouraged native unrest. The Maoris were well organised and vigorous, numbering probably nearly 100,000, as against 5,000 settlers. With little more provocation they would have forced the British into a desperate fight for existence.

Fortunately at this crisis Captain George Grey was brought from the scene of his success in South Australia to take control of New Zealand. To this remarkable ruler, who holds a foremost place amongst the makers of the Empire, New Zealand now owed its security. The Maoris quickly learned to rely on his friendship, his integrity, and his firmness. He promptly took his stand upon the treaty of Waitangi. He forbade, under heavy penalty, the irregular acquisition of lands, appointed a native police, gave guarantees for justice to native delinquents, and then, with the good will of the leading chiefs, repressed Maori agitation with a strong hand. The strength of the new Governor was next shewn in his attitude to the Home Government. A Constitution for the colony was passed through Parliament in 1846 without consultation with the Governor; when it reached him, in 1847, he declined to put it into force. So convincing were the protests which he sent to the Colonial Office that a year later the entire Constitution was repealed on the motion of its own authors.

Governorship
of Sir G. Grey,
1845.

Middle Island was now methodically colonised. Otago, in the extreme south, was founded by Scotchmen; Canterbury, adjoining it, was organised as a Church of England settlement. The New Zealand Company, the constant hindrance to uniform policy in the Islands, was dissolved in 1851, and the way made for a sound working Constitution suited to the local conditions. This was introduced in 1852. The white settlers now amounted to 27,000, the Maoris to 56,000, of whom 50,000 inhabited North Island. No convict had ever been transported to the colony.

Progress of
the Colony,
1845—52.

The Constitution providing responsible government was in

the main Sir George Grey's scheme. Parliament included the Governor, an Upper Chamber nominated by the Governor, and a House of Representatives. Elective Provincial Councils for local government were set up. Crown lands, customs and trade regulations were, as in Australia, entrusted to the Legislature. Local government, however, in New Zealand, as in other colonies, refused to accommodate itself to organisation from England, and the provincial councils were gradually superseded by more workable local units. Maori rights under the old treaty were secured by reserving the Native department and Land regulations from colonial control. The Constitution of 1852 has not been seriously modified. It may be noted that the House of Representatives includes four native members for Maori constituencies.

Meantime the Maori question had not been settled. In 1860 the natives still held the greater part of North Island; the English settlements being limited to certain coast districts. A general anti-European movement now began to gather force. The trouble, which originated in land encroachments, merged about this time into a struggle for independence. War broke out in 1860, and the security of the English in North Island was gravely threatened. In the following year Sir George Grey, summoned in haste from the Cape, arrived as Governor for a second term. The war, which seemed to have abated under his influence, suddenly broke out again, the guerilla tactics of the Maoris rendering the task difficult for European troops. Native affairs had been, at the Governor's instance, entrusted in 1862 to the Colonial Government. The colonists were, as they have generally been, less tender to native interests than the Home Administration. A policy of confiscation and military repression was resolved upon, increasing the bitterness of the struggle. Vital differences of opinion divided the Governor and his

Responsible
Government,
1852.

The Maori
Wars, 1860—
1871.

Sir George
Grey returns,
1861.

cabinet, and colonial authorities were at issue with Ministers in England. But the war, once seriously taken in hand, could have but one ending. By 1871 the natives were forced, though sullenly, to admit their defeat, and the islands have since that time had peace. With the solution of the Maori difficulty New Zealand entered upon a career of peaceful development. No colony presents characteristics of climate and of society so nearly akin to those of the Mother country. New Zealand after 1870 has become recognised as the most homelike of British Imperial possessions. It has in later days acquired a special interest as the field of political and economic experiments.

CHAPTER X.

BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA.

1795—1881.

BEFORE entering upon the history of the European communities of South Africa its geographical features may be shortly recalled. Africa, south of the Zambesi, is a great plateau, edged on three sides by mountain ranges, between which and the sea lies a comparatively narrow coast-belt. From the great river-estuary southwards to Natal this fringe of land is in places swampy, is generally malarious, and is unsuited to European settlement. Within the limits of Cape Colony, however, and in the greater part of Natal, it is healthy, and for the most part fertile. The mountain region varies in breadth; facing southwards three well-marked parallel chains run from east to west; behind Natal, the summits reach a height of 10,000 feet.

Physical
features.

Within this mountain belt is enclosed the South African plateau, stretching northwards to the Zambesi and beyond it. Thus Kimberley stands 4,000 feet above the sea, Johannesburg and Buluwayo 5,700 feet. The rainfall decreases steadily with the distance from the east coast, the western half of the plateau receiving barely 10 inches of rain per annum. As a consequence there are no permanent rivers of importance in South Africa. The atmosphere of the plateau is of peculiar and healthful dryness. There are no forests of giant trees; the

surface is covered by stretches of grass land and scrubby 'bush,' easily traversed by settlers, and yielding but a poor return to sheep-farmer or grazier. The features of the country, once clearly grasped, will explain the nature of its colonisation.

At the close of the 18th century, when the English connection with South Africa begins, the native population of the Cape region fell into three well-defined groups: the Bushmen, the Hottentots, and the Kaffirs. The Bushmen, the surviving primitive aborigines of the continent, and already dying out, stood lowest in the scale. The Hottentot, of uncertain origin, was now hard pressed by the Kaffir tribes, a vigorous and prolific race, who were steadily forcing their way down from the plateaux of Central Africa, driving before them the earlier and weaker forerunners of their own blood. The relations of the white men with the Hottentot and Kaffir have been only second to the influence of geographical conditions in determining the history of European South Africa.

The Native Races.

This history began with the decision of the Dutch East India Company to establish at the Cape of Good Hope a permanent port of call for their Indian fleets, just as the French were attempting in vain to do in Madagascar, and as England was doing at St Helena. In 1652 three vessels landed a garrison and officials in False Bay, and a settlement was founded. Collisions with the Hottentots, and dread of rival European occupation, compelled the enlargement and fortification of the primitive post. Immigrants, however, were few. Holland had little overplus of population, and the national instinct went out rather to trade than to the uncertain toil of plantation. Towards the end of the century certain companies of Huguenots, expelled by Louis XIV, brought to the Cape, as they did to England and to America, new industries, such as vine-culture, and an admirable strain of citizenship. But the Dutch jealously distributed the new-comers over the colony: their children were

The Dutch at the Cape, 1652.

forced to learn Dutch. The French were thus soon lost in the dominant race. During the 18th century the colonists began to explore the region lying beyond the mountain range. They found a country unsuited to cultivation, but offering free scope for grazing. The Hottentot population was thinly scattered, and harmless; there were no natural barriers of forest or river, and the grass, though poor, covered vast areas. The Dutch

farmer, or 'Boer,' had little in common with the
The Boer. official class at Cape Town, and under the

influence of the open veldt (or grass plain) he developed a taste for solitary and semi-nomadic life which he still retains. Ignorant and backward to begin with, this existence kept him permanently out of touch with civilisation. The Cape Boer remained Dutch indeed, but Dutch of the early 17th century. Settlers of his race have never been tender in their dealings with native peoples. The Dutch promptly introduced slaves from the Gold Coast and from their Malayan islands, and proved hard masters to the Hottentots, whom they reduced, where they could, to a state of serfdom.

As the Boers became more widely scattered the boundaries of the colony were enlarged. The Great Fish
The limits of the Colony. River, 450 miles east of Cape Town, and the innermost hill-range, the Sneeuwberg mountains, were the frontiers in 1780. By this advance the Boers were brought up to the edge of Kaffir territory. There was fighting in 1781, and the Fish River was accepted on both sides as the dividing line of the white race and the Kaffir. But ten years later the black man had again encroached, and there was no effective boundary.

Meantime various causes—bankrupt finance, burgher discontent, revolution at home—had brought the
Decline of the Dutch E. I. Company. administration of the Dutch Company, which still ruled the colony, into chaos. The governors of British India were suspicious of renewed activity of the French in the East. In 1795 France converted Holland into

the Batavian Republic. To secure the Cape against French naval designs, the British Government resolved to occupy it in force. This was effected, with the authority of the Stadtholder, in 1795; Cape Town surrendering after slight resistance.

First British
Occupation,
1795—1803.

For seven years Cape Town was governed as a military dependency, whose sole importance to Britain lay in its strategic relation to India. At the Peace of Amiens it once more reverted to Holland. With the renewal of the war the Cape was again occupied by a British force, and possession was formally confirmed by the Treaty of 1814. The sum of £6,000,000 was paid to the Dutch Government at home as compensation, and important concessions made to it in the Far East.

Definitive
Conquest, 1806.

The population of the colony in 1806 consisted of 26,000 Europeans, almost entirely of Dutch origin, who owned 30,000 African and Malay slaves, and about 17,000 Hottentots. The principal industries were, in the district of Cape Town, vine and fruit culture, and gardening; between the hill-range and the coast, corn growing and mixed farming; whilst cattle and sheep grazed the grass plateau and the higher valleys. The pioneers amongst the Boers were the grazier-farmers, who had 'trekked' away from civilisation till they reached the southern watershed of the Orange River, or were stopped by the advancing Kaffirs. Until the close of the Napoleonic War, British immigration, outside of Cape Town, was of the slightest. After 1817 the causes that affected emigration to Canada and Australia had their influence also on South

Character-
istics of Cape
Colony, 1806.

Immigration,
1819—1821.

Africa. Systematic 'colonisation' was organised at the instance of the Imperial Government, whose object was "not so much to send out to the Cape a number of isolated individuals, who should on landing be left to their own devices, as to despatch, in charge of responsible directors, parties of men or of families who should be associated together on the voyage and located

together after arrival" (Lucas). Parliament voted £50,000 for the scheme, and land-grants and advances of money were assured to settlers, who were landed at Algoa Bay in the eastern district of the colony. From this time, 1819—1821, this region of the colony has developed a distinctively British character, whilst the middle and western areas apart from Cape Town have in the main retained their Dutch affinities. The analogy of Ontario and Quebec, the British and French provinces of Canada, was thus in a certain degree reproduced. The effect of the English immigration was to prepare the way for the decline of slavery by the introduction of free labour, and, by bringing settlers of British race within reach of the Kaffir borderland, to unite both Dutch and British in the task of common defence. The prospects of a genuine amalgamation of the two European elements in South Africa were perhaps more encouraging during the first 20 years after the conquest of 1806 than they have ever been since.

The Cape being primarily a military station its government was at the outset naturally of a military type. Government, 1806—1833. The Governor was directly responsible to the Crown, and held supreme authority in the colony. But the local institutions of the Dutch were retained; their law, their language, slavery, and the methods by which they organised themselves for frontier defence. To the Dutch grazing farmer, living from 100 to 300 miles from Cape Town, the change of rulers made little difference.

We have seen that the first step towards colonial self-government has often been taken by the creation of an advisory Council formed of officials of the colony, such as the Commander of the troops, the Treasurer, the Secretary, the Surveyor of Lands, the acting Judge, and so on; and that later on to this Council were added leading colonists who held no official post. This now took place in the Cape between 1825—8. In 1833 the full status of a Crown Colony was reached by the appointment of two Councils: the Executive,

consisting of the Governor and principal officials; and the Legislative, which contained, in addition, an even proportion of colonists nominated by the Governor. The Governor obviously kept the chief influence in his own hands: but none the less he was now in direct touch with colonial opinion, and had to defend any new regulation before critics who could, and often did, complain of his action to the Secretary of State at home.

During this same period the Dutch methods of local government were abolished, and replaced by a new organisation of Commissioners and Resident Magistrates; and the Dutch language gave way to English in the local courts. Apart from this latter point the changes were no doubt an improvement, and were particularly to the advantage of the natives. But like many English reforms they were harshly enforced, and rode rough-shod over historic customs and prejudices. There was nothing conciliatory in the manner in which the unfamiliar institutions were imposed upon a conservative and tenacious race.

Dutch local
government
abolished, 1828.

There were, henceforward, various causes at work which tended to discontent among the Cape Boers. Like that of their fathers of the Spanish wars, their faith was a rigid Calvinism. To the Boers, as to the Scottish Covenanters, whose creed theirs much resembled, the Old Testament, rather than the New, was the guide in war and politics. The Dutch Boer regarded the Hottentot and the Kaffir as the Hebrew did the men of Canaan or of Amalek. The claim of the native to the rights of Christian morality was not admitted, and was certainly not acted upon. When, by the expansion of the colony, the Boer had to face the cunning and ferocity of the Zulu Kaffirs, he hardened his heart still more against the black man, and viewed him as his co-religionists viewed the human panthers of the Canadian forest. Further, the Dutch had, as we have seen, never shewn themselves sensitive on the subject

Gradual
alienation of
the Boers.

The Native
question.

of slavery. In South Africa, although the climate afforded none of the excuse that could be pleaded in the

Slavery.

West Indies or in Java, domestic slavery was a deep-rooted institution. An ordinance of the Governor in 1828 declared all free natives to have the rights of citizens, in respect of security of person and of property, to the disgust of the Dutch, who could not brook so appalling an equality. It was attributed by them to their arch-enemies, the Missionaries.

The influence of the Protestant Missionaries of South Africa, like that of the Jesuits in Canada, was not only a religious but a political force. On the point of creed, there was little or no antagonism between them and the Dutch Calvinist farmers. But long before the English occupation, Moravian pastors were bluntly told that native conversions would not be permitted; and outside missionary effort was steadily repressed. Within a year of the English conquest (1806), Moravians were being welcomed at Cape Town, and English and Scottish religious bodies were soon at work amongst the Hottentots. Now the missionary societies at home were at this time powerful in Parliament, where Wilberforce had just gained his first great victory in the abolition of the slave-trade. Complaints of ill-treatment of the natives, whether slave, serf, or free, by the Boers, were reported to Cape Town and thence to London. The Boers complained that their characters were traduced. An incident of 1815 remains still a bitter memory with the Boers: the arrest of a farmer for a cruel outrage to a native servant produced an outbreak, upon which five Dutch prisoners were hanged. The missionaries henceforward took up the native cause with vigour. No doubt there was much exaggeration, but the truth was bad enough, and the black men had no other spokesmen but the missionaries. As regards the border warfare with the Kaffirs, we must remember that the Boer not seldom lived for years with his wife and children exposed to hourly peril. He could look to no State protection. Isolated,

The Mission-
aries and the
Boers.

untouched by public opinion, believing himself called to drive back the heathen, he tended to become as fierce and as impatient of control as the primitive Hebrews, in whose footsteps he walked. On the other hand, the missionaries were in many cases unintelligent men, partisans rather than arbitrators, ignoring the exigencies of a life of peril, and always sure of a more favourable hearing than their opponents. For all that, they represented humanity; they educated, trained, and civilised, as well as preached. Amongst them, as readers of Livingstone's travels well know, were pioneers of the wilderness as fearless as the Boers themselves. The Government and public opinion in England generally accepted the missionary view of the Boer character.

The exasperation thus produced was intensified by the Act of 1834, under which slavery was abolished in all British colonies. The measure struck a Abolition of
Slavery, 1834. severe blow at the wealth and customary institutions of the Boers. The 'wrongfulness of slavery' was a phrase without meaning for the Dutch farmer, and the monetary compensation which reached him seemed, and probably was, inadequate. On the whole native question therefore the Boers were at issue with the better The Boers
and progress. thought of their age. Government, missionaries, and public opinion alike, were but the mouth-pieces of a stage of progress to which the Boers were unable to conform. The cleavage, therefore, between the two races was, in reality, unavoidable.

The colony was now entering upon the severe crisis of the Kaffir wars. The Zulus had in the early years of the century, under their great chief Tshaka, The Kaffir
Wars, 1811—
1878. been trained to fight in battalions and to adopt military tactics, which rendered them invincible in native warfare. Pressing downwards along the coast they cleared Natal (1830) of its Kaffir population, and brought about a general pressure of native tribes upon the limits of Cape Colony. An

offshoot of the Zulus were the Matabili, who in 1817 occupied the district north of the river Vaal. The Basutos, a race of mixed origin, and not less martial than the Zulus, made their home in the difficult mountain country between the present Orange Free State and Natal. The Bechuanas, a people of milder instincts, held the more arid territory west of the modern Transvaal. The Great Fish River was still (1834) the boundary between the white man and the Kaffir. But in that year the colony was invaded in force. The frontier districts settled by the English north of Algoa Bay were raided with fearful barbarity. Next year, however, the tide of savagery was hurled back, and the limit of European settlement carried forward 70 miles to the river Kei. The Governor of the colony, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, concluded with great wisdom an agreement, under which the Kaffirs were allowed to live as British subjects with their rights duly safeguarded by law. But the Home Government refused to ratify the policy which had received the united approval of Dutch and English settlers alike. The frontier was once more withdrawn to the Great Fish River and the fruits of the war thrown away. To the Dutch Boer the action of the English ministry was as the last straw. The Great Trek of 1836 was the immediate result.

The fundamental question confronting British rulers in South Africa was this:—Should it be the aim of the white man to fix an arbitrary line of division between his possessions and civilisation and those of the Kaffir: or should it be to bring about, under the strong protective arm of the British Empire, such a fusion as would admit of the two races living side by side? The former method has generally ended in the extinction of the weaker race; the latter, though full of difficulty, is the method of true Imperialism.

But the colonial authorities at home, reflecting perhaps

Reversal of
the Kaffir
Settlement,
1836.

English Liberal opinion as a whole, were at this time (1836) averse to any measures which seemed to increase British responsibilities.

Retreat appeared to present less risk than advance in colonial affairs. Home politicians had yet to learn that the price of such policy has inevitably to be paid by the next generation. In this case the fierce Kaffir wars of 1846 and 1851 were the direct result of overruling, on insufficient knowledge, the expert advisers of the Crown at the Cape. But the forward policy of bringing Kaffir-land under civilised control was carried through to its proper end by Sir George Grey, the Governor, in 1858. By judicious white settlement, by the making of roads, by encouraging agriculture, and by firm and even-handed justice between European and native, the extension of the *Pax Britannica* over Kaffraria was assured, though it was not finally accomplished until 1878.

The immediate result of the policy of withdrawal imposed upon the colony in 1836 was a decision of the Boers of the eastern districts to shake themselves free from British rule. The North and North-East lay open to them; there they could resume that semi-patriarchal life which was becoming impossible to them in their present homes. The Great Trek, or secession, of the Cape Dutch was begun in 1836. The movement was spread over several years, for the emigrants moved in detachments; and from first to last between seven and ten thousand English subjects went out from the colony into the unknown wilderness. Amongst them, a boy of ten, was Paul Krüger, afterwards the strong-willed ruler of the Transvaal State. The parties which made for the northern plains crossed the Orange River, and those who rested there ultimately constituted the Orange River Sovereignty. But not a few pushed further northwards still, and crossed the Vaal River, where they came into conflict with the Matabili warriors not far from the Witwatersrand. There the trekkers fell upon them and drove them to find a new seat for their tyranny between the Limpopo and the Zambesi, where, some time after 1840, their Chief built his

The Boer
Trek, 1836.

The Boers
cross the
Orange River
and the Vaal.

kraal at Buluwayo. The Boers then spread themselves thinly over their new lands and found themselves once more cut off from the world.

Meantime from Cape Colony a large and stronger company of Boers had turned North-eastwards, crossing the Quathlamba range into the country then beginning to be called Natal. They found that region still desolate after the scourge of the Zulu invasion ten years before. The Boer leader, Pieter Rietief, was treacherously murdered with his followers by the Zulu king, Dingaan. In revenge, a valiant attack was made by a mere handful of fresh immigrants and the Zulu host utterly routed on Dec. 16th, 1838—a day still honoured in the Transvaal as Dingaan's Day. The Boers then resolved to occupy Natal. The English had been there before them on the coast, but no sovereignty had hitherto been proclaimed. Pietermaritzburg was now founded by the Boers; farms were marked out; a *Volksraad*, or Assembly, met. But the English Governor at the Cape, who had not interfered when the Boers trekked into the interior, had now the vision of a new maritime state with all its possible complications.

The British
decide to claim
Natal, 1842.

Moreover difficulties between the Boers and the Kaffirs had already arisen and threatened the peace of Cape Colony. The Home Government suddenly turned round: it was resolved in 1842 to occupy Natal in force. Troops were sent to Durban, and were promptly besieged by Boer levies, who resented what seemed to them an intrusion. A year later Natal was proclaimed a Colony (1843), with the watershed as its eastern boundary and Kaffraria separating it from the Cape; northwards it impinged upon the Zulu stronghold. The Boers sullenly yielded to circumstances. But the majority of them trekked away again to the Vaal or the Orange River. Once more the Boer had a grievance, this time not without foundation.

It is characteristic of the change which had come over English opinion, that the grant of self-government was pressed

upon the Cape by the Colonial Office several years before the colony agreed to accept it. In 1853 representative government was introduced. The Legislature included two Elective Chambers, and the franchise was accorded without distinction of race or colour upon a low qualification. The Executive Government, however, remained independent of the Legislature, so that the Constitution was that of a Crown Colony. But the measure of self-government thus accorded served the purpose of training the colonists, divided as they were by race and interests, in the duties of common citizenship. Responsible government was granted in 1872, with the full powers exercised by the Parliaments of Canada and Australia. It was hoped that, as in the case of Canada, the grant of full autonomy might prepare the way for a great South African confederation. Such a project had been mooted by Sir George Grey, when Governor of the Cape, in 1858. It seemed to him, as to Lord Carnarvon twenty years later, to offer the best method by which British, Dutch, and native peoples might reach a working reconciliation under the protection of the Empire.

Self-government in Cape Colony, 1853—1872.

Federation mooted, 1858.

From 1845 to 1856 Natal formed part of the Cape Colony for administrative purposes. In the latter year Natal gained a colonial status of its own. During these years it was remarkable for the small proportion of its European population; in 1852, this amounted to 8,000 against 113,000 Kaffirs. Native interests were naturally proved of grave concern to the colonial rulers. For many years the tribal organisation was preserved and civilising influences were brought to bear through the Residents placed with the chiefs. But by degrees the policy has been adopted of encouraging the Kaffirs to enter into the ordinary life of the colony, as cultivators and owners of land and as citizens. As a field for emigration Natal had, at the outset, a bad name. But first wool, then sugar were successfully

Natal, 1845—1860.

produced; and about 1860 the colony began to make steady progress. As regards administration, Natal remained a Crown Colony until its troubles with the Zulus on the northern border were finally settled by the breaking-up of the Zulu military organisation in 1887. Responsible government was granted in 1893.

The relations of the British to the Boers settled beyond the Orange River must now be followed up.

England and the Boer Republics. Between the Orange River and the Vaal the Boer population was less rigid in its antipathy to the English than their brethren farther north. Within the former area, the Orange River district, there was indeed a large proportion of farmers ready to admit British Imperial protection, if not actual annexation. It thus happened that in 1848 a territory nearly identical with that of the Orange Free State of our present maps was formally taken over as a dependency of the Crown under the title of the Orange River Sovereignty. The Boers of the Transvaal, however, now consisting of a number of small unorganised communities, scattered over an area nearly as large as France, were tenacious of their independence. But a fit of disgust at the growth of Imperial responsibilities once more seized ministers at home. By the Sand River Convention of 1852 the independence of the Transvaal was formally admitted by the High Commissioner, and two years later the Orange River Sovereignty was deliberately abandoned, by the Bloemfontein Convention, to save the risks and expense of its defence. This amazing step was taken in defiance of the strongest protests, not only from the Cape but from our Orange River subjects themselves. From these Agreements dates the existence of the two independent Boer Republics of South Africa. The Orange Free State has pursued a career of steady progress, marked by friendly relations with the paramount Power. The Transvaal State, however, rescued from imminent dissolution

in 1877, and therefore annexed by the Crown, recovered from Mr Gladstone's ministry in 1881 a measure of internal freedom, whose limits have been since that time the subject of bitter dispute. The discovery of diamonds near the Orange River in 1867, followed by that of gold on the Witwatersrand in the Transvaal (1884), profoundly affected the economic and political conditions of South Africa. But the problem remains essentially one of racial differences, and can only be rightly understood in light of the history of the European and native factors in South African development.

CHAPTER XI.

THE FRENCH WAR, WEST AFRICA, THE ASIATIC SEAS.
1793—1885.

IN the four preceding chapters we have traced the foundation of our Indian empire and the development of the three groups of self-governing colonies. It remains to follow the steps by which Britain established a footing in Asia outside the limits of the Peninsula, and extended her power in West Africa and in the West Indies. We shall find that, speaking generally, we have not here to deal with true colonies, *i.e.* new homes for people of British race; for these acquisitions lie almost wholly within the tropical region, and were made from motives in which suitability for permanent settlement had no place. These possessions will range themselves for historical treatment under three groups: those acquired during the French war of 1793—1815; those deriving their origin from the connection of England with the Slave-Trade, *i.e.* the West African possessions; lastly, the islands and military and commercial settlements in Asiatic seas.

Apart from the Peninsular campaigns of Wellington, England's share in the continental war was not brilliant. British operations were mismanaged and sometimes disastrous. One reason for the failure was the consciousness that our stake in the struggle on land was of secondary importance. The ocean, and that

Possessions
rather than
Colonies.

Those ac-
quired by war,
1793—1814.

which lay beyond it, were the real concern of England, and there we reaped our profit from the conflict.

The naval war, it must be borne in mind, was The Sea-Power, 1805. vital, not merely as deciding the security of the Channel, but as enabling the colonial empire to be held and extended. No European fleets menaced the peaceful development of Canada or Australia. The British took the Cape and controlled the Deccan without interference from France. The Battle of the Nile dissipated Napoleon's dream of an Eastern empire. Trafalgar finally delivered the colonies of France and of her allies into British hands. So that although this chapter cannot treat of the steps by which the supremacy of England at sea was once more confirmed, the significance of the sea-power at this crisis must be kept vividly in mind. Nelson and Pitt stand in the background, the indispensable personages without whom expansion in the East, the West, and the South would have been wholly impossible.

Napoleon's attack upon England in 1798 by way of Egypt, with India as his ultimate goal, suggests that we may consider, first, the results of the great war in establishing the security of British power in the East. In 1795, as we Ceylon, 1795. have already seen (p. 279), the Cape of Good

Hope was occupied for its strategic importance in relation to India. In the same year, Ceylon, Dutch also, was taken by the Indian fleet. Ceylon had been in Dutch hands for nearly 150 years; but intent as usual on the profitable spice trade, the conqueror had not brought the higher and cooler districts of the interior under control. The English were welcomed by the natives—as they invariably were, where the Dutch had preceded them—and steadily developed the resources of the island, of which first coffee and then tea became the important exports. Trincomalee is one of the chief naval harbours in Asiatic waters; and the risk of its passing into hostile possession induced the original attack upon Ceylon, and has caused it to be tenaciously held. It was not, like the Cape,

restored at Amiens in 1802. In 1798 Ceylon came directly under the control of the Crown, and its subsequent history is that of a typical Crown Colony.

As a unit of the line of communications to the East, Napoleon had seized Malta in 1798 on his way to Egypt. The Knights of St John, a military Order of the Crusades, had governed the islands since 1530. They now rose against the French garrison, and by aid of the British fleet expelled it in 1800. The islands were thereupon ceded by the inhabitants to Great Britain. It was a provision of the Treaty of Amiens (1802) that the cession should be annulled: the refusal to carry out this condition was the actual pretext for the renewal of the war. It was on both sides seen to be a link of great importance in the line of posts that connects Western Europe with the East. It was and still is the counterpoise to Toulon, and the chief station of the British fleet in the Mediterranean. The native Maltese retain a large share in the Legislative Council, and their institutions have been little interfered with.

One further acquisition, of similar significance, that of the Ile de France, or Mauritius, was due to the war. Originally Dutch (named from Maurice of Nassau), it passed early in the 18th century into the hands of France. La Bourdonnais (see p. 198) had created in the island a first-rate naval station, a perpetual thorn in the side of the East India Company, by reason of its privateers, and of its convenience as an advanced base of a French fleet. Wellesley pressed the importance of its capture; but this was not effected until 1810.

Each of these possessions gained from Holland or France—Malta, the Cape, Ceylon, Mauritius—was seized with direct reference to the military security of India. We notice the seriousness with which under the influence of Pitt the English Government regarded the claims of Indian defence. Indian statesmen have known

Malta, 1800.

Mauritius,
1810.

Each of these
important to
India.

ever since, that these claims, once clearly grasped, will always be supported with the full strength of the Empire.

We now turn to the West. The American war which ended in 1783 had sorely tried the British West Indies. Many of the islands had been occupied by French troops, and Tobago had been surrendered. The balance was now to be redressed. St Lucia,

The West
Indies, 1793—
1814.

coveted for its harbour, one of the finest in the West Indies, was taken by Admiral Jervis in 1794. Restored at Amiens it was taken for the last time in 1803. Trinidad, the fine Spanish island over against the mainland, was attacked in 1797.

St Lucia, 1794.

Trinidad, 1797.

There was a large admixture of French settlers, who resisted, but the Spaniards, dragged into a war not of their own seeking, declined to join in the defence. The island was definitely ceded in 1802. Tobago, closely adjoining, which had seen many changes of owner since Englishmen first settled there in 1625, was in 1803 finally recovered for its original possessors.

Tobago, 1803.

The war also gave to England her one possession in the South American continent. Guiana had, indeed, been closely associated with English adventure in the 17th century. Raleigh's romantic enter-

British
Guiana, 1796.

prise was followed by attempts at plantation under Charles I. Lord Willoughby, a great West Indian Governor, received a 'Patent' for a new settlement at the Restoration. But the Dutch were there already, and the French had a footing also. The war with Holland, which gave us New York in 1664, ousted us from Guiana. The Dutch now retained possession until 1796, when a British force from Barbados—always to the fore if the British flag were to be planted on fresh ground—took the settlements on and near the Essequibo, with the half-concealed good will of the Dutch Governor. The forms of government were but slightly altered; Dutch proprietors retained their privileges, and no attempt was made to impose

British institutions upon the population. The colony, however, had been but slightly developed; and the proportion of negro slaves to whites was, about the time of the Peace (1815), thirteen to one. British Guiana, now almost exclusively a sugar colony, is by no means wholly explored. It still keeps certain Dutch elements in its constitution as a Crown Colony.

The shores on either side of the peninsula of Yucatan had, for a hundred and fifty years, been frequented by wood-cutters from the West Indian Islands: hardy and pugnacious men, in close relations with the Buccaneers. They were, by origin, mainly British subjects; they had a standing feud with the Spanish rulers of Mexico, but were on friendly terms with the vigorous native tribes that survived in the great forests. Until 1798 the settlements at and near Belize were still dependent upon Spain, though under protection, by treaty, of Great Britain, an anomalous arrangement bound to lead to trouble. In 1798 the Spaniards determined to clear the coast of the intruders. But by aid of a small British force the settlers beat back the attack. Vague rights of occupation now merged in definite British Sovereignty. The colony of Honduras remained for some time a primitive settlement with the minimum of interference from Great Britain. Ultimately it became a Crown Colony with organised administration. It is not larger than Wales, and owes its prosperity to its valuable forests of mahogany and logwood.

WEST AFRICA.

It is an easy transition to pass from the West Indies to West Africa. The intimate relation of the two regions, through negro slavery, has been touched upon already. The traffic in African slaves reached its height in the closing years of the 18th century; and the effects of it were shewn in the gradual abandonment

West Africa
and the Slave-
Trade.

of other crops in favour of cotton, rice and sugar within the area of slave cultivation. In 1807, however, the efforts of Wilberforce and his friends were crowned with their first success, in the passing of an Act for the abolition of the import of slaves into British dominions. The suppression of slavery itself followed in 1834. The effects of this revolution upon the West Indian colonies were profound and lasting. In Africa the consequences have been not less marked. European nations, England amongst them, went to Africa mainly to buy slaves. When the traffic was suppressed England kept her hold upon the coast, partly, at least, in order to undo the consequences of the evil she had helped to create. No part of the imperial possessions can lay less claim to the title of 'colony': for in the West African coast-region the white man cannot make his home. The centres of British power are five: Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Lagos, and the Niger. These have each had a separate origin and history: the first three are connected intimately with the story of the slave-trade; the two latter are the acquisition of recent years.

The chief
centres of
British trade.

The Gambia, with its broad and accessible estuary, stretching two hundred miles into the interior, attracted English traders to follow in the wake of John Hawkins. But in the 16th century none beyond occasional voyages were made. When England decided to compete with Holland and Portugal for a share in the slave-trade (see p. 171) Fort James was built near the mouth of the river and became a chief centre of British African trade. The Gambia has ever since remained an English possession; whilst France has, in the same way (except for a short interval after 1763) controlled the more northerly river, the Senegal. In the latter half of the 18th century the English Fort became a centre of territorial possession, which, however, has never extended beyond the navigable estuary, and has never been enlarged by a Protectorate of the native *hinterland*.

The Gambia:
Fort James,
1662.

Bathurst, the seat of government, superseded Fort James after the abolition of the negro traffic.

About the same time that Fort James was built the English were forcing from the Dutch a foot-hold on the Gold Coast, 500 miles away, which, facing south, forms part of the north shore of the Gulf of Guinea. There, no attempt was made to gain actual territory : on a convenient plot of coast-land, rented from a native chief, a strong post, or 'Castle,' was built, and Dutch, English, Danes and Prussians had each their own slave-trading companies who owned such Forts, in which negroes were collected for embarkation. The chief English forts were named Cape Coast Castle and Accra: the Dutch centre was Elmina. Between the Senegal and the Niger there were, at the end of the 18th century, forty of such 'castles.' Europeans held them for trade alone, and that trade was solely in human beings. After 1807 four forts only were retained by the English slave-traders, who perforce adapted them to other commerce. These came under the direct ownership of the British Government in 1821, when they were included with Gambia and Sierra Leone under the Crown Colony of the 'West African Settlements.' But in 1827 the Gold Coast portion was abandoned to a committee of merchants, who took over the 'Castles' and enjoyed a small subsidy from Parliament. The district now began to make steady progress. We have seen that a reluctance to retain possessions which seemed difficult of development and involved troubles with natives, marked English colonial policy from time to time during the period which followed the Peace of 1815. The Gold Coast was already harassed by Ashantee wars which have but lately ceased. But the principle of withdrawal was seldom long adhered to. Thus the Crown again resumed the control of the Gold Coast in 1841; a genuine effort to undo the evil effect of the slave-trade régime was now made. A police force was organised; roads made; chiefs brought under civilising

The Gold
Coast, 1661.

influences; missions assisted. Of the European States which continued to hold castles on the coast, and so broke the continuity of the English sovereignty, the Danes first and the Dutch afterwards sold them to this country. Native chiefs were protected from the Ashantees, and slave-raids and human sacrifices sternly repressed. It was sorrowfully recognised that the degradation of the negro peoples of the nearer African interior was the direct result of European slave-dealing. The savagery of Dahomey and Benin was the survival of the ferocity by which native chiefs, a century earlier, had supplied the demands of English and Dutch traders for victims for the plantations.

The entire
Gold Coast
English, 1870.

The settlement of Sierra Leone owes its origin to this same desire to atone for the crime of slave-trading.

It lies between the two ancient seats of the traffic, the Gambia and Cape Coast Castle, in a district noted as a hunting-ground for negroes since the days of John Hawkins. A philanthropic association in London took over the territory in 1791, with the object of forming a community of freed slaves. After the Act of 1807 cargoes of negroes intercepted by British warships were landed there; and a strange mixture of black refugees found its way to the colony. Sierra Leone, once fairly started on its mission of restoration, became a Crown possession, and in 1821 formed part of the West African Settlements. To-day it is a separate Crown Colony. From these three colonies the great explorers of the Niger started on their journeys, including the greatest of all African discoverers, Mungo Park, who traced the course of the Niger in the early years of the 19th century.

Sierra Leone,
1787-91.

In 1861, Lagos—between the Gold Coast and the Niger—was ceded to Britain, and became a new base of warfare against the slave-trade, a new missionary

Lagos, 1861.

field, and the seat of a profitable trade in West African produce, chiefly palm-oil. English rule had now reached the delta of the Niger; traders pushed along its broad streams, bartered,

negotiated with native tribes: the inevitable result followed.

**The Niger,
1884.**

Trade forced an opening in the wake of explorers, the Queen's Government was called upon to recognise rights thus acquired by British

subjects; then came the Chartered Company or the Protectorate, and in the end formal sovereignty over the Lower Niger.

But a new rival had now appeared. The French pressing

**The French
in West
Africa.**

down from the north across Sahara, and from the west along the Senegal, had joined hands.

The English Government had in 1865, in a fit of disgust at the costliness and apparent uselessness of the West African Settlements, decided once more upon a policy of withdrawal. This was the opportunity of the French. By a series of quiet but effective military movements, they gained control of the territory lying behind the English settlements, hemming them in from the interior. When the reaction had passed, England found her sphere of expansion much restricted—the Upper Niger closed to her, and the Lower Niger saved only by the exertions of individual traders. The Conference of Berlin of 1885 and subsequent negotiations determined peacefully the respective spheres of influence of European powers in Africa. From this time

**European
partition of
Africa.**

dates a new era in African development, on the Eastern not less than the Western side of the

Continent: whilst the British occupation of Egypt (1882) opens a new chapter upon the Nile.

POSSESSIONS IN ASIATIC SEAS.

Aden, on the coast of Arabia, about a hundred miles east of the Straits of Babel Mandeb, was ceded

Aden, 1838.

by the Arabs in 1838. It forms one more link in the chain of posts which stretch from Gibraltar to the

Pacific. In recent times, Aden has served as a centre of British influence in southern Arabia. Perim, a small island at the mouth of the Red Sea, had been occupied temporarily in 1799; it was definitely annexed in 1857. The chief importance of both these points lies in their relation to India, and on that account both are administered through the Government of Bombay.

The historic rivalry between England and Holland in the Far East had ended in the virtual exclusion of English traders from the archipelago eastwards of Sumatra. At the end of the 18th century, the East India Company retained posts in that island, and held Penang off the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. During the Napoleonic war, Java, like other Dutch possessions, had fallen to The Malay Peninsula. England; but it was restored, with reluctance, at the Peace, as part of the bargain by which the Cape was formally ceded by Holland. But Englishmen were no longer content to see the trade of the great island-seas a monopoly of another nation. The possibilities of British commerce with China were already realized by the East India Company. It was deemed necessary to take a forward step to improve the position of British power on the main highway to the East. With great sagacity Sir Stamford Raffles, who had temporarily administered Java, fixed upon Singapore as the Singapore, 1819. spot most suitable for the site of a naval and commercial harbour. In 1819, under instructions from Lord Hastings, then Governor General, he acquired the island from its native Raja. Five years later, by treaty with the Dutch, the district of Malacca was Malacca, 1824. exchanged for the settlements in Sumatra, and the entire peninsula thus came under English influence. Singapore was, in 1837, made the centre of administration for the three possessions—Penang, Malacca and Singapore itself—whose area is about that of the county of Suffolk. The foresight which led to the occupation of Singapore has

been justified by the wonderful growth of its commerce and its importance as a coaling-station and place of call for shipping. The Straits Settlements, as they are called, were taken from the control of the Indian Government and formed into a Crown Colony in 1867. After 1875 the neighbouring independent States of the Peninsula were gradually brought under a British Protectorate, over which the Governor at Singapore exercises advisory authority. The Malay Peninsula, and Singapore in particular, is the meeting-place of all the South-Asiatic races, Arab, Indian, Malay and Chinese, who under British order live side by side in mutual toleration.

The importance of Singapore turns largely on its position in the path of European commerce with China. The East India Company sent regular voyages to China as early as 1670; and amid much difficulty a growing trade was carried on with the port of Canton, to which the Chinese rigidly confined it. When the Company's monopoly of this trade expired in 1834, and merchants of less experience in Chinese methods appeared, difficulties quickly arose. To secure English privileges and protection for traders, Hong Kong, an island, but close to the mainland and within reach of Canton, was obtained by cession, confirmed by the Treaty of Nankin (1842), under which five ports were opened to British trade.

In 1842 Hong Kong was declared free to the commerce of all European nations. Its subsequent growth has been remarkable. Instead of its population of 7000 fishermen it has now 250,000 inhabitants, mainly, of course, Chinese. British security, commercial freedom, nearness to Canton, and its own position on the great trade route from Japan and Shanghai to India and Europe, have contributed to the importance of Hong Kong; which is at the same time the principal naval station in the Far East. Upon the Legislative Council of the Colony two seats are usually occupied by Chinese representatives.

In Borneo British interests date from 1609; but neither the English nor the Dutch East India Company could, owing to the piracy prevalent in those seas, and the hostility of the natives, attain any commercial success. Sir James Brooke (1840) founded an independent state under his own sovereignty in Sarawak, and a company of English merchants gained certain cessions of land in the northern end of the island (1877—8); the Chartered Company of British North Borneo which took over these latter rights holds a quasi-independent position. Both these states are under a British Protectorate. Labuan has been a Crown Colony since 1846. It must be noted that the richest islands of the Archipelago have remained a Dutch possession since England yielded her place in the Far East in the reign of James I.

North Borneo, 1840.

British New Guinea, the south-eastern section of the island, was proclaimed a Protectorate in 1884, at the instance of the Australian Colonies, who were anxious lest a territory within 80 miles of the Queensland coast should fall into the possession of a European rival. It was definitely annexed as a Crown Colony in 1888. The influence of Australian opinion in determining colonial policy had already been manifested in the treaty, by which, in 1874, the Fiji Islands were acquired through the agency of the Governor of New South Wales: and the position of Great Britain in the Pacific Ocean has since been one of deep interest to Australian statesmen.

New Guinea, 1884.

Fiji, 1874.

CHAPTER XII.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE BRITISH POWER IN
INDIA. 1805—1858.

THE recall of Wellesley was followed by one of those intervals of reaction which have so often, in the history of the Empire, succeeded a period of advance and consolidation. In the present case, it is to be remembered that the Governor General's pace in extending the bounds of British rule appeared bewilderingly fast to the Directors at home. Their hopes of steady and comfortable dividends were disappearing under the régime of one who shared Pitt's heresies about Free Trade, and would rarely condescend to mention the yearly 'investment' and native markets in his Despatches. Moreover, outside India House, many thoughtful observers, ignorant of the true circumstances of Indian politics, felt that the grave condition of European politics demanded that our hands should be as free as possible from distant entanglements. So the Mahratta war was wound up with all speed, and Holkar, still in the field, allowed to raid at will on the Sutlej and throughout Rajputana. Had, indeed, the instructions of the Directors been literally carried out, the whole defensive system of Wellesley would probably have been abandoned, and the Deccan and Central India given up to anarchy. But the common sense of the Governor General (Lord Minto) prevented such a catastrophe.

Policy of
Reaction.
1805—1813.

The work of finally reducing the Mahrattas fell to Lord Hastings, who went out to Bengal in 1813 an avowed opponent of the 'forward policy.' It was his destiny, however, to resume and complete Lord Wellesley's work: not so much from the motive of extending British power, but from the clear conviction that the interests of the Indian peoples themselves were most surely advanced by the maintenance of the strong and peaceful control of English rule. Before he left Calcutta in 1823 Great Britain was acknowledged as the paramount Power in the peninsula.

The
Marquess of
Hastings,
1813—1823.

In this task of securing order, Lord Hastings was in 1814 involved in war with Nepal. The Gurkha chiefs of this kingdom of jungle and mountain raided year by year the weak and defenceless inhabitants of the Ganges plain. The subjects of the Nawab of Oudh had lived under the guarantee of British protection since the Treaty of 1801. On their behalf two campaigns were fought. The Gurkhas were the bravest enemies whom we had so far met in India. The jungle and broken hill country of the lower Himalayan region is, perhaps, as difficult fighting ground for Europeans as can be found. The first year's operations were disastrous; but General Ochterlony, in the brilliant campaign of 1815, compelled Nepal to sue for peace. That part of the hill district which forms the outer range of the Himalayas on the South-west of the defeated state was ceded. By this treaty Simla and a region extending to the Sutlej came into English possession. Our relations with Nepal are still governed by this instrument of 1815; and the Gurkhas have proved faithful and courageous soldiers of the Queen.

The war
with Nepal,
1814—5.

The Pindaris were next subdued. They were not a nationality, like the Mahrattas, although they had succeeded to their place as the organised freebooters of Central India. The nucleus of their forces consisted probably of restless and nomadic

The Pindaris
destroyed,
1816—8.

Mahrattas, but by far the larger number was composed of adventurers, outlaws, criminals—the general offscourings of native States, to whom the newly imposed order of British India was intolerable. Their audacity had grown as the firm grip of English administration had become relaxed since Wellesley's recall. Though not openly countenanced they were secretly encouraged by the Mahratta states of Poona, Indore and Nagpur: and their raids in 1811—1815 were a source of great misery and havoc from Rajputana to Orissa. Lord Hastings determined to rid India of this standing menace. Armies of 120,000 men were formed; Sindia, restless, and ready for treachery, was overawed. By a series of actions the various bands of Pindaris were kept apart, followed up and destroyed.

But in 1817 the Peshwa, chafing under the restraints of the Treaty of Bassein, by which his power had been rescued from destruction, rose suddenly in rebellion. The Courts of Indore, where Holkar's heir was still a boy, and of Nagpur allied themselves with the Peshwa. The Governor General thus found himself confronted by a war with the whole Mahratta Confederacy, with the exception of Sindia who, awaiting the progress of events, did not move. But whilst the Mahrattas were now less formidable—they had no Chief of the ability of the great Holkar, who died in 1811—the British were far better able to cope with them. One pitched battle and two minor but crucial engagements crushed the revolt.

The Peshwa, the originator of the war, was first dealt with. His office was abolished; his dominions annexed to the Bombay presidency; he himself was made prisoner, and lived till the eve of the Mutiny, a pensioner of the Company at Cawnpore. At Nagpur and Indore infant Princes were placed in power, under the immediate control of a British Resident officer; but no annexation of

Mahratta
States impli-
cated.

The Peshwa
revolts, 1817.

Nagpur and
Indore follow.

The Peshwa's
power broken
up, 1818.

British con-
trol at Nagpur
and Indore,
1818.

territory was made. Rajputana, relieved of the pressure of Holkar and his captains, was taken under British protection, without interference with the internal rule of the Hindoo Rajas. In place of the Peshwa, the Raja of Sattara, a direct descendant of the great Sivaji (see p. 177), was restored to the titular headship of the Mahratta race, with the support of a Resident. The policy of Wellesley of bringing the Mahratta power under effective control, and of relieving Central India of the terror of their raids, was now finally accomplished. It was a great act of pacification, the indispensable condition of settled order in India. The ceded territory, of which Poona was the capital, submitted with much content to its new masters. No portion of India had suffered more from perpetual war and from civil misrule. A quarter of a century later hardly any province was so prosperous. All hereditary rights, ownerships, and religious privileges were scrupulously respected. Revenue was placed on a basis intelligible to the taxpayer, and was honestly collected. Lands long abandoned were brought into cultivation; villages and towns were once more peopled as life and property were felt to be secure. Mountstuart Elphinstone, one of the ablest administrators that India has known, was entrusted with the pacification of the district, and his memory was long treasured amongst the people. The district of Khandeish, on the northern border, was rescued by Major Outram from a similar state of desolation. Under the Moghuls it has been noted for its fertility. Outram's service, in reducing the wild hill-men, the Bheels, to order, by enlisting their young men in a corps of irregular cavalry, and winning the rest to a life of peace and industry, was one of the characteristic benefits which British rule has conferred on India.

The Mahratta power finally broken.

The British administration.

But the policy of Lord Hastings was harshly judged at home by critics who could not realise the risks involved in chronic anarchy in India,

Opposition to Lord Hastings' policy.

and the utter inability of the Mahratta Powers to control it. There were, however, other grounds for the ill-will of the Directors and of the narrow type of politician towards the Governor-General.

For Hastings had clearly perceived the position of England in relation to her great possessions in the East.

His general aims in India. It was impossible for him to regard our vast responsibilities there in the light of a reservoir of profit to Proprietors in Europe. The transition from the Trading Company to the Sovereign Power had been made in fact, if not in form. Lord Hastings held a truly Imperial view of his duties. He not only extended, but he deepened, the foundations of British rule. In the first place,

His internal policy. he raised the standard of civil administration by according promotion to ability and integrity, and not to influence. His own immense industry and keen sense of responsibility reacted upon his subordinates. Next, to him was due the first attempt at the organisation of Native education under British auspices, by the creation of vernacular schools. Thirdly, he made the Anglo-Indian Press virtually free, and welcomed the appearance of the first native newspaper. His attitude on such subjects was not in accord with dominant opinion in England, and was probably the true cause of the opposition to his policy, which led to his return home in 1823.

His successor, Lord Amherst, was forced into a policy of annexation in a new quarter. The first war with

Lord Amherst, 1823—8: Burmah was in no sense of our seeking. The

First Burmese War. Court of Ava was at once the feeblest and most pretentious of the States who had taken up arms against the English Power. The King had, in 1818, demanded from Lord Hastings one half of Bengal; and in a strange ignorance of his own strength, in 1824 declared war against the Company. Lord Amherst planned three campaigns: against Rangoon by sea, against Assam by river, and against

Arakan by land. In the end the Burmese were severely punished by the loss of Assam, in the hill country of Bengal, and of the coast districts of Arakan (always a seat of disorder) and Tenasserim. Burmah retained the valley of the Irrawaddi intact.

For twelve years there was peace in India: and of that period Lord William Bentinck was the central figure. The nature of the services which he rendered to Indian progress is recorded in the inscription upon his statue at Calcutta, composed by Lord Macaulay. He 'infused into Oriental despotism the spirit of British freedom'; 'never forgot that the end of government is the welfare of the governed'; 'abolished cruel rites'; 'effaced humiliating distinctions'; 'allowed liberty to the expression of public opinion.' Free from the anxieties of war he devoted his undivided attention to the securing of the well-being of Indian populations.

Lord W.
Bentinck and
Indian pro-
gress, 1828—35.

His relations with Mysore illustrate his conception of the responsibility of England towards dependent States. We saw how Lord Wellesley in 1799 restored a boy-prince of the Hindoo dynasty to his throne. After his assumption of full power in 1811 the Raja had proved an unworthy ruler. By waste of the resources of his State, and indifference to all sense of public duty, he had brought the kingdom to a condition of misery and rebellion. The British Government was, by terms of the Treaty of 1799, responsible for the security of the throne. But the Governor-General refused to maintain the Raja in control of his Government at the expense of the inhabitants, for whose welfare, he maintained, the English power was not less responsible than for the safety of their sovereign. The Raja was, therefore, temporarily displaced from authority, a fixed proportion only of the revenue was assigned to him, and the rest, with the entire administration, passed into the hands of English Commissioners, under whom order and

The Raja of
Mysore.

prosperity were soon restored. There was no annexation, no increase of burdens upon the Mysore State; the step was taken simply in fulfilment of a responsibility to the general well-being of the community, as superseding that owed to the individual Raja: a distinction which we shall find strongly marked in Indian administration. The Indian Government has since (1881) found itself able to hand back the reins of authority to the successor of the Raja displaced by Lord W. Bentinck. The little hill-state of Coorg, in the extreme south of India, was admitted to the empire by the urgent wish of its inhabitants, who could, in this way only, escape the tyranny and exactions of their Raja: for in India, then as now, the one guarantee of order and liberty is the protection of a Government strong enough to enforce them.

The internal reforms of the Governor-General were numerous and important. To him were due the abolition of Suttee, or the immolation of Hindoo widows on the funeral pile of their husbands: and the rooting out of the Thugs, or hereditary societies of professional assassins, the standing terror of peaceful travellers. Steps were taken to introduce native officials into judicial courts and the Civil Service. In the matter of native education, especially in medicine, in the policy of freedom of the Press, and in careful control of the Revenue, Lord William Bentinck followed in the steps of Lord Hastings. The Land Settlement of the North-West Provinces—a far more thorough piece of work than that of Bengal in the previous century—was effected after a detailed survey of an area of fifty millions of acres, supporting twenty-three millions of people. Steam communication with England, then first mooted, was ardently urged by the Governor-General, and as steadily opposed by the Directors as a ‘dangerous’ measure. The renewal of the Company’s Charter in 1833 was only secured by the abandonment of all exclusive rights to Indian

**Internal
Reforms.**

trade and the express permission to Europeans to settle in the peninsula.

The path of internal progress was suddenly barred by Lord Bentinck's successor, who initiated the period of conflict involved in the effort to attain a definite and secure frontier on the North-west of British India. The end is still unattained and forms the great problem of Indian defence.

Lord
Auckland,
1836—1841.

The North-
West Frontier.

At the period when Lord Hastings had pushed back the limits of British dominion to the Sutlej by the treaty with Nepal in 1815, there were three nations who held in their hands the peace of North-Western India: the Punjab and the upper courses of the Indus were held by the Sikhs; the lower valley of the Indus, by the Sind tribes; the mountain chains beyond, by the Afghans. The advance of Russia into Central Asia, which has now brought her to the northern foot of the great mountain barrier of India, was then beginning to cause alarm in Calcutta. It was resolved to forestall the coming danger by acquiring a direct control over Afghan politics. It is easy for us to see, in the light of experience, how futile was such a design under the conditions of the time.

Proposed
Control of
Afghanistan,
1837.

Afghanistan was removed from the British base by enormous distances; it was, from a military point of view, a country of extreme difficulty; its inhabitants were a fighting race, hardy, and most tenacious of their independence. Moreover, their front was protected by two other peoples, who, though not friendly to the Afghan, would sooner or later resent the establishment of the English military power in their rear. One of these nations, the Sikhs, with the finest native army India had seen for a century, stood in the direct path from the Ganges valley to Kabul. Sind blocked the more southerly way by Quetta and Kandahar.

In 1837, Lord Auckland, the new Governor-General, put

forward a dethroned Ameer, Shah Shuja, then a fugitive on British territory, in opposition to the reigning prince at Kabul, Dost Mahommed; and war at once followed. It must be borne in mind that this step was taken in defiance of all the best expert opinion in India. As Runjeet Singh, the Sikh Ruler, refused passage to the British forces, invasion was made by way of Sind and Kandahar. Dost Mahommed fled; Shah Shuja was restored (1839); and, with an English Resident installed at Kabul with a protecting force, it seemed as though Afghanistan were secured. Kabul was occupied in this way for two years: then the Afghans grew restless; they once more chased Shah Shuja from the throne. Englishmen were murdered, the Resident amongst them. The British garrison retreated, were overtaken in the Khyber Pass, and one solitary survivor reached Jellahabad (1842). An avenging army occupied Kabul a second time; but Shah Shuja had been murdered. The idea of control was given up and Dost Mahommed was allowed to ascend his throne. A policy, mistaken in itself, had been, in its execution, hopelessly mismanaged. The invasion was an attempt to anticipate remote and problematical dangers, by men who had taken no pains to study the difficulties of the task and had not the needful resource or tenacity to meet them when they arose.

Though the disasters in the field had no effect on native opinion in India, a desire to wipe out the stain of failure may have contributed to bring about the war for the reduction of Sind in 1843, the grounds of which seem hardly sufficient. The operations were short and effective, and Sind was annexed.

The Sikh war, which had for some time been looming ahead, began in 1845, and, after a respite of four years, ended in 1849 with the incorporation of the Punjab in British India. The Sikhs, a religious Hindoo sect rather than a nation, had had a long

The First
Afghan War,
1837—1843.

Annexation
of Sind, 1843.

The Sikh
Wars, 1845—9.

history. They had suffered much under Aurungzebe, but on the break up of the Moghul Empire they had become a territorial power, aiming at independence both of Kabul and of Delhi. Runjeet Singh, the true founder of the Sikh kingdom, took Peshawar from the Afghans, and captured the lofty valleys of Kashmir. His army was not a rabble, like those of Haidarabad or Oudh, but a first-rate fighting machine, often compared, in religious fervour and martial spirit, with Cromwell's Ironsides. When Runjeet Singh died in 1839, the policy of friendliness to the English was abandoned. Intrigue and disruption now distracted the State. Ministers were creatures of the army which remained the sole power in the State. In 1845 the generals decided on an invasion of British territory. One campaign, marked by four great battles followed; by the last of these, Sobraon, the Sikhs were driven across the Sutlej, and Lahore, the capital, then surrendered. Lord Hardinge, the Governor-General, was content with proclaiming a Protectorate; the Sikh army was reduced, and a Regency formed, under the supervision of the Resident, Major Lawrence, with whose name (as Sir Henry Lawrence) the pacification of the Punjab will always be associated. The Protectorate, however, was a failure; the Council was corrupt, the Queen-mother unworthy of respect, the army still strong enough to resent defeat. Amid clashing intrigues fanaticism broke out; Lawrence was absent; British officers were murdered by official orders. The Afghans promised support and the Sikh generals rushed again into war (1849). Lord Dalhousie was now Governor-General. The defeat of Chilianwalla was restored by the victory of Gujerat, in which the Sikh army was simply destroyed. The Punjab was now annexed.

The settlement of the Punjab under the two brothers, Henry and John Lawrence, is one of the striking successes of British Indian rule. Here there was no old and complex civilisation to purify and adapt to English standards. A territory of the area

The Settlement of the Punjab.

of England, inhabited by four millions of people, was, before Lord Dalhousie left India, transformed into the model province of the Dependency. Disarmament was first effected: then the protection of the district at the foot of the hills secured by forts and moveable detachments. The problem of the mountain frontier had begun. Then a simple and intelligible Code of law was prepared. Thuggee was rigorously stamped out. In true Roman fashion the basis of order was laid by the speedy building of roads and bridges. Cultivation was enormously increased by works of irrigation on a scale unknown outside India. The Land Settlement was prepared with the advantage of previous experience in other provinces. The tax, as it fell on the cultivator, was lighter by one half than that paid under Sikh rule; hence, with the advent of order, vast areas were once more brought under the plough, and the Punjab became the great wheat region of India. To the details of this great constructive work, the true conquest of the Punjab, Dalhousie paid unremitting attention; and in its success he took the greatest pride. The reward came when in the crisis of the Mutiny the Punjab stood firm, and its native regiments reconquered Delhi from the revolted Sepoys.

A model
province.

The Second
Burmese War,
1852.

The second Burmese war arose, in 1852, out of grievances of British and Indian traders at Rangoon. Intent as Lord Dalhousie was on maintaining peace, the refusal of all redress compelled war. A short campaign put the Indian expedition in possession of the lower valley of the Irrawaddi, which, with its important port of Rangoon, was now annexed. No part of British India has shown in a more striking way what peace and security can do to develope industry, wealth and population, than the sea-board of Burmah.

Two other spheres of Lord Dalhousie's activity demand notice: his attitude towards the Protected States, and his policy in internal affairs. It was his conviction that it was a vital

part of the mission of England in India to establish the principle that the rights of rulers are limited by the corresponding claim of their subjects to good government. He proceeded to enforce this axiom on the extinction of the direct line of succession to the thrones of Sattara and of Nagpur, which befell during his term of office. The question was raised whether in the case of States which had been created by the free bounty of the Government like Sattara (see p. 305), or restored after just forfeit like Nagpur (see p. 304), the Governor-General was not entitled, in the interests of the subjects of such States, to assume the sovereignty which had now lapsed by death. The Raja of Nagpur had left no heir, either lineal or adopted. In Sattara a death-bed adoption of a child-heir had been declared; and by Hindoo law such adoption carried with it the full rights of son-ship. Lord Dalhousie, admitting such a claim to be valid in private persons, refused to accept it in case of sovereignty. The people of Sattara had paid heavily for their Raja; and on the principle of 'the good of the governed' the Governor-General declared the line of the Raja extinct, and the State escheated to the Queen. Nagpur, or Berar, of which it was the capital, lapsed in the same way, in the absence of any royal claimant. This 'doctrine of lapse' was warmly debated in India; the historic right of adoption was dearly prized by the Hindoos; and the extinction of Native administrations was regretted by many who saw that it resulted in the exclusion of educated natives of position from a share in the government of their own countries.

Lord Dal-
housie and
Native rulers.

The Doctrine
of Lapse.

Sattara.

Nagpur.

The deposition of the Nawab of Oudh was brought about on the same grounds, after the most careful review of the history and the internal situation of that kingdom. The Nawabs had undoubtedly been faithful to the English rule. On the other hand, they were, as princes, contemptible, rapacious, and utterly indifferent

The State of
Oudh.

to public duty. The British Residents at Lucknow had long complained of evils that were of a hundred years' standing, of corruption of public officers so general and so inveterate, that the misery of the people could only be relieved by a revolution in the State. Lord Dalhousie, after grave reflection, and with some anxiety, yet confident in the broad justice of the step, decided to pension and remove the Nawab.

The general work of the administration was marked by the same lofty sense of responsibility. The Civil servants of the Company—the minor Judges, and the collectors of revenue—were, with his cordial support, now selected by competition instead of by favour. A scheme for education of boys and of girls in State-aided schools was carried through in the teeth of prejudice; and a project of higher teaching by Universities and Colleges was sketched out. The irrigation works of the Punjab were rivalled by those of the Ganges valley. The trunk line of railway from Calcutta to Delhi was planned, and an Indian 'railway-policy' drawn out and pressed upon the Directors at home. The Public Works Department, upon whose achievements the food of millions of peasants now depends, was under Lord Dalhousie organised as a permanent Department of State. The Governor-General, worn out by his exertions, returned to England in 1856, and died, still a young man, four years later. He ranks with Warren Hastings and Wellesley as a greater builder of the Empire in the East.

We have now reached the period of the Sepoy Mutiny, the causes and nature of which it is important to understand. Early in 1857 warnings were received by Lord Canning, the new Governor-General, of impending trouble. There were circulated, and superstitiously believed, certain predictions of the downfall of the ruling Power on the completion of its century of rule (*i.e.* since Plassey, 1757) in Bengal. Calumnies of most extraordinary nature

Internal ad-
ministration.

Lord Can-
ning, 1856—
1862.

The Mutiny,
1857: its
symptoms.

were spread and accepted with credulity. Behind all this there was much intrigue at work in Native Courts and amongst discontented politicians, initiated by the Moghul princes still keeping state at Delhi.

Little effect, however, would have been produced but for other and more serious causes. It is undoubtedly true that the very passion for honest government which animated Lord Dalhousie had stirred up discontent amongst those who benefited most by his policy. He had not allowed—as Lawrence did in the Punjab—for the intense conservatism of Oriental races, to whom oppression from their own kin is preferable sometimes to freedom at the hand of foreigners. The interference with the right of adoption roused grave suspicion when it was seen that it resulted in the aggrandisement of British dominion. Lord Canning was careful to confirm this right when the day of pacification came in 1859. The violent changes in Oudh, well-meant from the English standpoint but injudicious in their suddenness, had been ill received. Moreover, it had been unwise to leave the Moghul as nominal sovereign in the ancient capital, Delhi, where his enormous wealth and the prestige of his name enabled his household to create a network of anti-British intrigue. Insignificant as he now was in a military or political sense, the Moghul had not been forgotten : he stood for legitimate and traditional supremacy in India. There were, too, other dispossessed rulers or their representatives : the Nawab of Oudh, the Raja of Mysore, and Nana Sahib, the adopted son of the last Peshwa : and these were all ready to take a hand in treachery. At the same time the English regiments were just at the moment unduly weak, and their complement of officers had been reduced by the needs of the various new administrations in the Central Provinces, Punjab and Oudh. Perhaps Indian society had been passing too quickly through a period of change ; the British temper was restless and pushing ; steam, electricity, education, newspapers, betokened a future still more disturbed.

Its causes.

About January, 1857, it was rumoured in the barracks that the new rifle cartridges had been greased with the fat of pigs and cows to contaminate the religious purity of the Sepoys. During March and April, in certain regiments, insubordination became frequent. On May 10th the native troops at Meerut broke out into open mutiny. Their first step was to march to Delhi, some 40 miles distant, to place themselves under the authority of the Moghul. The outbreak was probably premature, a concerted rising having been arranged for a somewhat later date. But the news spread, and the Mutiny had begun.

The Out-
break at
Meerut, May
10, 1857.

The rising was mainly confined to the army; only at Delhi, in Oudh and in Rohilkhand was the populace seriously affected. In the next place, the Mutiny did not spread beyond the line of garrisons stationed from Benares up the Ganges valley, and on to Peshawar. The Sikh regiments remained loyal. In the Central Provinces the trouble was limited to the Ganges plain. Bombay, Madras, and Lower Bengal itself were untouched by it. The Nizam, under the influence of a sagacious prime minister, did not move. Rajputana was quiet.

Character-
istics of the
Mutiny.

Further, the crisis was sharp and short. The 10th of May was the date of the first outbreak. Within a month the area of disaffection was fairly well revealed. The Cawnpore murders took place on June 27: on Sept. 20 Delhi was recovered, and the Moghul a prisoner. Lucknow was relieved on Nov. 16.

The danger
at an end,
Dec. 1857.

Before the end of the year all danger was over, though Sir Colin Campbell and Sir Hugh Rose had still work to do in stamping out the last embers of revolt. There is no space to treat of the heroic incidents and personalities of the struggle, which left England more firmly established in her Indian empire than before.

The end of
the East India
Company,
1858.

One immediate effect of the Mutiny was the decision to terminate once for all the dual control of the Crown and the East India Company

in Indian government. By an Act of 1858—under which India is still administered—the Company was brought to an end. The administration was now directly assumed by the Crown, acting through a Principal Secretary of State, a member of the Ministry, and responsible to the Queen and country for the general policy of Indian government. The Secretary for India is assisted by a Council of expert advisers sitting in London. The Governor-General, with the new title of Viceroy, acts under the instructions and subject to the approval of the Secretary of State. He is assisted by a double Council; the Executive Council, a direct descendant of the old Council of Calcutta, as Hastings knew it, consisting of officials, and the Legislative Council, which includes in addition a certain number of non-official members, European and Native. The former body corresponds in a sense to the Cabinet of a constitutional country: the latter to the Legislative Council of a Crown Colony. The old Presidencies of Madras and Bombay were left with many marks of their historic equality with Bengal. Codes of Law, in which British, Anglo-Indian, and Native elements all find a place, were carefully drawn up and enforced in 1860–61. The Civil Service gained in status by the changes of 1858. It is through the strong, upright, and experienced men who from one end of India to the other, hold in their hands the local administration of justice, order, revenue, and public works, that the influence of British rule most makes itself felt.

The proclamation of the sovereignty of the Queen was made at a grand Durbar or gathering of princes at Allahabad on November 1, 1858. The declaration of the royal guarantee of toleration, of equal justice, and, to all but actual murderers, of amnesty, effectually pacified India. One step alone remained to be taken. The Moghul had now been deposed, and his dynasty and the empire whose tradition he represented

The new
Government
of India.

The Queen's
Sovereignty
proclaimed,
1858.

came to an end. The Moghul Empire had in a real sense served as a bond amongst the divergent races, faiths, and governments of the great Indian continent. The East India Company had, since the administration of Lord Wellesley, controlled both Delhi and the Emperor; had been in reality itself the 'Corporate Emperor' of India in his place. It was, therefore, at this time strongly urged that the Queen should claim the now vacant title, and declare herself Empress of India. But not until 1877 was the real position of Queen Victoria, as the inheritor of more than the ancient dominion of the Moghul, formally proclaimed by that title which both appeals to the imagination and the historic sense of the peoples of India, and best expresses the nature of her power.

The heir-
ship to the
Moghul
Empire.

The Empress
of India,
1877.

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
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



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